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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION  
The proliferation of logistics alliances has continued to grow (Daugherty, 2011; Stank et al., 
2011), due to ongoing deregulation (reflected in more than 400 free trade agreements 
nowadays) (Escaith and Maurer, 2014), globalization (continuous growth of world trade 
volume) (WTO, 2015) and geographic coverage (Ghemawat and Altman, 2014)), increasingly 
demanding customers (Hertz, 2001), and the constant pressure for efficiency improvements in 
logistics operations (Bowersox et al., 2007). Logistics alliances are inter-firm partnerships in 
which supply chain entities, such as buyers, suppliers, third-party providers and customers, 
share resources, information and risks in order to accomplish common goals (Min et al., 2005) 
for mutual competitive advantages (Hofenk et al., 2011; Mentzer et al., 2000). Logistics 
alliances gained attention due to the outsourcing trend of logistics activities in the 1980s and 
1990s (Bowersox, 1990). By letting Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) perform the logistics 
services on behalf of the shipper, these logistics alliances allow for cost reductions 
(inventory/storage), increased flexibility towards demand fluctuations, improved quality of 
customer service (Bowersox, 1990), and reduced capital investment (Daugherty, 2011; 
Frankel and Whipple, 1996b; Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2003). Every second Logistics Service 
Provider already engages in a logistics partnership (either vertical or horizontal) (Anonymous, 
2015: 9). Empirical studies indicate that vertical logistics alliances allow for logistics cost 
reduction of 9%, inventory cost reduction of 5% and fixed logistics cost reduction of 15%, as 
well as improvements in their order fill rate and order accuracy (Long, 2015). Recently, 
logistics alliances between two or more LSPs gain more and more importance in practice as 
LSPs need to face increasing competition, lower inventory levels and customer demands for 
higher service levels (Cruijssen et al., 2007b) on a global scale (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 
2011). Allied LSPs strive for efficiency gains, service improvements and better market 
  
 
2 
positions through resource, information, and cost sharing among themselves (Cruijssen et al., 
2007b). In the German logistics industry every second LSP (almost 60%) is engaged in at 
least one horizontal partnership (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011).  
While scholars have spent considerable efforts over the last decades studying vertical 
alliances from various angles (Grimm et al., 2015), i.e., by focusing on (a) their types and 
governance forms (Golicic et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 1996; Rogers and Daugherty, 1995; 
Tokman et al., 2007), (b) their performance impact factors (Frankel and Whipple, 1996a; 
Gibson et al., 2002; Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003) and (c) their outcomes (Ellram and Krause, 
1994; Goh and Uncles, 2003; Sjögren and Söderberg, 2011), the literature on horizontal 
alliances between LSPs is still in its infancy (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011). Pioneering studies in this area emphasized the identification of (a) 
potential cost savings based on analytical and simulation approaches (Chen and Chen, 2003; 
Park, 1997; Yan and Chen, 2007) and (b) performance impact factors based on econometric 
analyses (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). Despite the 
proliferation of logistics alliances (Daugherty, 2011; Stank et al., 2011), a large percentage of 
logistics alliances have difficulties in meeting partners’ expectations (Midoro and Pitto, 2000; 
Min et al., 2005) and may even be considered failures (Kampstra et al., 2006; Stank, 2011; 
Wilding and Humphries, 2006). For example, according to Dittmann et al. (2010), “successful 
collaborative relationships between a firm and its core suppliers are still rare”; this is reflected 
in the fact that almost 70 percent of strategic alliances fail (Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003). 
This failure rate remains surprisingly high and not entirely explained in literature. Major gaps 
remain in our understanding and explanation of logistics alliances and their evolution (both 
success and failure). There are a number of reasons for these gaps, including incomplete 
alliance models offered by the nascent logistics discipline (Daugherty, 2011), logistics 
scholars’ hesitancy to embrace recent approaches in the general management and strategy 
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literatures (Cheng and Grimm, 2006; Grimm et al., 2015), a lack of practical knowledge on 
how to manage logistics alliances successfully (Lambert et al., 1999), and limited interest in 
cooperation related pitfalls and risks (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Lambert et al., 1999; Zineldin 
and Bredenlow, 2003). Min et al. (2005) consider logistics alliances to “have great potential, 
but further investigation is needed to understand its practical value” (Min et al., 2005: 238). 
Given the wide acknowledgement and increasing importance of logistics alliances (both 
vertical and horizontal) on the one hand, but their well-established diagnosis of high failure 
rate on the other hand, this development raises questions as to why some firms are more 
successful in logistics alliances than others. This thesis addresses the central theme of 
effective logistics alliance management based on three central research questions:   
(1) What are the performance impact factors of logistics alliances, and how do these 
factors facilitate effective alliance management? 
(2) How can firms develop logistics alliance management capability to secure an effective 
and successful management of logistics alliances over time? 
(3) What are reasons of alliance failure? And how can firms prevent alliance failure and 
improve logistics alliance performance?  
To elaborate the current understanding and explanation of both logistics alliance management 
and failure, this thesis builds on four independent research studies. (1) The first study 
(Chapter 2) consolidates and synthesizes the current research on logistics alliances. It provides 
a systematic overview on performance impact factors, and managerial levers for alliance 
improvements. (2) The second study (Chapter 3) incorporates promising theoretical 
approaches (namely the dynamic capability construct) (Schilke, 2014; Schilke, 2010; Teece, 
2007) from strategic management and organization research fields into the logistics (alliance) 
scholarship. This study provides a promising approach for gaining new insights into logistics 
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alliance management and evolution. Based on a case analysis employing the qualitative 
method of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), (3) the third study (Chapter 4) 
explores the dynamics of logistics alliance failure and its underlying mechanisms to better 
understand and explain logistics alliance failures. Referring to the same case study and 
research design as in the third research work, (4) the fourth study (Chapter 5) elaborates on 
the exploration of dynamic logistics alliance management capabilities to shed light on their 
constitutive routines and their impact on the evolution of a firm’s logistics alliances. 
Each of these four research studies aims to improve our understanding on logistics alliances 
and to shed light on its management and evolution which help firms to prevent failure and 
improve logistics alliance performances. Thereby, this thesis adds to the current 
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of logistics alliances and thus contributes 
to the existing logistics alliance scholarship. The introduction proceeds as follows: first, 
logistics alliances are explained to provide a sound understanding of the phenomenon under 
study. In the following section, the outline of the thesis is described along the four constitutive 
papers (research objectives, methods, results) emphasizing their individual contributions, but 
also their overall common relation to the topic of logistics alliance management and 
evolution. The concluding remarks in the final section incorporate the key results of the 
thesis, research limitations and an outlook on future research opportunities. 
1.2 LOGISTICS ALLIANCES  
The logistics literature approaches the cooperation phenomenon through various theoretical 
perspectives and terminologies, as chronologically reviewed by Daugherty (2011). Even 
though a common definition is lacking, there is consensus in describing logistics alliances as 
long-term (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Gentry, 1996; Nyaga and 
Whipple, 2011; Park et al., 2003; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012) and voluntary (Park 
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et al., 2003; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) relationships between two or more independent 
actors of a supply chain. Since the 1980s logistics alliances have continuously gained in 
importance (both in practice and academia) as they are a promising alternative way (besides 
organic growth and Mergers and Acquisitions) for organizations to grow, meet customer 
demands (speed, reach, quality) and to increase efficiency of logistics services (Bowersox, 
1990; Daugherty, 2011; Ellram and Martha, 1990; Hertz, 2001). Thereby, logistics services 
involve not only the management of the spatial and temporal transfer of these goods, but also 
a wide range of related services associated with order processes, inventory management, 
transportation, handling, facility network management, and information management 
(Bowersox et al., 2007). Recently, value-added services, supply chain management, and 
financial services have complemented these traditional logistics functions (Carbone and 
Stone, 2005; Delfmann et al., 2002). LSPs are “companies which perform logistics activities 
on behalf of others” (Delfmann et al., 2002: 204) either completely or partly.  
Following this LSP perspective, logistics alliances are either formed vertically between 
buyers – typically original equipment manufacturers or retailers and LSPs – or horizontally 
between LSPs to perform logistics activities for the shipper (Bagchi and Virum, 1998). 
Vertical logistics alliances are “long-term formal or informal relationship[s] between shippers 
and logistics providers to render all or a considerable number of logistics activities for the 
shipper” (Bagchi and Virum, 1998). Such partnerships are also known under the terms of 
third-party logistics, or contract logistics (Delfmann et al., 2002a; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; 
Sink et al., 1996). Through the integration of the LSP in a shipper’s business and processes, 
such partnerships reduce operating costs, increase scope and quality of services (Kleinsorge et 
al., 1991; Slack et al., 2002), and provide more general competitive advantages (Cruijssen et 
al., 2007a; Mentzer et al., 2000; Zinn and Parasuraman, 1997) through co-specialization, 
synergies, and share of complementary resources and competencies (Bagchi and Virum, 
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1998). In comparison, horizontal logistics alliances are “voluntarily initiated, long-term 
relationships among autonomous LSPs that … strive for benefits that could not be achieved 
by the individual companies alone” (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012: 54). These 
partnerships may occur either within or across different types of LSPs – such as contract 
logistics firms, forwarders, and transportation or courier, express and parcel carriers. Through 
the pooling and leveraging of partners’ resources and competencies (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011), involved LSPs strive for efficiency gains, service improvements and 
better market positioning (Cruijssen et al., 2007b). Thereby, logistics alliances gain 
acceptance as promising growth strategies among LSPs next to mergers and acquisitions 
(Carbone and Stone, 2005).  
The critical point of logistics alliances is that LSPs interact directly in their operations 
processes with both buyers (here called shippers) and customers (in so called service triads 
(Wynstra et al., 2015)). LSPs act as the third player in the logistics network of shippers and 
customers (see Figure 1 form (a)). The partnering LSP needs to secure an effective access and 
use of both shippers’ and customers’ inputs to deliver logistics services in the expected 
manner. This requires an alignment of data and information exchange and customization of 
operational processes depending on the logistics services performed.  
Figure 1 Forms of logistics alliances  
 
LSP1
LSP2
Customer
(a)
LSP1 LSP2 Customer
(b)
Shipper
LSP
Customer
(c)
Vertical Horizontal
Shipper
Shipper
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In contrast to these vertical logistics alliances and many other kinds of alliances or service 
triads, the critical point in horizontal logistics alliances is that the allied LSPs act together as 
the third player in the logistics network of shippers and customers. The point of contact 
between shipper and customer may either be located at one LSP or shared among the allied 
LSPs (see Figure 1 form (b) and (c)). In any case, the allied LSPs need to secure access and 
share of data and information among all involved parties (shipper, customer and LSPs) to 
deliver reliable and competitive logistics services. This exchange usually requires common or 
at least aligned information and technology systems among allied LSPs to realize an effective 
exchange and common use of complex data and information among independent LSPs. In 
addition, also to other service triads (Wynstra et al., 2015), allied LSPs need to align their 
specific operations processes, such as i.e.. their handling processes, products and quality 
standards to secure common, seamless and effective services to their customers.  
These critical points play an important role especially in horizontal logistics alliances with 
shared contact points (see form (c) in Figure 1). In this situation, the partnering LSPs depend 
mutually on their data/information exchange and their seamless operational processes. LSP1 
need to make sure that its alliance partner LSP2 receives all necessary data and information 
from the shipper, and that their operational processes are effectively coordinated. Only then, 
LSP2 is able to deliver the expected services to the customer. The higher the complexity of 
jointly performed logistics services is, the greater the need for significant partner integration 
(and maybe even for anti-trust immunity). The performance, reputation and success of allied 
LSPs depend on the effectiveness of their interactions, both in terms of their data/information 
exchange and their operational process alignment. However, this process-related expertise lies 
at the heart of LSPs’ competitive advantages (Wagner, 2008). Thus, the sharing of this 
expertise with partnering LSPs (who usually remain competitors on other markets) raises 
significant concerns and threats. The trade-off between necessary partner integration and 
  
 
8 
share of expertise to maximize and capitalize logistics alliance opportunities causes 
significant challenges to the management of logistics alliances, i.e. of horizontal LSP 
alliances.  
Logistics alliances are traditionally conceptualized in a rather reductionist manner, with two 
distinct components. First, the governance structure that varies between the two extremes of 
transactional- and partnership-based (cooperative) agreements (Daugherty, 2011; Lambert et 
al., 1999). These structural differences are reflected, for example, in formal versus informal 
governance mechanisms (Frankel and Whipple, 1996b) or legal forms (Evangelista and 
Morvillo, 1999). Second, the relationship intensity (Gardner et al., 1994) mapped along a 
continuum between operational and strategic partnerships (Lambert et al., 1999). To measure 
intensity, various scholars have examined the scope of integrated activities (Chen and Chen, 
2003; Mortensen and Lemoine, 2008; Stefansson, 2006); the level of trust, interaction 
frequency, and commitment (Rinehart et al., 2004); and the extent of trust, conflict, 
investments and adaptations, and personal friendship (Panayides and Gray, 1999). Only 
recently have scholars more prominently advocated for the systematic exploration of logistics 
alliances’ multidimensional nature, such as in Schmoltzi and Wallenburg’s (2011) analysis of 
horizontal alliances. Their empirical analysis, which provided a structural architecture of 
horizontal LSP alliances including their contractual, organizational, functional, geographical, 
service, and resource scope, contributed to a more precise and diversified understanding of 
logistics alliances and thus, development of additional managerial initiatives. 
1.3 OUTLINE  
This thesis brings together four research studies. While these studies represent individual 
research essays, they contribute both individually as well as in an integrative manner to the 
overall topic of logistics alliance management and evolution. The structure of this thesis 
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evolves as follows: I first provide a brief outlook into the four research studies emphasizing 
(a) their specific research questions and aims, (b) the applied research design, and (c) the core 
research results and contributions relevant for both research and practice (an overview over 
the paper status is provided in Table 1). Afterwards, I provide some concluding remarks 
regarding the key contributions of this thesis, its limitations and an outlook for future 
research. The main chapters (2, 3, 4, and 5) consist of the respective independent papers 
outlined previously, which can be read separately.  
Table 1 Paper overview and status 
Article and Title Co-Authors Journal Status Ranking 
1 Effective Logistics 
Alliance Design and 
Management 
S. Albers International Journal 
of Physical 
Distribution and 
Logistics Management 
(IJPDLM) 
Accepted for 
publication: 
IJPDLM, 
Vol:46, Issue 
2, 2015 
5Year Impact 
Factor
1
: 2.874 
VHB JQ3
2
: B 
 
2 Logistics alliance 
management 
capabilities: where are 
they? 
W. 
Delfmann;  
S. Albers 
International Journal 
of Physical 
Distribution and 
Logistics Management 
(IJPDLM) 
Published:  
IJPDLM, 
Vol:43, Issue 
7, p.529-543, 
2013 
5Year Impact 
Factor
1
: 2.874 
VHB JQ3
2
: B 
 
3 The dynamics of LSP 
alliance failures: a 
grounded theory 
approach 
none Journal of Operations 
Management 
Resubmission  5Year Impact 
Factor
1
: 7.692 
VHB JQ3
2
: A 
 
4 Unpacking Dynamic 
Alliance Management 
Capability: a grounded 
theory approach 
none Academy of 
Management, Annual 
Meeting 2014 
Accepted as 
Conference 
paper and 
presented in 
Operations 
Management 
Division 
 
  
                                                          
1 Web of Science 5 year impact factor (in Oct., 2015) 
2 Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. (VHB): Journal Ranking VHB-JOURQUAL3 (in 
Oct., 2015) 
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Paper 1: Effective Logistics Alliance Design and Management 
The first step towards a better understanding and explanation of logistics alliances and their 
evolution is to systematically consolidate and synthesize the extant scholarship on logistics 
alliances. Arguing that the extant body of scholarly works on logistics alliances has resulted in 
a multitude of heterogeneous contributions, the paper consolidates and systematizes the 
current knowledge on effective design and management of logistics alliances. Based on a 
systematic literature review we collect, assess and consolidate relevant literature of both 
horizontal and vertical logistics alliances and their respective (hitherto mainly independent) 
research streams to provide a comprehensive picture of LSP alliance design and management.  
The paper aims to (a) synthesize the existing findings in a meaningful way and guide future 
research for effective design and management; and (b) improve logistics alliance performance 
in practice. As a result, this study categorizes the logistics literature on vertical and horizontal 
alliances into four key areas: (1) alliance composition, (2) alliance structure, (3) operational 
process design, and (4) relational behavior. This categorization allows for a structured 
consolidation of key performance impact factors, their sub-constructs and performance effects 
of logistics alliances. As these results are specified to the context of logistics alliances they 
allow for a structured identification of implications for both research and practice. The 
developed research agenda provides concrete research opportunities in four directions: 
horizontal logistics alliances; vertical logistics alliances; transfer of new research streams into 
the context of logistics alliances; and the incorporation of impediments and negative effects. 
Based on the consolidated research results, the paper provides guidance for managers looking 
to establish or adapt logistics alliance structures and management systems. In addition to 
practical implications, the consolidation of key performance impact factors on logistics 
alliances (both vertical and horizontal) provides a platform for further research. The 
developed agenda offers specific research opportunities to improve our understanding of 
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logistics alliance performance. The following three papers of this thesis build on these 
research opportunities identified, systematically addressing major research gaps in current 
logistics alliance literature.  
Paper 2: Logistics alliance management capabilities: where are they? 
Given the continued high failure rate of logistics alliances, the second paper proposes to 
incorporate the so far widely neglected dynamic capabilities approach into the explanation of 
logistics alliance performance. Based on (a) the dynamic capabilities approach of strategic 
management on the one hand, and (b) the identification of specific characteristics of logistics 
alliances on the other hand, a three-dimensional framework of Logistics Alliance 
Management Capability (LAMC) is argumentatively developed. The three layers of the 
LAMC model are: (1) operational logistics activities (micro-level) that deal with the 
execution of joint (alliance) logistics processes; (2) logistics alliance management routines 
(macro-level), which ensure effective alliance management and, therefore, alliance 
performance; and (3) learning mechanisms (meta-level) that aim to improve the firm’s 
logistics alliance management routines continuously over time. Through this three-
dimensional model, the paper results reflect structurally the idiosyncrasies and management 
challenges of logistics alliances: (1) the need for partner integration, i.e. to secure effective 
data/information exchange and joint coordination (macro-level). (2) The alignment of 
operational processes for efficient, seamless logistics activities (micro-level). In addition, (3) 
the results indicate the need for continuous learning to improve current and/or future logistics 
alliances (meta level). While the capabilities on micro and macro-level are very specific to the 
design and management of logistics alliances, the third capability “learning mechanisms” is 
applicable to any alliances. However, the content of what to learn varies again according to 
the specific alliance context, here to logistics alliances.  
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Overall, the developed LAMC model illustrates how LAMC can explain improved logistics 
alliance success and contributes to the logistics literature by making a more general yet 
established construct of dynamic capabilities accessible to logistics scholars and practitioners. 
Thereby, the framework provides a valuable starting point for a wider range of empirical 
studies. Further research is encouraged either in the form of qualitative studies by elaborating 
on, e.g., the specification and understanding of the sub-processes that underlie logistics 
alliance management capabilities in different alliance settings, or in the form of quantitative 
investigations in order to reliably assess the differences and performance implications of these 
capabilities. In addition, the developed conceptualization of LAMC helps managers in their 
relevant strategic and organizational attempts to enhance logistics alliance success. Overall, 
this paper adds to the current logistics literature by introducing a more general yet established 
construct accessible to logistics scholars and practitioners. Building on the concept of 
dynamic capabilities, this logistics alliance management capability construct provides a new 
framework that is potentially more comprehensive than the collection of somewhat isolated 
alliance success factors that have hitherto been proposed in the logistics literature. 
Paper 3: The dynamics of LSP alliance failures: a grounded theory approach 
Given the high failure rate of strategic alliances, also in the context of logistics, the third 
paper explores the drivers and their underlying mechanisms of logistics alliance failure. The 
aim of this paper is to gain insights into these dynamics of LSP alliance failure (Cruijssen et 
al., 2007b; Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003) in order to prevent future failures and improve 
alliance performance. To gain new insights into the so far underexplored process of logistics 
alliance failure, the study builds on a case analysis, employing the qualitative method of 
grounded theory, which allows for a purposeful investigation of processes and their evolving 
nature. The research results indicate that alliances between Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) 
fail due to an iterative self-enforcing process. This evolutionary process is marked by four 
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specific phases, which finally result in alliance failure: (1) limiting alliance setup, (2) inferior 
alliance structure, (3) non-satisfactory performance, and (4) alliance stagnation. The 
underlying mechanisms that drive LSP alliances through these four stages towards failure 
consist of: (a) low partner dependence, (b) a lack of benefit allocation, (c) non-agreement on 
adaptations, and (d) a lack of alliance value. These four drivers emerge due to the specificities 
of horizontal LSPs alliances: (1) need of (commercial) dependence and/or formalized benefit 
allocation to handle LSPs’ independence, competitive relation and secure their alliance 
commitment over time. The generation of (tangible) alliance benefits increases the likelihood 
of (2) the required partner integration based on process/system harmonization required for 
effective, seamless operation processes among allied LSPs. The dynamic of this self-
enforcing failure process emerges because limitations in the alliance setup and structure cause 
non-satisfactory performance. The dissatisfaction reduces the likelihood of LSPs’ agreement 
on significant alliance adaptations. This limited alliance adaptability, however, fails to 
improve future alliance execution and performance, leading finally to alliance failure. The 
study develops an initialprocess-based conceptualization of LSP alliance failure. Thereby, it 
offers new and valuable insights into the so far black box  of alliance failure, which add to the 
current understanding and management of logistics alliances. The research results, including 
the failure dynamics and their underlying mechanisms, provide a promising basis for further 
research. In addition, the identification and explanations of failure drivers help managers to 
develop concrete managerial implications in order to prevent failure and improve logistics 
alliance performance.  
Paper 4: Unpacking Dynamic Alliance Management Capability: a grounded theory 
approach 
While existing literature acknowledges the importance of dynamic alliance management 
capabilities (DAMC) for a firm’s alliance success and competitive advantage, existing 
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scholars have failed so far in explaining how DAMC work and why some firms are more 
successful with their deployment than others. Applying the qualitative method of grounded 
theory, this study explores alliance management capabilities understood as specific dynamic 
capability reflected in the continuous development, reflection and reconfiguration of alliance 
management processes in response to changes and/or to shape situations. The study proposes 
a first conceptualization of DAMC in the context of multilateral alliance management based 
on four constitutive routines: (1) coordination, (2) proactiveness, (3) mobilization and (4) 
transformation. Applying a dynamic view on the processes and conditions underlying DAMC 
routines, the research results allow firms to develop and deploy alliance capability in order to 
generate competitive advantages. The study provides new and valuable insights into the 
process of DAMC adding to our current understanding of both (dynamic) alliance 
management capability and logistics alliance management. In addition, the results offer 
valuable and useful insights into the motivations and practical challenges in such strategic 
alliances and their evolution towards helping managers in improving alliance performance.  
Overall, the thesis incorporates four independent research studies. Each of these research 
studies addresses major shortcomings in logistics alliance literature. Their individual research 
results contribute to our existing understanding and explanation of an effective logistics 
alliance management. By focusing on performance impact factors and/or on alliance 
management capabilities, the conducted studies help to prevent alliance failure and to improve 
alliance performance.  
1.4 CONCLUSION  
This thesis provides a comprehensive account of logistics alliances (both vertical and 
horizontal). Thereby, this thesis adds to our understanding and explanation of logistics 
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alliances and their performance. More specifically, it contributions to the logistics alliances 
scholarship in three ways: 
(1) Explanation of performance impact factors of logistics alliances: Using evidence 
from both existing research on logistics alliances (systematic literature review) and 
from an explorative case study (grounded theory), this thesis adds to our 
understanding and explanation of performance impacts factors which drive logistics 
alliance evolution (both success and failure). These findings build a comprehensive 
platform for further research and provide organizations concrete managerial 
implications for logistics alliance improvements.  
(2) Introduction of new theoretical constructs: As the theoretical concept of dynamic 
alliance management capability has gained importance in both strategic management 
and organization science over the last decade to explain alliance performance, we see 
considerable potentials in introducing this concept into the research field of logistics 
alliances. Based on a conceptual application and empirical investigation, this thesis 
provides initial and valuable frameworks of logistics alliance management capability, 
which shed lights on its constitutive routines and impacts on logistics alliance 
performance. Thereby, this thesis adds to our explanation of logistics alliance 
performances and provides a valuable platform for further research and managerial 
implications in this area.  
(3) Providing empirical validation based on an in-depth case study of a multilateral LSP 
alliance. Applying the qualitative method of grounded theory, this study is the first to 
explore the failure process of logistics alliances. This empirical analysis of dynamics 
and underlying mechanisms provides unique insights into the evolutionary process of 
alliance failure. The process-based conceptualization of logistics alliance failure 
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provides valuable insights into the so far black box  of logistics alliance failure and 
presents relevant managerial levers for real-world applications.  
Limitations: Although this thesis contributes to our understanding and explanation of 
logistics alliances, it has some limitations. The analysis follows an in-depth case-study 
research design applying the qualitative method of grounded theory (see Study 3 and 4) 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1968). I intentionally selected this methodology in order to (a) gain 
concrete, practical insights into the specific process of logistics alliance failure, and (b) 
capture the dynamic nature of logistics alliances. I acknowledge the limited reliability and 
external validity of my findings due to the focus on a single case study within a specific 
context, however, my findings nonetheless contribute to the existing knowledge by providing 
new insights that are useful for theory-building (Flyvbjerg, 2006). While in-depth case-study 
research provides a valuable path to gain and accumulate knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 
2014), grounded theory is particularly useful for (a) generating deep insights from practical 
examples and (b) investigating the dynamic nature of processes. Grounded theory gains 
attention in supply chain research as it allows the investigation of inter-organizational systems 
(such as alliances) as a whole, in the context of modern supply chain complexity (Randall and 
Mello, 2012). Thus, the knowledge generated in this thesis provides new insights, which add 
to our understanding and explanation of alliance evolution in the context of logistics. 
Outlook for further research: The thesis provides concrete research opportunities in the 
field of logistics alliances in two ways. First, based on the results of the systematic literature 
review (Paper 1), concrete research avenues are developed in the field of both horizontal and 
vertical logistics alliances. Second, the research results act as a promising starting-point for 
further investigation and elaboration of my findings. Given the in-depth case-study research 
design focusing on a specific industry context, future research could emphasize more 
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extensive studies in other industry settings to test the generalizability of my research results. 
Thereby, future research could examine the variations of these impact factors and their 
interplay within different alliance contexts. By focusing on the so far under-investigated 
research field of alliance pitfalls and failure, future research could explore the contingencies 
under which logistics alliances become an asset or a liability. Overall, the thesis provides a 
comprehensive foundation for further research to explore factors and processes that impact 
the logistics alliance evolution and value creation.   
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2. EFFECTIVE LOGISTICS ALLIANCE DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
Purpose: We argue that the productive analyses of logistics alliances in the 
literature have led to a multitude of heterogeneous contributions. These should be 
consolidated and systematized in order to (a) synthesize the existing findings in a 
meaningful way and guide future research for effective design and management; 
and (b) improve logistics alliance performance in practice. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use a systematic literature review to screen 
and consolidate current knowledge on effective design and management of 
logistics alliances.  
Findings: This article categorizes the logistics literature on vertical and horizontal 
alliances into four key areas in order to systematically consolidate key 
performance factors, their sub-constructs and performance effects to identify 
implications for both research and practice. 
Research implications: Within our research agenda, we develop concrete 
research opportunities in four areas: horizontal logistics alliances; vertical 
logistics alliances; transfer of new research streams into the context of logistics 
alliances; and the incorporation of impediments and negative effects.  
Practical implications: By consolidating existing research results, we provide 
guidance for managers looking to establish or adapt logistics alliance structures 
and management systems.  
Originality/value: The consolidation of key performance impact factors on 
logistics alliances (both vertical and horizontal) provides a platform for further 
research. The developed agenda offers specific research opportunities to improve 
our understanding of logistics alliance performance. 
Keywords: Strategic alliances, logistics (business), collaboration, cooperation, 
3PL, Logistics Service Providers, Literature review 
Type of paper: Literature review 
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2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the proliferation of logistics alliances (Daugherty, 2011; Stank et al., 2011), many do 
not meet the partners’ expectations and may even be considered failures (Kampstra et al., 
2006; Stank et al., 2011; Wilding and Juriado, 2004). Logistics scholars have spent 
considerable efforts to explain why some logistics alliances are successful, while others are 
not. However, major gaps remain in our understanding of these arrangements. There are a 
number of reasons for these gaps, including incomplete alliance models offered by the nascent 
logistics discipline (Daugherty, 2011), a lack of practical knowledge on how to manage 
logistics alliances successfully (Lambert et al., 1999), and limited interest in cooperation 
related pitfalls and risks (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Lambert et al., 1999; Zineldin and 
Bredenlow, 2003). An additional explanation for these perceived gaps could be the sheer 
quantity and variety of contributions, which are often based on the heterogeneous usage of 
terms, constructs, and theories that follow different methodologies and research traditions. 
Although this variety and heterogeneity can be enriching, it can also hinder progress. One step 
towards a better understanding of logistics alliances is to systematize and consolidate extant 
scholarship to offer a platform for more targeted research.  
This paper provides a systematic literature review in order to comprehensively 
identify, assess, and synthesize current knowledge on logistics alliances design and 
management. We have analyzed scholarly work on both vertical and horizontal logistics 
alliances. Logistics alliances are understood here as formalized, long-term, cooperative 
relationships between at least one logistics service provider (LSP) and other legally 
independent actors in a supply chain for mutual competitive advantage. The specific analysis 
and consolidation of both horizontal and vertical logistics alliances and their respective 
(hitherto mainly independent) research streams provides a comprehensive picture of LSP 
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alliance design and management. In particular, it allows to identify and develop concrete 
research avenues that draw from the cross-fertilization between vertical and horizontal 
logistics alliance literatures. Our results are likely to have direct and indirect impacts on 
practice logistics management. The direct impact is that consolidated research results enable 
practitioners to gauge research results and derive meaningful managerial implications. The 
indirect impact is that our review results can spur additional research with particular 
managerial relevance in logistics alliance management and design. 
We acknowledge and complement existing logistics and supply chain literature 
reviews in various ways. Our review and consolidation systematizes the comprehensive 
findings on logistics alliances management and design in order to go beyond a chronological 
review of value creation in buyer-supplier relationships (Mentzer et al., 2008). It extends both 
Daugherty’s (2011) evolutionary overview of research topics and the trends and future 
directions found in Stank et al. (2011). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start by briefly summarizing the 
understanding and scholarly treatment of logistics alliances, both vertical and horizontal. We 
then explain the literature review approach and provide a structured presentation of the review 
results along four broad research foci. Based on these results, we identify further research 
avenues with which to address major gaps in logistics alliance research and management. 
 
2.3 LOGISTICS ALLIANCES AND LSP 
Despite the lack of a common definition of logistics alliances, there is consensus in terms of 
describing logistics alliances as long-term (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; 
Gentry, 1996b; Nyaga and Whipple, 2011; Nyaga et al., 2010; Park, 2003; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011, 2012) and voluntary (Parket al., 2003; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) 
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relationships between two or more independent actors of a supply chain. We understand 
logistics alliances as formalized long-term, cooperative relationships between at least one 
logistics service provider (LSP) and other legally independent actors in a supply chain striving 
for mutual competitive advantage. LSPs are “companies which perform logistics activities on 
behalf of others” (Delfmann; et al., 2002: 204). From an LSP perspective, such logistics 
alliances can either be horizontal (LSP with other LSP) or vertical (LSP with client). Both 
types of alliance have attracted substantial attention in the logistics literature.  
Vertical logistics alliances are “long-term formal or informal relationship[s] between 
shippers and logistics providers to render all or a considerable number of logistics activities 
for the shipper” (Bagchi and Virum, 1998). Research on these arrangements developed as a 
response to the increasing outsourcing of logistics functions to LSP in the 1980s. Outsourcing 
was seen as an adequate response to meet the increasing customer demands for speed, reach, 
quality, and affordability of logistics services (Daugherty, 2011; Ellram and Cooper, 1990). 
Since then, vertical alliances among supply chain actors, such as manufacturers, suppliers, 
retailers and customers and LSPs, have become increasingly important (Bowersox et al., 
2000; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Daugherty, 2011). One rationale underlying this trend is that 
outsourcing allows clients to focus on their core assets and activities, thereby enhancing their 
productivity and service levels (Daugherty, 2011; Kleinsorge, 1991; Slack, 2002). These 
advantages emerge due to specialization and size effects for LSPs in general; specifically, 
their process-related expertise (Wagner, 2008) and the opportunity for them to consolidate 
shipments and services.  
Many studies have investigated the drivers (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Lambert et al., 
1999), types (Gardner et al., 1994; Rogers and Daugherty, 1995) and success factors (Gibson 
et al., 2002; Lambert et al., 1999; Tate, 1996) of vertical alliances. This vibrant and fertile 
research activity has led to a wide yet insular knowledge base with sometimes contradicting 
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results and implications, which have left future researchers and practitioners puzzled about 
how to effectively design and manage such alliances.  
With regard to horizontal logistics alliances, extant research can be laid out quite 
differently. Horizontal logistics alliances are “voluntarily initiated, long-term relationships 
among autonomous LSPs that operate on the same stage of the supply chain …[and] strive for 
benefits that could not be achieved by the individual companies alone” (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012: 54). These benefits are realized through the pooling and leveraging of 
partner’s resources and competencies (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) in order to achieve 
efficiency gains and to extend their service portfolio. Some logistics alliances put greater 
emphasis on efficiency gains through cost reductions and increased productivity; for example, 
through better asset utilization and reduction of empty mileage (Cruijssen et al., 2007b), while 
for others, the broadening of their members’ service portfolios via the combination of 
complementary assets is the primary raison d’être.3 In any case, horizontal LSP alliances are 
highly fragile as the independence of, and rivalry among, partnering LSPs increases the threat 
of opportunistic behavior as well as the alliance management complexity (Cruijssen et al., 
2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). 
Research on horizontal alliances between LSP remains in its infancy (Cruijssen et al., 
2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). Pioneering studies in this area have had two main 
aims: (a) to identify potential cost savings based on analytical and simulation approaches, and 
(b) to identify performance impact factors based on econometric analyses (Cruijssen et al., 
2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). 
Therefore, for logistics alliances in general, we observe two different research streams 
that have been developing largely independently from each other.
4
 This isolation would not be 
                                                          
3 The logistics literature has tended to focus on the former, as our review will illustrate. 
4
 This phenomenon is not specific to the logistics field, as Belderbos et al. suggested: “vertical and horizontal 
alliances have both been the subject of investigation in prior research, but the two streams of literature appear to 
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problematic if it were justified by substantial and relevant differences in the object of inquiry. 
We argue that -- while there are major differences between horizontal and vertical logistics 
alliances -- these differences do not justify the relative isolation of their research streams that 
has marked the field to date, especially with regard to questions of logistics alliance design 
and management. The major conceptual differences between vertical and horizontal logistics 
alliances are delineated below.
5
 
Motivation: Vertical and horizontal logistics alliances are seen to differ in terms of the 
reasons for their foundation and in terms of the primary beneficiary of the alliance’s success. 
Vertical logistics alliances (that is, alliances between LSP and their clients
6
) are formed 
primarily to enhance productivity and services for the client. This clear client focus as a 
shared goal helps to align interests among partnering firms. Such a shared goal is less 
prominent in horizontal alliances which emphasize efficiency increases and/or improved 
service offerings for each individual LSP
7
 through the alliance.  
Nature of the relationship: Vertical and horizontal alliances differ in the nature of the 
relationship between partnering firms. Vertical relations between client and LSP build on a 
clear differentiation of assets, capabilities and purpose of each partner, as they are active on 
different stages in the supply chain. The immediate threat that the one party will “take over” 
the client of the other is minimal. This is different for horizontal LSP alliances, where partners 
are competitors and each partner could – in principle – also serve its partner’s clients. 
Relationships in horizontal LSP alliances are therefore marked by an increased threat of 
opportunism.  
Interdependence: Vertical alliances are characterized by resource interdependence 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
have developed in relative isolation” (Belderbos et al., 2012: 1818). 
5
 Analogous to Rindfleisch’s (2002) view on buyer-supplier relationships, we identified key differences between 
vertical and horizontal logistics alliances capturing their respective idiosyncrasies. 
6 
The term client is used throughout this paper to describe any partnering supply chain actors, such as buyers, 
manufacturers, suppliers, retailers, or customers.  
7 
The term LSP is used throughout this paper to describe the provider of logistics services, such as carriers, and 
Third Party Logistics (3PL). 
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among partners based on the complementary nature of their resources and competences 
(Gulati, 1995). Partnering LSP, on the other hand, are quite independent of each other’s 
resources to perform in business. As the extent of dependence determines the commitment of 
involved parties towards the alliance (Lambert et al., 1999; Makukha and Gray, 2004), the 
low degree of interdependence in horizontal alliances increases the risk that rivalry and 
opportunistic behavior will impair alliance stability (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012).  
Although these differences are substantial, they are also well-defined. Horizontal and 
vertical logistics alliances actually share a variety of commonalities that suggest the 
usefulness of a wide array of results across the direction of the cooperative relationship. 
Common to both streams are the particular industry context, the pivotal role of LSP as 
alliance partners, and the specific type of interorganizational relationships 
(cooperation/alliances) that they investigate. We argue that despite the important differences, 
the shared foundations of logistics alliance research have resulted in a large yet untapped pool 
of results that is relevant to both streams. Therefore, our literature review helps to bridge these 
streams by simultaneously increasing their specificity and relevance. We do this by presenting 
the results of our comprehensive review along four distinct areas that apply to both horizontal 
and vertical logistics alliances and thereby stress their commonalities, which are: (1) alliance 
composition, (2) alliance structure, (3) relational behavior, and (4) operational process design. 
We present the findings of the literature streams on horizontal and vertical logistics alliances 
separately along these four areas, and then juxtapose the different approaches, topics, and 
results for the two streams in order to finally offer, in the final section of the paper, our cross-
fertilizing synthesis that emerges when comparing these different foci.  
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2.4 METHODOLOGY: REVIEW SCOPE AND SELECTION CRITERIA  
In order to arrive at a broad, comprehensive, and scholarly relevant literature basis for our 
analysis, we reviewed high-ranking academic journals with primary domains of logistics, 
operations management, and supply chain management (Mentzer et al., 2008). The focus on 
these domains enabled us to capture a broad scope of logistics scholarship along its functional 
(planning, controlling, and executing intra-functional activities), cross-functional (operations 
management), and cross-organizational management levels (SCM) (Mentzer et al., 2008). 
Because there is no global consensus regarding which logistics journals should be considered 
“top-tier,” we consolidated a list of 40 high-ranking journals based on three ranking systems 
that are widely acknowledged beyond their countries of origin. These are: (a) the Journal 
Citation Reports provided by Thomson Reuters, (b) the JourQual2 ranking published by the 
German Academic Association for Business Research, and (c) the logistics and transportation 
journal ranking from the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS) at the University 
of Sydney (see Table 2). Next, in keeping with Daugherty’s (2011) notional review on 
interfirm relations in logistics, we searched the article abstracts or topics (Web of Science) 
within the selected journals for the following terms: “alliance”, “partnership”, “collaboration”, 
“cooperation”, “joint venture” and “buyer-supplier relationship”. The search returned a total 
of 1,037 articles published between 1990 and 2012. To identify relevant articles on logistics 
alliances, we then defined and employed inclusion and exclusion criteria to analyze the 
articles’ titles and abstracts (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006; Tranfield et al., 2003). We included 
all articles that studied alliance design and management parameters and linked them to the 
explanation of logistics alliance performance. We excluded articles that studied (a) the choice 
of alternative governance options to alliances (for example, alliances vs. mergers and 
acquisitions), (b) relations with governmental actors or relations among geographically 
proximate but heterogeneous actors (as in urban studies), and (c) non-LSP relationships, such 
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as manufacturer–retailer relations.8 The first author performed the selection in this step, and 
the second author was consulted in cases of ambiguity and uncertainty (142 articles). Upon 
screening the full texts, both authors reached agreement on inclusion or exclusion from 
further analysis. As a result, a total of 48 articles were selected as relevant, which provided 
the basis for our review.  
In a fourth step, we reviewed these articles in depth, then consolidated and synthesized them 
using a data-extraction form (Carter and Ellram, 2003; Tranfield et al., 2003) structured 
around the research foci, including title, author, publication details, research focus, study type, 
methodology, sample, independent and dependent variables, findings, and implications.
9 
We 
also coded each study with keywords to identify emerging themes (Wassmer, 2010). Thus, we 
were able to systematically and visually record our narrative review process and extract the 
data from which our results emerged.  
Based on this systematic extraction, we made a differentiation between studies that focused 
on vertical alliances and studies that emphasized horizontal relationships; this was done in 
order to incorporate the respective idiosyncracies of these alliance types in logistics alliance 
design and management. Finally, we structured the identified research issues of both vertical 
and horizontal alliances along four main categories. The review results are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
                                                          
8 
We included all studies that included LSP at least as part of their sample of supply chain collaborators (as in: 
Fawcett et al., 2008; Fawcett et al., 2006; Zacharia et al., 2009). 
9
 The full table of analysis can be provided upon request.  
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Table 2 Journal selection and respective number of included articles 
Top-tier Journals  ITLS Journal Citation 
Reports   
Jour-
Qual2  
Article 
hits  
Article 
selected 
Accident Analysis and Prevention X     1 0 
Discrete Applied Mathematics      X 0 0 
Environment and Planning A X     0 0 
European Urban and Regional Studies X     35 0 
International Journal of Logistics Management X X   9 0 
International Journal of Logistics: Research and 
Applications 
X     32 3 
International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management   
  X   104 2 
International Journal of Physical Distribution and 
Logistics Management 
X X X 102 12 
International Journal of Shipping and Transport 
Logistics 
  X   3 0 
Journal of Business Logistics    X X 64 13 
Journal of Economic Geography X     13 0 
Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 
X     12 0 
Journal of Operations Management X X   62 2 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management     X   45 2 
Journal of Supply Chain Management    X X 41 3 
Journal of the American Planning Association X     30 0 
Journal of the Operational Research Society X     41 2 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy X     5 1 
Journal of Transportation Engineering X     3 0 
Journal of Urban Economics X     5 0 
Land Economics X     25 0 
Management Science X   X 101 0 
Maritime Policy & Management X     43 2 
Naval Research Logistics X     2 0 
Networks & Spatial Economics X     3 0 
Operations Research      X   28 0 
Production and Operations Management X     22 0 
Public Transport  X     0 0 
Regional Science and Urban Economics X     6 0 
Regional Studies X     101 0 
Supply Chain Management – An International 
Journal  
  X   14 0 
The Town planning review X     13 0 
Transportation  X     3 0 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice  X   X 19 0 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological X   X 5 0 
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging 
Technologies  
X     8 1 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment  
X     2 0 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics X   X 25 4 
Transportation Science  X   X 8 1 
Transportmetrica X     2 0 
Sum: 40 32 10 9 1037 48 
Selection criteria: ITLS (all journals (32) ranked in the top two categories (tiers 4 and 3) of the ITLS ranking 
(http://sydney.edu.au/business/itls/research/journal_rankings)); Journal Citation Reports (all journals from the Business and Management 
category maintaining either Logistics, Supply Chain Management or Operations Management in their title and with an impact factor > 1); 
JourQual2 (all A- and B-ranked logistics and transportation subset journals of the German JourQual2 ranking (Schrader and Hennig-Thurau, 
2009)
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2.5 REVIEW RESULTS ALONG THE KEY RESEARCH CATEGORIES 
Scholarly interest in logistics alliance design and management has increased in recent decades 
(see Figure 2). The number of articles on the subject indicates that it has drawn particularly 
high interest from the more strategy-oriented logistics journals (see Table 2). The majority of 
the selected studies have applied a quantitative research design (15 vertical, six horizontal 
logistics alliance articles). The next most common research designs were qualitative (10 
vertical), mixed quantitative and qualitative (four vertical), analytical (two vertical, six 
horizontal), and conceptual (three vertical, two horizontal) (see Table 3). 
Our review shows four main research areas across horizontal and vertical logistics alliances: 
(1) alliance composition, (2) alliance structure, (3) relational behavior, and (4) operational 
process design (see Figure 3). We elaborate on each of these four areas below; first in the 
context of vertical logistics alliance and then with a focus on horizontal logistics alliances.  
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Figure 2 Number of selected articles published per period in top-tier logistics journals 
(that fulfilled the search/selection criteria) 
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Table 3 Descriptive review results 
 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 2008-2012 Sum 
Unit of analysis: Vertical alliance 
Alliance size       
Bilateral 3 7 6 11 27 
Trilateral 1 2 1 - 4 
Multilateral - 1 1 1 3 
Not specified     - 
Sum 4 10 8 12 34 
Research methodology       
Conceptual 1 2 - - 3 
Analytical 1 - - - 1 
Survey 1 2 4 8 15 
Case study - 3 1 3 7 
Interviews/expert panel - 1 1 1 3 
Interviews/case study and 
survey 
1 2 1 - 4 
Sum      
Research foci      
Alliance composition - 5 4 5 14 
Alliance structure 2 6 5 3 16 
Relational behavior 1 4 3 5 13 
Operational process design 2 5 4 6 17 
Sum 5 20 26 19  
Empirical context      
US 2 5 1 1 9 
EU - 1 5 5 11 
Asia - 1 - 1 2 
International - - - 2 2 
Absent 2 3 2 3 8 
Unit of analysis: Horizontal alliance 
Size of horizontal alliances      
Bilateral   3 2 5 
Trilateral - - - -  - 
Multilateral - 2 2 1 5 
Not specified - 1 - 3 4 
Sum - 3 5 6 14 
Research Methodology       
Conceptual - 1 - - 1 
Analytical - 1 4 3 8 
Survey - 1 - 2 3 
Interviews/expert panel - - - - - 
Interviews/case study and 
survey 
- - 1 1 2 
Sum  3 5 6 14 
Research foci      
Alliance composition - 2 1 2 5 
Alliance structure - 1 - 3 4 
Relational behavior - - - 2 2 
Operational process design - 1 5 3 9 
Sum - 4 6 9  
Empirical context      
US - - - 1 1 
EU - - 2 4 6 
Asia - - - - - 
International - 1 - 1 2 
Absent - 2 4 1 5 
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Figure 3 Overview of the identified four research fields in logistics alliances 
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2.5.1 Vertical Logistics Alliances  
Alliance composition in client-LSP alliances 
Researchers focusing on vertical alliances have emphasized the importance of the fit of 
partner’s individual resources and competences (a) towards the alliance tasks (operational fit), 
and (b) towards each other (relational fit) as determinants of alliance effectiveness and 
productivity (see Appendix 1 for an overview of performance impact factors of vertical 
logistics alliances)..  
 
Operational fit 
Partner knowledge 
Knowledge about partners benefits both LSPs and clients (Zacharia et al., 2009). It fosters the 
level of cooperation between LSPs and clients, and yields increases in alliance outcomes and 
client performance. Thus, this knowledge compensates the additional efforts invested in 
gaining these partner insights (Zacharia et al., 2009). From a client’s perspective, knowledge 
about LSPs facilitates the evaluation of competences, reputations and organizational profiles, 
which enhances the selection of qualified LSPs (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Zacharia et al., 
2009). From an LSP perspective, the positive impact of a deep understanding of the client’s 
business rests upon three mechanisms. First, being able to put oneself in a client’s place 
improves openness and cooperation between LSPs and clients (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; 
Chen et al., 2010; Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011; Lambert et al., 1999; Zacharia et al., 2009). 
Second, client knowledge enables LSP to customize their services yielding operational 
improvements (Bagchi and Virum, 1998). Third, client knowledge also enables LSPs to 
anticipate and acquire necessary capabilities in order to flexibly cope with changing customer 
demands, which ensures ongoing value creation (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Hartmann and De 
Grahl, 2011). This value creation is a prerequisite for customers to engage in logistics 
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alliances (Gibson et al., 2002; Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011). Empirical findings support the 
logic behind client knowledge, indicating that it improves the LSP-client collaboration (Chen 
et al., 2010) and LSP flexibility, thereby indirectly driving customer loyalty (Hartmann and 
De Grahl, 2011). However, partner knowledge requires both LSPs and clients to be willing to 
spend time and effort to understand each other (Bagchi and Virum, 1998) and implies a clear 
articulation and explanation of a firm’s business and its expectations from the alliance 
(Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Panayides and Gray, 1999; Tate, 1996; Zacharia et al., 2009). 
Logistics scholars suggest that continuous and systematic access to valuable partner insights 
(Tate, 1996; Zacharia et al., 2009) can be realized by, for example, involving LSPs in a firm’s 
planning process (Tate, 1996), implementing intense exchange and specific cross-firm 
trainings among employees, hiring alumni or other experts, and/or establishing educational 
and research facilities (Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011).  
 
Alliance capability 
Partners looking to cooperate effectively in supply chains require specific alliance capabilities 
to unfreeze, transform, and continuously improve their interactions if they are to achieve high 
levels of collaboration that yield competitive advantages (Fawcett et al., 2008). Taking a 
client perspective, Chen et al.’s (2010) empirical findings indicate that a client’s capability to 
drive vertical alliances depends on the client’s top management championship facilitating 
client-LSP collaboration, thereby indirectly enhancing client logistics performance (Chen et 
al., 2010). From a LSP perspective, empirical findings show that LSP alliance capability 
fosters client loyalty (Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011), alliance outcomes (Deepen et al., 2008) 
and business performances (Zacharia et al., 2009). The logic behind this is that the 
cooperative attitude (a) helps LSPs overcome the “not-invented-here” syndrome (Zacharia et 
al., 2009), (b) enhances the exchange of valuable information (Hartmann and De Grahl, 
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2011), and (c) facilitates continuous alliance improvement (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; Deepen 
et al., 2008; Gibson et al., 2002). To achieve greater collaboration, Zacharia et al. (2009) 
suggested frequent face-to-face meetings, a high level of joint decision-making, open sharing 
of information, free flow of useful and novel ideas, openness to new ways of thinking, and 
discovering new knowledge among LSPs and clients. Bagchi and Virum (1998) emphasized 
employees’ motivation and training as crucial determinants of excellent services and 
empowerment to act. Empirical findings show that alliance capability as joint exploitation of 
alliance opportunities fosters a client’s market performance; interestingly, this capability has 
no significant impact on its logistics performance, which was blamed on these factors’ late 
occurrence (Sinkovics and Roath, 2004). 
 
LSP operational flexibility 
Given the focus on operational performance in vertical alliances, it is not surprising that both 
LSPs and clients perceive operational flexibility as a major performance impact factor 
(Gibson et al., 2002). From a client’s perspective, operational flexibility is recognized as the 
main evaluation and selection criterion of qualified LSPs (Gibson et al., 2002). For LSPs, 
operational flexibility reflects their ability to meet changing customer demands (Bagchi and 
Virum, 1998; Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011; Makukha and Gray, 2004) and/or to create 
proactively alliance improvements (Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, 2000; Deepen et al., 2008; 
Gentry, 1996a; Gibson et al., 2002), which determines the likelihood of achieving client 
satisfaction (Gibson et al., 2002), loyalty, and competitive advantage (Hartmann and De 
Grahl, 2011). In addition, operational flexibility can be seen as a result of mutual adjustments 
and specific processes for flexibility within vertical alliances (rather than a specific LSP 
capability). Logistics scholars who held this view found empirical evidence for operational 
flexibility having a positive impact on alliance improvements (Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, 
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2000) and on the logistics and market performance of clients (Sinkovics and Roath, 2004; 
Tate, 1996). However, empirical results indicate that clients are not yet satisfied with LSPs’ 
operational performance in terms of yield cost reductions (Gibson et al., 2002) and perceive 
LSPs as having insufficient capabilities to organize and manage the entire or large parts of 
their supply chains (Makukha and Gray, 2004). This distrust of clients in LSPs’ operational 
performances impedes a stronger integration of LSP in client’s business on a more strategic 
level (Gibson et al., 2002; Makukha and Gray, 2004). 
 
Relational fit 
Organizational Compatibility  
Organizational compatibility is generally acknowledged as a performance impact factor on 
alliance success (Tate, 1996). However, it does not seem to be perceived as a major success 
factor in vertical alliances by LSP and/or clients, as both ranked it relatively low in 
importance (ranked 10
th
 (client) and ninth (LSP) out of 13 factors) (Gibson et al., 2002).  
 
Partner dependence 
Partner dependence, which has been defined “as the way in which different firms perceive 
they need each other to perform their work and reach certain outcomes” (Zacharia et al., 2009: 
103), emerges due to the complementary assets, skills, and knowledge resident in the 
partnering firms. To prevent failure, both LSPs and clients need “a realistic chance of 
obtaining significant benefits from the relationship” (Lambert et al., 1999: 169). Zacharia et 
al. (2009) indicated that a partner’s interdependence positively impacted collaboration, which 
in turn impacted operational, relational, and business performance outcomes. To counter 
mutual dependency, Makuhka and Gray (2004) suggested concentrating on core business and 
pursuing mutual benefits.   
  
 
39 
Alliance organizational structure in client–LSP alliances 
In pursuit of an effective governance system of LSP–client alliances, partnering firms face the 
challenge of driving “strong operational excellence and corporate competence while 
simultaneously promoting inter-organizational process collaboration” (Fawcett et al., 2006: 
30). To cope with this complexity and to optimize the interactions among LSP and clients in 
order to accomplish the alliance goal(s), logistics scholars have emphasized (a) the degree of 
LSP integration, (b) the extent of formalization, and (c) social governance mechanisms.   
 
LSP integration  
“Integration is the hallmark of logistics” (Bagchi and Virum, 1998: 207). Therefore, the 
integration of the LSP into a client’s business operations is widely acknowledged and 
empirically supported as major impact factor on the effectiveness of the inter-firm 
coordination (Bagchi and Virum, 1998), and on the responsiveness of LSP’ services to 
client’s changing demands (Rogers and Daugherty, 1995). From a client’s perspective, closer 
integration of LSPs allow for “customized or tailored logistics solution providing a unique or 
superior service for a shipper’s customers” (Makukha and Gray, 2004: 368), which improves 
both the client’s operational and the overall supply chain performance (Gentry, 1996a, b). 
However, clients are reluctant to fully integrate LSPs due to their concerns about LSP’s 
abilities to autonomously design, manage, and develop their whole logistics strategy, to keep 
control and reduce their dependence (Makukha and Gray, 2004). Thus, they prefer joint 
management and planning teams that are controlled by the client (Makukha and Gray, 2004). 
From the LSP’s perspective, stronger integration of LSP increases their importance, as 
perceived by the clients (Gentry, 1996a, b). LSP’s involvement in the buyer–supplier 
negotiation process is required to optimize the supply linkages, while it increases the number 
of concerns to be solved in the negotiation phase (Carter and Ferrin, 1995). Hofenk et al.’s 
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(2011) results indicate a negative relationship between a carrier’s thoroughness during 
contract negotiation and the alliance’s effectiveness for the LSP, with no effect on customers. 
However, there are integration barriers to the requirement of data availability and sharing 
between partners, negotiation of transfer payment, legal ramifications, and coordination of 
operating schedules (see Carter and Ferrin (1995) for details). Scholars have suggested 
specific organizational modes that can steer the LSP integration effectively, such as 
employees stationed full-time on the client’s premises (Bagchi and Virum, 1998), cross-
functional and interorganizational teams (Fawcett et al., 2006; Makukha and Gray, 2004), and 
a modified reporting structure to enhance communication and coordination among partners 
(Fawcett et al., 2006). Makukha and Gray (2004) observed that, overall, the majority of 
client–LSP alliances are still more operational than strategic in nature, as “shippers tend to 
avoid close integration with LSPs, whereas LSPs claim to be true strategic partners but remain 
unable to provide the service required” (Makukha and Gray, 2004: 361).  
 
Formalization 
Formalization refers to the specification of roles, responsibilities, policy guidelines, and 
procedures (Makukha and Gray, 2004; Tate, 1996) and their codification within the contract 
design (Lambert et al., 1999; Lei et al., 2006; Makukha and Gray, 2004). Thus, formalization 
helps to synchronize a broad scope of activities (Tate, 1996). Formalization defines the 
desired behavior and outcomes of involved parties based on enforceable agreements and 
sanctions (Frankel and Whipple, 1996). It also determines the formal alliance power and 
control relations among LSP and clients, both within the alliance (Gibson et al., 2002) and 
internally in the organization (Emberson and Storey, 2006). Research results from Hofenk et 
al. (2011) indicated a positive relationship between contract formality and alliance 
effectiveness, both for LSPs and customers, in building effective, productive working 
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relationships, carrying out mutual responsibilities and commitments, developing and 
maintaining relationships, and creating alliance satisfaction.  
Despite these advantages, empirical evidence interestingly indicates ambiguity regarding the 
perceived importance of written contracts as a significant impact factor for both clients and 
LSPs on the success of an alliance (Frankel and Whipple, 1996; Gibson et al., 2002). In 
addition, even with written mutual agreements, alternative corporate strategies and priorities 
may brush aside alliances, revealing the general dependencies and vulnerability of alliances in 
practice (Emberson and Storey, 2006). 
 
Social governance mechanisms 
Alliance performance depends on the interplay between formal and relational alliance design 
(Hofenk et al., 2011) to develop mutual understanding, cooperation and commitment among 
partnering LSPs and clients (Kee-hung, 2009). Social contracts, as “unwritten agreements 
between firms which are enforced not by formal authority and power but rather by the desire 
to create and maintain a positive reputation for integrity and fairness” (Frankel and Whipple, 
1996: 49), facilitate interest alignment without formal enforcements (Frankel and Whipple, 
1996). However, they also require organizational commitment to human resource 
development for individuals involved in the alliance, particularly at the senior executive level 
(Frankel and Whipple, 1996). Logistics scholars have recently recognized socialization as an 
important mechanism to foster personal familiarity, communication, and alliance 
improvements (Cousins and Menguc, 2006; Van De Vijver et al., 2011). Socialization unfolds 
over time through such means as cross-functional teams, social events, joint workshops, on-
site visits, and regular conferences (Cousins and Menguc, 2006; Van De Vijver et al., 2011). 
However, there has not yet been any unanimity regarding socialization’s positive performance 
impact. For example, Cousins and Menguc (2006) found a strong direct relationship between 
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the LSP’s socialization and its operational and communication performances, allowing for 
improvements in the client’s perceived level of contractual conformance. Van De Vijver et al. 
(2011), on the other hand, maintained that socialization does not invariably have a positive 
impact on communication quality because socialization tactics must be tailored to the history 
and current phase of the relationship.  
 
Relational behavior in client–LSP alliances 
The third area identified in our literature review concerns the relational quality that partners 
display based on (a) the trust among LSPs and clients and (b) their alliance commitment. 
 
Trust 
Trust is the extent to which alliance partners believe in each other’s credibility, while 
goodwill between LSPs and clients (Nyaga et al., 2010) is the key driver of alliance success 
(Gibson et al., 2002; Lambert et al., 1999; Tate, 1996). Trust enhances an open and fair 
attitude towards partners, at the same time as reducing the perceived risk regarding specific 
investments and dependency (Makukha and Gray, 2004). Trust emerges over time due to joint 
communication and relationship efforts (Hofenk et al., 2011; Nyaga et al., 2010) that 
demonstrate goodwill and facilitate trust among partners (Nyaga et al., 2010). It provides the 
groundwork for an effective alliance management for both buyers and carriers adding to 
alliance effectiveness (Hofenk et al., 2011), alliance commitment, and satisfaction (Nyaga et 
al., 2010).  
 
Commitment 
Commitment is widely acknowledged by both academia and practitioners (LSPs and clients) 
as a major determinant of the alliance’s effectiveness (Hofenk et al., 2011), and of alliance 
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and firm performance (Nyaga et al., 2010) allowing for competitive advantages (Fawcett et 
al., 2006). Commitment is embodied in partners’ perceptions of the relationship as something 
valuable (Hofenk et al., 2011) and can be conceptualized as having four types of managerial 
support: top management support, broad-based functional support, channel support, and 
infrastructural/governance support (Fawcett et al., 2006). However, Nyaga et al.’s (2010) 
empirical results indicated that the effect of commitment is positive only on the client’s 
performance, and does not ensure the LSP’s performance; therefore, trust remains the main 
impact factor on performance for LSPs. Logistics scholars have identified two main 
determinants of continuous alliance commitment. The first is individual champions who 
convince the involved parties of the alliance’s benefits (Emberson and Storey, 2006), and the 
second is dedicated alliance investments that create dependencies and reduce the threat of 
opportunism (Gardner et al., 1994; Lambert et al., 1999; Nyaga et al., 2010). Interestingly, 
Nyaga, et al.’s (2010) results support the idea that investments positively impact commitment, 
but not – interestingly – trust, both for clients and LSPs. 
 
Relational quality 
Logistics scholars strive to capture the different dimensions of relational behavior within a 
multi-dimensional second-order construct of so-called relational quality or social exchange 
behavior (Moore and Cunningham III, 1999; Nyaga and Whipple, 2011). Nyaga and Whipple 
(2011) empirical findings indicated that the greater the level of so-called relational quality, the 
better the supply chain’s operational performance and satisfaction, both for buyers and the 
LSP (Nyaga and Whipple, 2011). However, the relational quality of a LSP-client alliance 
depends more on the effectiveness of the relationship than on the underlying relationship type 
(transactional versus alliance agreement) (Nyaga and Whipple, 2011), which shifts the 
managerial focus from how business is transacted to performance issues (Moore and 
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Cunningham III, 1999). 
 
Operational process design in client–LSP alliances  
The fourth category of performance impact factors in logistics alliances refers to the 
management factors, which determine how alliance potentials are achieved (Lambert et al., 
1999). Logistics scholars have emphasized three major components in LSP–client alliances: 
(a) communication and information exchange, (b) joint planning, and (c) performance control. 
Each of these are examined in turn below. 
 
Communication and information exchange  
Logistics scholars have elaborated on the articulation of client’s expectations (Bagchi and 
Virum, 1998) and on the communication structures and processes (Bagchi and Virum, 1998; 
Gibson et al., 2002; Panayides and Gray, 1999; Tate, 1996). This knowledge and data base 
forms the basis for the alliance’s implementation and benefit realization (Mortensen and 
Lemoine, 2008). It also enables a seamless, smooth, and timely exchange of information and 
ideas (Zacharia et al., 2009) and, thus, the coordination and synchronization of joint alliance 
activities. Empirical findings have indicated that frequent, open, computer-based 
communication and information sharing facilitates joint problem-solving, cost reduction 
programs, and improvement-oriented evaluation of carriers (Gentry, 1996b). Empirical 
evidence has shown (a) that information sharing mediates the impact of trust and commitment 
on alliance satisfaction and performance (Nyaga et al., 2010), and (b) that communication 
directly impacts the degree of cooperation, and indirectly proactive improvements of an 
alliance (Deepen et al., 2008). Linking communication, flexibility, and alliance outcome, 
Hartmann’s empirical study indicated that communication has a direct positive effect on LSP 
flexibility and an indirect positive effect on customer loyalty through their relationship to 
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collaboration (Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011).  
 
Joint Planning  
Logistics scholars have acknowledged and provided empirical evidence for the positive 
relation between joint planning in client–LSP alliances and channel profitability (Lei et al., 
2006). To foster joint planning, scholars suggest joint planning teams (Lambert et al., 1999; 
Makukha and Gray, 2004) and the integration of LSPs into the planning process (Gibson et 
al., 2002). Although Cousins and Menguc (2006) found that joint planning has a positive 
impact on communication performance and clients’ perceptions of the level of an LSP’s 
contractual conformance, they found no relationship between this kind of integration and 
operational performance. The major impediment of joint planning lies in the lack of aligned 
information systems among partners (Cousins and Menguc, 2006). 
 
Performance control 
Logistics scholars have pointed out the importance of effective systems to measure alliance 
performance over time (Gibson et al., 2002; Kleinsorge, 1991) in order to steer and monitor 
the execution and outcomes of LSP–client alliances. Therefore, the essential performance 
variables must be developed and applied in order to initiate the required adaptations and 
maintain expected alliance performance (Bagchi and Virum, 1998). Examples include cost-
based pricing tools for transportation services, which improves information exchange and 
efficiency for both clients and LSPs (Bø and Hammervoll, 2010).  
Adequate performance measurement forms the basis for assessing risks and rewards 
and allocating them among the partners. These “pie-sharing” mechanisms are another 
potential performance impact factor for logistics alliances (Lambert et al., 1999; Wright et al., 
2010). Risk-sharing improves the client’s perception of the LSP and increases the LSP’s asset 
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utilization because of guaranteed business and fair compensation agreements (Gentry, 1996b). 
Although the logistics literature generally acknowledges the impact of risk- and reward-
sharing and control processes on alliance success, Gibson et al.’s (2002) empirical results 
showed that both shippers and carriers rank these factors lowest in terms of importance.  
 
2.5.2 Horizontal Logistics Alliances  
The literature on horizontal alliance design and management can be systematized along the 
same major categories regarding the explanation of alliance effectiveness as the literature on 
vertical alliances (see Appendix 2 for an overview of performance impact factors of 
horizontal logistics alliances).  
Alliance composition in LSP alliances  
Logistics scholars have emphasized the three following major performance impact factors of 
LSP alliances: (a) organizational complexity based on the alliance size and alliance task 
complexity, (b) operational fit, and (c) relational fit among partnering LSPs.  
 
Organizational complexity 
Alliance size 
LSP alliances with a higher number of involved parties (both LSPs and business functions) 
offer the opportunity for pooling more resources to either broaden LSPs’ service offerings or 
to optimize their resource utilization within the alliance. Thus, the greater the alliance size, the 
higher the potential for service improvements, for lower prices, and for higher profitability 
and profit margins within LSP alliances (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). However, 
increasing alliance size comes with greater alliance complexity due to two reasons. The first 
emerges simply due to a significant increase in coordination efforts to synchronize logistics 
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products, processes, and systems and to steer partners’ behavior and outcomes among a 
growing number of partnering LSP. Second, the higher number of partnering LSP adds to the 
likelihood of goal inconsistency, hidden agendas, and opportunistic behavior raising 
coordination and monitoring efforts (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). The potential 
of intra-alliance competition, overlaps, and redundancies increase challenges an effective 
alliance management (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012), and drives instability by, for 
example, impeding smoothness and pace of decision-making (Midoro and Pitto, 2000). 
Empirical findings indicate that the alliance size and the accompnied increased organizational 
complexity impacts the functioning of structural coordination mechanisms. For example, it 
hampers the positive impact of social governance mechanisms, at the same time as increasing 
the importance of formal governance mechanisms for alliance effectiveness, success, and 
satisfaction (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). Similarly, Midoro and Pitto (2000) found that 
bilateral alliances are the most efficient and stable agreement in the shipping industry. 
However, data on the German logistics industry shows that the majority of horizontal LSP 
alliances are multilateral agreements with up to 100 LSPs, which indicates the strong 
organizational complexity of LSP alliances (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) and the 
requirement for effective LSP alliance management.  
 
Task complexity  
Task complexity in LSP alliances emerges due to the scope of activities (Evangelista and 
Morvillo, 1999; Hernández et al., 2011; Midoro and Pitto, 2000) and the environmental 
uncertainty in which these tasks are performed (Midoro and Pitto, 2000). The scope of 
alliance activities – which vary in their nature (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999), geographical 
reach, transportation modes, and areas of value creation (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) – 
determines the alliance potential of value creation (Midoro and Pitto, 2000), the degree of 
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partner integration (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999), and the operational performance of LSP 
alliances (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). The 
environmental uncertainty surrounding the alliance activities (that is, specific antitrust laws) 
adds to the task’s complexity, thereby causing further market instability (Midoro and Pitto, 
2000).  
 
Operational fit 
Operational fit is achieved if the partners’ similar or complementary resources and 
competencies can be synergistically combined. Operational fit implies at least some 
familiarity with the alliance tasks and facilitates interorganizational coordination among 
partnering LSP. Therefore, it has a major impact on alliance performance (Cruijssen et al., 
2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). Empirical evidence suggests that the most 
effective alliances are formed by LSPs with complementary contributions (i.e. highly 
complementary geographical networks and customer portfolios) but similar business activities 
and competencies. This operational fit reduces the degree of managerial complexity and 
rivalry between partnering LSPs (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). However, the lower the 
similarity of LSP’s geographic and service profile, the less familiar the partner will be with 
the alliance tasks. Also, lower geographic and service similarity increases the likelihood of 
task-related information asymmetry and the risk of exchange hazards, hampering the 
harmonization of joint market offerings, and thus resulting in alliance failure (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011). On the other hand, empirical findings indicate that high similarity 
between LSP’s contributions to the alliance still leads to significant managerial complexity. 
For example, significant overlaps in geographical and competences profiles cause intra-
alliance competition, which compromises both interfirm coordination and decision-making 
processes (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012).  
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Relational fit 
Relational fit refers to how the partners fit with each other, as reflected in the degree of 
corporate culture similarity and rivalry between the partners (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 
2012). Empirical findings indicate that the most effective LSP alliances are formed by LSPs 
with similar corporate structures (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). However, other 
empirical evidence shows that competitive tensions emerge due to overlaps in geography and 
competences, which hinder alliance value creation (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). Given 
the importance of strategic know-how for LSPs’ competitive advantages and the lack of 
safeguards (for example, regarding intellectual property rights) in this industry, there is a high 
risk of inadvertent exchange of strategic knowledge and threat of rivalry (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012). To face the threat of intra-alliance competition, Midoro and Pitto (2000) 
suggested limiting the number of partners, differentiating their roles and contributions, and 
coordinating sales and marketing activities. They noted that the adequacy of a partner’s 
resources, competencies, and familiarity were not as important to alliance success as the 
firm’s ability to leverage these competencies efficiently. 
 
Alliance structure in LSP alliances 
Given the low interdependence and the rivalry among partnering LSPs in horizontal alliances, 
the effectiveness of an alliance structure underlies specific and significant challenges. To 
foster effective alliance execution and reduce the threat of opportunism, logistics scholars 
have emphasized three social governance mechanisms: equity share, formalization, and 
mutual influence. These are discussed in turn below. 
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Equity share 
Equity is frequently seen as an effective instrument to align partner interests in alliances 
(Albers, 2005). Echoing this general finding, studies concentrating on LSP alliances suggest 
that the importance of equity involvement grows with the strategic importance of the alliance 
for its members (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) and with the scope of alliance activities 
performed (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999). 
 
Formalization 
Formalization, in the form of mutually binding agreements or written contracts regarding 
areas such as tasks, activities, and authority structures, builds an agreed-upon basis among the 
partnering LSPs (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). This basis facilitates the alignment of the 
partners’ various interests, steers the day-to-day interactions, and provides transparency about 
the relationship behavior, processes, and outcomes, all of which enhance the alliance’s 
commitment and effectiveness (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). While formalization 
increases in importance with increased alliance complexity (high number of partners, high 
degree of rivalry), it causes conflicts among LSPs, due to two reasons. The first is its 
limitations regarding foreseeing and capturing all possible contingencies ex ante. The second 
is inflexibility, in terms of coping with these deviations from expectations, which raises 
conflicts among involved decision makers about sticking to and deflecting predefined rules 
(Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). Thus, the more formalized an LSP alliance is, the higher the 
extent of conflicts hampering goal achievement, improvements of productivity, and 
competitive position and overall alliance satisfaction (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011).  
 
Social governance mechanisms 
Another viable way to improve alliance performance is to facilitate the creation of mutual 
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influence. Mutual influence, in the form of self-regulative imperatives combined with moral 
perspectives (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012), creates an atmosphere of forbearance, 
respect, and balanced reciprocity among the partnering LSPs (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). 
The generally positive impact of mutual influence on alliance commitment, and effectiveness, 
depends on the alliance complexity. This impact grows as the heterogeneity of a partner’s 
geographical or business activities increases, but decreases with the growing number of LSPs 
and business functions involved (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). Interestingly, empirical 
findings indicated that the functioning of both formalization and mutual influence depends of 
the underlying type and degree of alliance complexity (organizational and strategic) 
reconciling the ambiguity of the governance–performance link (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 
2012).  
 
Relational behavior in LSP alliances 
The third category implies performance impact factors on the relational behavior level of 
horizontal LSP alliances, including the commitment (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) and 
conflict among partnering LSPs (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011).  
 
Commitment 
Commitment – as reflected in the partners’ attitudes towards long-term investments, resource 
dedication, and alliance-specific sacrifices – emerges due to the partners’ expectations of 
positive alliance benefits in the future and their identification with the collective goals and 
values (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). Empirical evidence indicates that commitment 
increases an alliance’s effectiveness and that even its importance rises in the context of highly 
complex alliances (organizational and strategic) (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). 
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Conflicts 
Conflicts among partnering LSP impact the alliance’s performance and innovativeness 
(Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). Wallenburg and Raue’s (2011) differentiated between the 
extent of conflict and the conflict functionality, finding that the extent of conflict has a 
significant negative impact on the LSP alliance performance (in fact, there was even a slightly 
positive impact on alliance-based innovation), which can only partially be balanced by the 
positive effect of conflict functionality. The reasoning behind this is that horizontal LSP 
alliances are “predominantly based on smooth operations that do not require creative tensions 
and constant innovation” (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011: 393). Thus, unresolved conflicts 
among LSPs lead to increased coordination costs in terms of resources and managerial efforts 
and disunity of efforts, which hinders information exchange and alliance success (Wallenburg 
and Raue, 2011). To reduce the extent of alliance conflicts, empirical findings indicate that 
LSPs should invest in their relational capital based on close personal interactions, mutual 
respect and trust, personal friendship, and high reciprocity, as these factors positively 
influence the functionality of conflicts, enhancing both alliance performance and alliance-
based innovation (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). 
 
Operational process design in LSP alliances 
The fourth category of performance impact factors refers to management components on the 
operational level of LSP alliances, including joint route planning, and profit allocation 
impacting alliance success. 
 
Joint route planning 
Joint route planning among partnering LSPs is acknowledged as a key impact factor on the 
alliance operational performance as it allows effective synchronization of joint activities and 
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reduction of inefficiencies, redundancies, and overlaps. Empirical evidence shows that joint 
planning – understood as the pooling of all partner’s distribution processes to serve customer 
requests – allows for cost savings of up to 30 percent (Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Krajewska et 
al., 2008). Specifically, this pooling can reduce the distance traveled by up to 30 percent, load 
factors by over 95 percent, and reduce fleets by up to 50 percent (Cruijssen et al., 2007a). 
Cruijssen et al.’s (2007a) findings suggest that joint route planning is most beneficial in 
horizontal alliances with a high number of LSPs with a “uniform and not too large size” 
(Cruijssen et al., 2007a: 302). However, these benefits are based on trade-offs between 
waiting for more affordable collaborative capacity and incurring higher holding costs 
(Hernández et al., 2011). Therefore, they require reliable and sufficient exchange of data 
among the partnering LSPs, which may be constrained by the misalignment of indispensable 
information and communication technology (Cruijssen et al, 2007b). Focusing on horizontal 
alliance in the aviation industry, scholars have differentiated between three forms of planning 
and scheduling: (a) complementary (pooling a partner’s network while only one partner 
operates on these routes); (b) parallel (pooling flights of the same route with all partners 
operating on these routes) (Chen and Chen, 2003; Park, 1997); and (c) mixed route 
(combination of parallel and complementary) (Yan and Chen, 2007). The empirical results of 
the abovementioned studies show that the impact of joint planning and scheduling varies 
across the planning type (complementary, parallel, or mixed). The mixed alliance type 
outperformed coordinated flight scheduling in terms of operating cost reductions and profit 
increases (Yan and Chen, 2007), while parallel alliances allow for higher load factor increases 
than complementary alliances do (Chen and Chen, 2003). However, a complementary alliance 
is likely to increase economic welfare, while a parallel alliance is like to decrease it (Park, 
1997). Bilotkach (2007) analyzed the impact of airline partners’ pricing and scheduling 
choices under different degrees of coordination (only joint scheduling versus joint scheduling 
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and pricing). The mathematical calculations in that study show that cooperation in prices and 
scheduling leads to lower prices, higher product quality, and higher consumer welfare 
compared to cooperation only in scheduling. 
 
Benefit allocation 
Given the differences in contributions and bargaining powers among partnering LSP, a major 
concern in horizontal alliances is the distribution of realized cost savings and profit gains in 
the alliance (Cruijssen et al., 2007a). Krajewska et al. (2008) found that a fair and stable 
distribution mechanism of total alliance gains is based on the benefits allocating weighted 
sum of each partner’s alliance contribution. In a similar vein, in the context of airline 
alliances, Wright et al. (2010) found that static revenue-sharing mechanisms as fixed transfer 
prices are outperformed by dynamic transfer prices (“bid prices”) based on the actual value of 
seat inventory. Despite their advantages, dynamic mechanisms are constrained by significant 
impediments; specifically, technical incompatibilities among revenue management systems 
within an alliance, competitive considerations, and antitrust laws (Wright et al., 2010).  
 
2.6 SYNTHESIS AND RESEARCH AGENDA  
Our review findings inform both practice and research on effective logistics alliances design 
and management. The reviewed studies have primarily focused on understanding four 
individual components of logistics alliances: (1) their composition (absolute and relative 
partner characteristics), (2) the organizational structure that links the alliance partners, (3) the 
partners’ relational behavior towards each other, and (4) the design of the underlying 
operational value-adding activities and processes that ultimately drive the alliance benefits. 
Our review has identified relevant performance impact factors of logistics alliances. However, 
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guidance on their effective deployment for an increased logistics alliance performance is 
lacking. To address this gap, we now derive and discuss our review implications. We do so by 
leveraging the hitherto neglected cross-fertilization potential of research results from 
horizontal for vertical logistics alliances, and vice versa. We also formulate concrete 
managerial implications from our review results that should aid logistics alliance practitioners 
(see Figure 4 and 5). In addition, our research agenda highlights a number of research 
opportunities that we believe have the strongest impact on logistics alliance performance and 
may guide further research. 
 
2.6.1 Effective Design and Management of Horizontal Alliances  
Horizontal LSP alliances are mostly seen as an instrument for LSP to realize synergies by 
exploiting similar resources. Our findings show five main levers to capitalize the alliance 
value (see Figure 4). However, further research could still improve our understanding of LSP 
alliance performance by further analyzing the significant organizational complexity and 
competitive tensions horizontal alliances are facing in realizing alliance success.  
 
Under-explored aspects of horizontal logistics alliances 
Our review highlights that logistics research still lacks evidence on how to cope with the 
threat of rivalry and significant complexity within horizontal logistics alliances. 
Formalization, fair benefit distribution systems, and relational capital have been identified as 
important factors to cope with these impediments. Research findings from vertical logistics 
alliances research provide evidence that interdependence, partner integration, and 
socialization are important for alliance success. Studies on performance impacts of horizontal 
logistics alliances, however, have not taken these factors into account, even though all three 
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address relevant mechanisms in these settings as well. This is of significant interest to explore 
how to take the identified performance impact factors into account in order to create and 
sustain alliance success.  
 
Figure 4 Managerial implications for horizontal logistics alliances 
Main performance levers of horizontal logistics alliances 
 Select LSPs as partners that have similar corporate structures, business activities, and competencies, but 
complementary geographical networks and markets. This will increase the likelihood of an effective 
alliance value creation and reduce the threat of rivalry (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Midoro and Pitto, 2000; 
Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012). 
 Adapt the formalization degree (specialization/codification of tasks, activities, and authority structures) to 
the alliance context (alliance size). This facilitates alliance commitment and effectiveness and reduces the 
threat of conflicts for goal achievement. (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012; Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). 
 Secure alliance commitment (for example, through mutual influence mechanisms) to enhance alliance 
effectiveness, especially in the context of high alliance complexity. However, the positive impact of 
mutual influence on alliance commitment and effectiveness increases as the heterogeneity of an LSP’s 
geographical or business activities increases, but diminishes as alliance size. (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 
2012) 
 Implement joint planning (in the case of large alliances), pricing, and revenue-sharing systems among 
partnering LSP to coordinate interactions. This enhances the potential for cost savings and profits. 
(Bilotkach, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2003; Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Park, 1997; Yan 
and Chen, 2007) 
 Develop an alliance capability that enhances the likelihood of leveraging partner’s resources and 
competences pooled within the LSP alliance and of orchestrating effectively the alliance activities (Midoro 
and Pitto, 2000).  
 
Multifaceted reality of horizontal logistics alliances 
To gain a more comprehensive understanding on the design, management and performance of 
horizontal LSP alliances, research would benefit from a broader perspective on these 
arrangements. Only recently scholars (3 out of 14) have begun to investigate the 
interrelationships among alliance composition, alliance structure, relational behavior, and 
operational process design (Midoro and Pitto, 2000; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011, 2012; 
Wallenburg and Raue, 2011). As the logistics literature suggests, additional research efforts 
on these interdependencies would be worthwhile. For example, the alliance size and the level 
of partner rivalry (alliance composition) affect the functioning of formalization, mutual 
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influence (alliance structure), and commitment (relational behavior) (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012). A more holistic and multilevel understanding of logistics alliances would 
therefore advance a more comprehensive understanding of alliance success. We encourage 
scholars to conduct survey studies to explore the linkages and interdependencies among 
performance impact factors. This knowledge is of major importance to understand, explain 
and consider existing moderating effects for an effective design and management of 
horizontal LSP alliances.  
 
Contingency factors 
A significant opportunity for further research lies in the ambiguity of identified impact 
factors’ effects. Contingency theory suggests that it is very unlikely that a specific factor, 
mechanism, or arrangement, will be universally more effective than another – its effectiveness 
is rather influenced by contextual parameters (Donaldson, 2001). A further elucidation of 
such contexts could help to resolve present ambiguities and offer further insights on relevant 
conditions (“contingency factors”) of effective logistics alliance activity. Candidate 
contingency factors include alliance size (bilateral versus multilateral), alliance strategy 
(exploitative versus explorative) (Pettigrew, 1990), and industry context as they are applied in 
the strategic management literature (Albers et al., 2013). We would expect that the underlying 
alliance type has a major influence on the effectiveness of specific alliance designs and 
management forms. Thus, multiple case studies and survey studies need to incorporate 
contingency factors in order to identify patterns of alliance design and management for 
different alliance types. For example, an alliance for the exploitation of existing resources will 
most probably be designed and managed differently than an explorative alliance aiming to 
gain new knowledge among LSPs.  
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2.6.2 Effective design and management of vertical alliances 
Based on our review, we observed that the performance of vertical alliances depends 
primarily on the ability of both clients and LSPs to become familiar and interlined with each 
other. Our findings reveal the major performance impact factors facilitating vertical alliance 
success (see Figure 5). However, we identify some gaps in the vertical alliance literature and 
propose the following research agenda.  
 
Figure 5 Managerial implications for vertical logistics alliances 
Main performance levers of vertical logistics alliances 
 Create operational fit between LSP and client in relation to the specific alliance tasks based on the specific 
knowledge the partners have regarding the other’s business, the firm-specific alliance capability, and the 
LSP’s operational flexibility. The operational fit facilitates the selection of valuable partners, which 
enhances the likelihood of higher collaboration degree, operational flexibility, and alliance adaptability, all 
of which contribute to the alliance’s success.  
 Create interdependence to enhance the degree of LSP–client collaboration and alliance performance, while 
corporate compatibilities are not considered a major performance factor. 
 Strengthen the LSP integration in the client’s business to facilitate the customization of services provided 
by the LSP and to enhance LSP’s reputation. Consider that clients are reluctant to pursue stronger LSP 
integration due to their lack of belief in LSP capabilities.  
 Adapt the formalization degree to increase alliance effectiveness and satisfaction, even if it is not 
perceived by clients or LSPs as a major success factor. 
 Consider the impact of socialization on alliance performance which depends on the alliance’s history and 
current phase (its impact is discussed ambiguously in literature)   
 Increase the relationship quality (that is, the trust and commitment of the partnering LSP and clients) to 
increase alliance performance and satisfaction. Consider that this quality depends more on the alliance 
performance than on the underlying alliance type.  
 Strengthen the communication and information exchange to enhance the degree of collaboration, proactive 
improvements, LSP flexibility, and the alliance’s effectiveness and client’s loyalty. In addition, this 
exchange mediates the impact of trust and commitment on alliance outcomes.  
 Conduct joint planning to improve the channel profitability, communication, and the client’s perceived 
level of LSP’s contractual conformance. The impact of joint planning on operational performances is not 
yet confirmed.  
 Control performance to monitor desired behavior and outcomes and to facilitate the adaptability of the 
alliance over time.  
 Share risks and rewards to increase LSPs’ asset utilization and the client’s perception of LSP, even it is not 
perceived as a major success factor.  
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Multilateral alliances along the supply chain 
The majority of studies focused on bilateral client-LSP arrangements (27 out of 34). However, 
logistics scholars have indicated a trend towards so-called supply chain collaborations among 
multiple supply chain actors, including manufacturers, suppliers, retailers, and LSPs. We 
argue that these alliances among multiple supply chain actors come with an increase in 
complexity. This complexity emerges due to (a) the higher number of involved partners with 
differing interests, (b) a broader scope of activities as more value creation processes are 
integrated in the alliances, and (c) a shift in the power relation between LSPs and clients as 
the LSP gains a more importance as central coordinator in the supply chain. Thus, further 
research is needed to redress this complexity increase in vertical alliances challenging the 
above-discussed governance mechanisms which base on a clear power structure within 
vertical alliances (Daugherty, 2011). While the horizontal alliances literature provides some 
initial evidence (e.g. captured in the impact factors of organizational complexity, joint 
planning and revenue-sharing (research impulses can come from the general management 
literature (Albers et al., 2015; Das and Teng, 2002), more conceptual work and case studies 
are needed to explore this emerging type of vertical alliances.  
 
2.6.3 Research opportunities for both vertical and horizontal alliances  
Although logistics scholars have devoted considerable attention to both vertical and horizontal 
alliances as instruments to gain competitive advantage, many of these alliances do not meet 
the partners’ expectations as they unfold over time, and some may even be considered failures 
(Kampstra et al., 2006; Stank et al., 2011; Wilding and Juriado, 2004). This well-established 
diagnosis encourages redoubled efforts in two directions: First, concentrating on failed 
alliances, future studies could investigate concrete pitfalls of logistics alliances and their 
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mechanisms of failure. Second, future studies could analyze alliances’ evolution over time, 
i.e. identify underlying drivers of change and its mechanisms in order to improve logistics 
alliance performance.  
 
Incorporation of pitfalls and negative effects  
Current studies – not only those in the logistics literature – tend to emphasize the positive 
effects of alliances; therefore, a major research opportunity is the investigation of the negative 
and lock-in effects of logistics alliances (Daugherty, 2011). As a better understanding of the 
“dark side” of alliances is required to adequately inform logistics management practice, 
additional research should explore such potential negative outcomes, pitfalls, and lock-in 
effects (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Lambert et al., 1999; Stank et al., 2011; Zineldin and 
Bredenlow, 2003). Empirical studies of logistics alliances have indicated such negative effects 
as increased complexity, difficulties, and costs of changing relationships because of greater 
integration and connectedness of firms (Hertz, 2001), or post-contractual lock-ins to supplier 
dominance because of transaction specific investments (Lonsdale, 2001). Future research is 
warranted to provide (empirical) evidence that will elicit ideas for avoiding or managing these 
negative effects, such as the pioneering work of Narasimhan et al. (2009), which identified 
specific pricing policies and investment intensity as a means to handle lock-in situations.  
 
Consideration of alliance dynamics 
Based on our review we observed that most of the extant inquiries into logistics alliance 
design and management have been static and performed at a given point in time (Li et al., 
2011). This is in line with Daugherty’s (2011) observation: “Typically, a great deal of 
time/effort/resources are expended on the formation of a cooperative relationship. But, how 
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often do companies check on the ongoing viability and vitality of the relationship? Business 
certainly is not static; you cannot assume relationships will be either” (Daugherty, 2011: 24). 
However, the logistics industry is dynamic, with some alliances operating for more than a 
decade and others collapsing even before they begin operations (Albers and Klaas-Wissing, 
2012). However, only a few studies of vertical alliances have pointed to the need for alliance 
transformation over time by referring to a firm’s specific strategic (Fawcett et al., 2008) or 
operational capabilities (Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, 2000; Tate, 1996) of a firm. Additional 
analysis of such “survivors,” which explores their potentially adaptive structures and 
processes, could generate valuable insights into key management and design practices for 
maintaining a continuous alliance change/transformation (Stank et al., 2011). A related 
suggestion for alliance adaptability rests upon specific logistics alliance management 
capability (Hofer et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011; Williams, 2002; Zacharia et al., 2009) that 
ensures the continuous reflection, development, and modification of approved alliance 
management routines in response to changes in contexts or conditions and to shape situations 
allowing for sustainable competitive advantages for the partnering firm (Brekalo et al., 2013). 
Conceptualized along multiple levels, this capability builds on operational logistics activities, 
comprising alliance design, relational governance, coordination and monitoring, and 
adaptation routines (Brekalo et al., 2013), providing a potential starting point for further 
research. To uncover the complex nature of logistics alliances, research into alliance evolution 
would require explorative research designs and qualitative research methods that provide an 
open approach toward identifying the logistics-specific drivers of alliance evolution.  
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2.7 CONCLUSION  
Alliances are a well-studied phenomenon in the logistics field. By analyzing both research 
streams of vertical and horizontal logistics alliances, we identified four main categories in the 
domain of effective logistics alliance design and management: (1) alliance composition, (2) 
alliance structure, (3) relational behavior, and (4) operational process design. Within these 
categories we present the current state of research by (a) identifying the major impact factors 
and their effects on alliance outcomes and (b) by consolidating their understanding and 
conceptualizations discussed in the logistics literature. In line with Daugherty (2011) stating 
that “previous research provides a solid foundation for future research, and there still seem to 
be ample research opportunities“ (Daugherty, 2011: 27), we provide a comprehensive 
consolidation of these findings that contributes to both academia and practice by adding to our 
understanding of logistics alliance performance. First, practitioners get a systematic overview 
of relevant performance impact factors providing insights into potential managerial levers to 
improve alliance performance. Second, our consolidation acts as a starting point for scholars 
who may be encouraged by our developed research avenues inter alia benefitting from cross-
fertilization between vertical and horizontal alliance literature or may be supported by a 
comprehensive picture on the state of the research. Overall, these research opportunities will 
enable scholars to gain additional, meaningful results on logistics alliances and their 
successful functioning. 
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2.9 APPENDIX  
2.9.1 Appendix 1: Overview of performance impact factors of vertical logistics alliances 
 
ALLIANCE COMPOSITION Understanding and Conceptualization 
Operational fit 
Partner  
knowledge  
 
- Understanding partner’s business needs: who are you, what are you going to do, what your 
plans are for the future (Tate, 1996) 
Client perspective 
- Knowledge on LSP's cost orientation: ability to take cost out of the operation; the ability to 
control costs; an emphasis on supply chain cost reduction (Gibson et al., 2002) 
- Insight to understand partner's skills/capabilities; business model; business risks; products; 
processes; business objectives; communication style; industry jargon; organizational culture; 
value they provide to their customer) (Zacharia et al., 2009) 
LSP perspective 
- Supply chain partner insight (LSP's understanding of client's skills, capabilities, business model, 
business risks, products, processes, business objectives, communication style, organizational 
culture, customer value) (Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011)  
- Client service expertise ( 3PL's effort to understand buyer's situation; adequacy of 3PL's 
knowledge/experience; strength  of 3PL's communication skills) (Chen et al., 2010) 
Organizational modes 
- Frequent and systematic communication at all levels of organizational structure to build client 
knowledge (Panayides and Gray, 1999) 
Alliance  
capability 
 
- Supply chain collaboration capability: unfreeze, transformation and continuous improving 
capability (Fawcett et al., 2008) 
Client perspective 
- Client’s Top Management Championship: level of participation in formulating a strategy; 
establishing goals and standards to monitor; clear vision (Chen et al., 2010) 
LSP perspective 
- Culture of trust and flexibility (Panayides and Gray, 1999) 
- Openness to new ways of thinking, to discover new knowledge, to improve joint performance 
(Zacharia et al., 2009) 
Mutual capability 
- Joint pulling; joint decision making; mutual respect (Deepen et al., 2008) 
- Joint exploitation of unique opportunities; looking for synergistic ways to do business; joint 
development of ideas (Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011) 
- Joint exploitation of opportunities; looking for synergies; joint idea development; sharing 
proprietary information (Sinkovics and Roath, 2004)  
- Redefinition of client's goals  (Bagchi and Virum, 1998)  
- Mutual  strategic management knowledge (Makukha and Gray, 2004) 
Organizational modes 
- Frequent face-to-face meetings, high level of joint decision-making, open sharing of 
information, free flow of useful and novel ideas, openness to new ways of thinking and 
discovering new knowledge. (Zacharia et al., 2009) 
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LSP  
operational  
flexibility 
 
Meeting changing demands 
- Fit towards client’s operational objectives (Bagchi and Virum, 1998) 
- Management of customers' supply chain; listening and responding to client's needs (Makukha 
and Gray, 2004) 
- Handling of unforeseen problems/changes; making adjustments; responding to requests 
(Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011) 
Proactively improvement 
- Proactive management of special needs and exceptions; the ability to handle changing carrier 
requirements (Gibson et al., 2002) 
- Proactive improvement: LSP continuously suggests improvements; in case of changes, LSPs 
modifies the system respectively; LSPs shows initiative to suggest improvements; LSPs shows a 
high level of innovation (Deepen et al., 2008) 
- Supply chain re-engineering (applying SC strategies: adapt modes of transport, 
consolidation/deconsolidation point, inventory centralization, warehouse management, 
reassignment of roles and responsibilities among supply chain entities) (Bhatnagar, 2000) 
- Co-operative and continuous improvements as carriers ability to make cost or service 
improvements when problems surfaced requiring partner's business knowledge (carrier 
involvement in joint problem-solving efforts with buyers and suppliers, in cost reduction 
programs; carriers being evaluated for continuous improvement) (Gentry, 1996a) 
Mutual efforts 
- Mutual adjustments making; processes for flexibility (Sinkovics and Roath, 2004) 
- Work together to respond to changing marketplaces and customer's needs (Tate, 1996) 
- Supply chain re-engineering (applying SC strategies: adapt modes of transport, 
consolidation/deconsolidation point, inventory centralization, warehouse management, 
reassignment of roles and responsibilities among supply chain entities) (Bhatnagar, 2000) 
Relational fit 
Organiza-
tional 
Compatibility  
- Shared culture and values, strategic fit, firm philosophy, vision, commitment to alliances (Tate, 
1996)  
- Compatible strategies, goals and objectives; similar management styles; compatible corporate 
cultures (Gibson et al., 2002) 
Partner de-
pendence 
- Partners are dependent for an effective solution; needed knowledge/skills the other 
possessed; needed each other to reach their goal) (Zacharia et al., 2009) 
- Win-win situation (Lambert et al., 1999) 
ALLIANCE STRUCTURE Understanding and Conceptualization 
LSP 
integration  
Strength of relationship 
- Type of agreement (“arm’s length” versus “strategic alliances”) (Gentry, 1996b; Makukha and 
Gray, 2004; Rogers and Daugherty, 1995) 
- Number of involved functions, time horizon, strength of ties and sharing (Lambert et al., 1999) 
- Long-term commitments; open communications/information sharing; cooperative continuous 
improvement; sharing of risks/rewards (Gentry, 1996a; b) 
Involvement in process 
- Involvement in buyer-supplier negotiation process (Carter and Ferrin, 1995) 
- Negotiation thoroughness: insisted on integrated logistics management; carefully handled 
staffing issues; considered quality issues, not just delivery performance (Hofenk et al., 2011) 
- Employee of logistics providers stationed on-site and full time by the client (Bagchi and Virum, 
1998) 
- Cross-functional/inter-organizational teams (Fawcett et al., 2006; Makukha and Gray, 2004) 
- Logistics information system as framework (Bagchi and Virum, 1998) 
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Formalization  
 
Specification 
- Client's clear definition of logistics management goals  (Bagchi and Virum, 1998) 
- Roles, responsibilities, policy guidelines, and procedures within (Makukha and Gray, 2004; Tate, 
1996) 
- Rules of engagement: written, detailed contract; conflict resolution process; formal process to 
analyze performance; process to renew, amend, or end contract (Gibson et al., 2002) 
- Operational business rules and procedures (regarding damage, returns, complaints, record-
keeping requirements, etc.) (Tate, 1996) 
Codification 
- Contract design (Lambert et al., 1999): Formal/informal (Frankel and Whipple, 1996), 
explicit/implicit (Kee-hung, 2009) 
- Contract formality: terms are written down; expectations are communicated; contractual terms 
are developed for coordination of activities; terms are verbalized and discussed (Hofenk et al., 
2011) 
- Internal authority: Threat of alternative corporate strategies and priorities brushing aside 
alliances (Emberson and Storey, 2006) 
- Control/power: equal power in the relationship; mutual authority to end the partnership; 
authority to require process changes by partner (Gibson et al., 2002) 
Social 
governance 
mechanisms 
Social contracts 
- Implicit contracts (Kee-hung, 2009) 
- Unwritten agreements enforced by the desire to create and maintain a positive reputation for 
integrity and fairness and build trust (Frankel and Whipple, 1996: 49) 
Socialization 
- Social events; joint workshops; on-site visits; regular suppliers conferences; team building 
exercise (Cousins and Menguc, 2006) 
- Workshops, strategic sessions, informal outings, special events (Van De Vijver et al., 2011) 
RELATIONAL BEHAVIOR Understanding and Conceptualization 
Trust 
 
- Culture of cooperation and trust; adversial views are placed by cooperation and loyalty; 
expectation of a long-term relationship (Gibson et al., 2002) 
- High integrity; counted on to do what is wright; sincere in their promise; treats our company 
fairly and justly; we trust completely (Hofenk et al., 2011) 
- Concerned about partner's success; consideration of partner's interests; consideration of 
partner's welfare (Nyaga et al., 2010) 
- Belief that partner is committed to other's long-term success (Lambert et al., 1999) 
- Builds over time on mutual understanding, communications, commitment, flexibility and 
fairness among involved parties (Tate, 1996) 
Alliance 
commitment  
- Top Management, broad-based functional, channel, and infrastructural/governance support 
(Fawcett et al., 2006) 
- Amount of specific investment (Gardner et al., 1994) 
- Long-term commitment (utilization of long-term carrier contracts; the carrier's participation in 
the strategic planning process of buyer-supplier partnership; assessment of carriers for their 
long-term financial stability) (Gentry, 1996a) 
- Very committed to the relationship; intended to maintain; effort to maintain; do almost 
everything to keep; cares great about long-term (Hofenk et al., 2011) 
- Expectation of long duration; committed to supplier/buyer; expectation of growing strength; 
considerable effort and investments undertaken) (Nyaga et al., 2010) 
- Dedicated investments: dedicated personnel; proprietary expertise and/or technology; 
significant investments (Nyaga et al., 2010) 
- Mutual commitment (all in together to meet our customers' needs, working through hard 
times) (Tate, 1996) 
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Relational 
quality 
 
- Guanxi (good relationships between top management; logistics managers; logistics 
employees) (Chen et al., 2010) 
- Relationship stability and efficiency  (Emberson and Storey, 2006) 
- Relationship stability (how well partners have worked together) (Kee-hung, 2009) 
- Social exchange behavior (trust, equity, commitment, conflict and opportunisms) (Moore and 
Cunningham III, 1999) 
- Relational quality (trust, relationship-specific investments, commitment, satisfaction) (Nyaga 
and Whipple, 2011) 
OPERATIONAL PROCESS DESIG Understanding and Conceptualization 
Communication 
and information 
exchange 
 
- Communication (well working of information exchange; speed of information exchange; 
reliability of information; suitability of the way of information exchange) (Deepen et al., 2008) 
- Systematic operational information exchange (Gardner et al., 1994) 
- Open communication and information sharing requiring multiple levels, access to production 
forecasts or shipping schedules, computer linkages between carriers (frequent carrier 
communications with buyers and suppliers; carriers having access to production schedules or  
 - shipping forecast; carriers being linked to buyers and suppliers through computer information 
systems) (Gentry, 1996a) 
- exchange of information; speed of exchange; reliability of information; adequacy of exchange) 
(Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011) 
- Communications (balanced, two-way, multilevel, joint teams) 
- Risk/reward sharing (willingness of either party to take a short-term "Hit" for the good of the 
other) (Lambert et al., 1999) 
- Information and communications technology:  Communication systems (e.g. EDI, Bar codes, 
track and trace) (Mortensen and Lemoine, 2008) 
- Information sharing (inform in advance; information is provided; keep informed) (Nyaga et al., 
2010) 
- Communication (horizontal/vertical communication, frequency, systems (media/personal)) 
(Tate, 1996) 
- Communication process (meeting frequently; amount of information shared; flow of 
information (usefulness, novelty) (Zacharia et al., 2009) 
Joint planning  - Tool for cost-based pricing (fixed (depreciation and interest related to capital investment in 
vehicles, insurance, administration costs, taxes, others) and variable costs (repairs and 
maintenance, fuel costs, tire costs, wages, others) (Bø and Hammervoll, 2010) 
- Supply chain integration (scheduling; order management; forecasting; operation planning) 
(Cousins and Menguc, 2006) 
- Planning (Gardner et al., 1994) 
- Open discussion of demand forecast; joint development of service schedules and goals; 
participating in each other's strategic planning (Gibson et al., 2002) 
- Design principles of physical distribution channel (Principle of transportation costs; separation 
principle; unit load principle; Weber's location principles; selective stocking principle; 
postponement; uncertainty absorption principle; Principle of data compatibility; Co-
ordination principle) (Gill and Allerheiligen, 1996) 
- Coordination and pricing policies (Lei et al., 2006) 
- Joint planning (joint teams, regular meetings among managers) (Lambert et al., 1999) 
- Joint relationship effort (joint teams; joint planning; joint decisions) (Nyaga et al., 2010) 
- partners used intensive collaborative planning; joint decision making; joint goal setting 
(Zacharia et al., 2009) 
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Performance 
control and 
measurement 
 
- Joint performance measurements (Bagchi and Virum, 1998) 
- mutual operating controls (Gardner et al., 1994) 
- Performance measurement tool (Kleinsorge, 1991) 
- Joint operating controls (jointly developed control measures, changes of partner operations) 
(Lambert et al., 1999) 
Risk/reward 
sharing 
 
- Sharing of benefits and burdens(Gardner et al., 1994) 
- Sharing of risks and rewards reflected in specialized or dedicated transport 
equipment/investments, cancellation clause and fair compensation (carriers providing 
dedicated equipment or drivers; using carrier contracts cancellation or penalty clauses for 
service failures; carrier being responsive to unforeseen special requests/scheduling changes) 
(Gentry, 1996a) 
- Shared risk and reward: specific rewards for outstanding performance; penalties for 
unacceptable performance; equal distribution of planned and unexpected costs; willingness 
to share cost savings (Gibson et al., 2002) 
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2.9.2 Appendix 2: Overview of performance impact factors of horizontal alliances 
ALLIANCE COMPOSITION Understanding and Conceptualization 
Organizational complexity 
Number of 
involved 
parties 
- Number of partners, nature of their role and contribution; level of mutual trust (Midoro and 
Pitto, 2000) 
- Number of partners and functional scope: areas of value creation (production, marketing and 
sales, procurement, human resources, research and product development, IT and 
administration and finance and accounting)(Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012) 
Task 
complexity 
 
Scope of activities 
- Service scope: mode of transport; value-added services(Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) 
- Geographical scope: national versus international scope (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) 
- Scope of alliance activities; environmental uncertainty surrounding these activities; adequacy 
of skills and competencies within the alliance (Midoro and Pitto, 2000) 
- Activities (waterborne transport; port terminal; inland transport; logistics services) and nature 
(joint scheduling; space agreements; joint services; cost and investment sharing; joint 
marketing activities) (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999) 
Operational fit 
Resource/ 
competence 
compatibility  
- Physical assets; less-tangible assets; organizational capabilities (Cruijssen et al., 2007b)  
- Business activities and core competencies, geographical network and  customer portfolio 
(Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) 
Relational fit 
Organi-
zational 
compatibility 
- Corporate structure (similarity of companies' financial strength, managerial strength, 
management style, corporate culture) (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) 
Rivalry  - Competitive tension due to overlaps in geography and competences (Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012) 
 
ALLIANCE STRUCTURE Understanding and Conceptualization 
Formalization  
 
Contract design 
- Contractual agreements; Joint venture; minority stakes (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999) 
- Verbal agreements, contractual agreements that involve no equity stakes, minority 
equity agreements, joint venture agreements (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011) 
Formal governance mechanisms 
- Operational formalization (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) 
- Formal control mechanism: written documents, detailed standard operating procedures 
(Wallenburg and Raue, 2011) 
Social governance 
mechanisms 
- Mutual influence: equal say and influencing right (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) 
RELATIONAL BEHAVIOR Understanding and Conceptualization 
Commitment  - Cooperation commitment (attitude towards long-term investments, resource 
dedication, cooperation specific sacrifices (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) 
Conflict 
 
- Conflict: extent, functionality (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011) 
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Relational quality 
 
- Relational capital: social control mechanisms: close personal interaction, mutual 
respect, trust, personal friendship, high reciprocity (Wallenburg and Raue, 2011) 
OPERATIONAL PROCESS DESIGN Understanding and Conceptualization 
Joint route 
planning 
- Scheduling and price (Bilotkach, 2007) 
- Joint route planning (parallel; complementary; mixed ) (Chen and Chen, 2003; Park, 
1997; Yan and Chen, 2007) 
- Joint route planning (Cruijssen et al., 2007a) 
- Joint Planning under dynamic capacities (level of discount rates) (Hernández et al., 
2011) 
- Lack of appropriate information and communication Technology (ICT) as impediments 
(Cruijssen et al., 2007b) 
Benefit allocation - Lack of fair allocation mechanism determining and dividing the gains as impediment 
(Cruijssen et al., 2007b) 
- Unequal negotiation positions of partners (Cruijssen et al., 2007b) 
- - Request allocation and profit sharing (game theory) (Krajewska et al., 2008) 
- - Revenue-sharing mechanisms (static, dynamic) (Wright et al., 2010) 
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3. LOGISTICS ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES: WHERE ARE 
THEY? 
 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Due to the continued high failure rate of logistics alliances, we propose 
incorporating the widely neglected dynamic capabilities approach into the 
explanation of logistics alliance performance.  
Design/methodology/approach: We identify specific characteristics of logistics 
alliances that we use to argumentatively develop our framework of logistics 
alliance management capabilities. 
Findings: We propose an initial framework of logistics alliance management 
capabilities, based on the dynamic capabilities approach of strategic management, 
with the aim of improving logistics alliance success. 
Research implications: Our framework offers a basis for a wider range of 
empirical studies. Qualitative researchers are encouraged to further specify and 
better understand the sub-processes that underlie logistics alliance management 
capabilities in different alliance settings. Quantitative studies could help to 
reliably assess the differences and performance implications of these capabilities. 
Practical implications: Our conceptualization supports managers in their relevant 
strategic and organizational attempts to enhance logistics alliance success. 
Originality/value: This paper contributes to the logistics literature by making a 
more general yet established construct accessible to logistics scholars and 
practitioners. The roots of our logistics alliance management capability construct 
in dynamic capabilities provide a framework that is new and potentially more 
comprehensive than the collection of somewhat isolated alliance success factors 
that have hitherto been proposed in the logistics literature. 
Keywords: Strategic alliances, Logistics (Business), Alliance capabilities, 
Logistics Service Providers 
Type of paper: Conceptual paper 
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Alliances between supply chain entities, such as buyers, suppliers, third-party providers, and 
customers have grown in popularity and have been promoted as an important component of 
the corporate and competitive strategy of the involved firms. Logistics involves the 
management of a wide range of core activities for the spatial and temporal transfer of goods, 
services, and related information, as associated with order processes, inventory management, 
transportation, warehousing/ handling, and facility network management (Bowersox et al., 
2007). Recently, value-added services, supply chain management, and financial services have 
complemented these traditional logistics functions (Carbone and Stone, 2005; Delfmann et al., 
2002). Logistics alliances gained attention due to the outsourcing trend of logistics activities 
in the 1980s and 1990s, which aimed to reduce costs, respond flexibly to demand fluctuations, 
and reduce capital investment (Daugherty, 2011; Frankel and Whipple, 1996b; Gunasekaran 
and Ngai, 2003). The importance of logistics alliances has continued to grow due to ongoing 
deregulation, globalization, and reduced time for the order fulfillment processes (Hertz, 
2001). However, not all logistics alliances are successful. For example, according to Dittmann 
(2010), “successful collaborative relationships between a firm and its core suppliers are still 
rare”; this is reflected in the fact that almost 70 percent of strategic alliances fail (Zineldin and 
Bredenlow, 2003). 
Thus, although the importance of logistics alliances is widely acknowledged and such 
alliances have been studied extensively for more than two decades in a great variety of aspects 
(e.g. with regard to their types and governance forms (Golicic et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 
1996; Rogers and Daugherty, 1995; Tokman et al., 2007), success factors (Frankel and 
Whipple, 1996a; Gibson et al., 2002; Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003) and outcomes (Cruijssen et 
al., 2007c; Ellram and Krause, 1994; Goh and Uncles, 2003; Sjögren and Söderberg, 2011), 
their failure rate remains surprisingly high and not entirely explained. Daugherty (2011), for 
  
 
77 
example, suggests that the current logistics alliance models may be incomplete and do not 
make it possible to monitor the viability and vitality of the relationship continuously.  
Against this backdrop, it appears useful and valuable to consider additional perspectives and 
constructs. The study of alliances in the general management, strategy, and organization 
theory literatures has offered such newer constructs: alliance management capability as a 
specific dynamic capability is seen as a major source of alliance success (Kale and Singh, 
2007; Schreiner et al., 2009) but has not been incorporated into the logistics and SCM alliance 
management discussions to date. We suggest that there is considerable value in linking the 
logistics alliance literature with the dynamic capabilities literature. Logistics research will 
potentially benefit from a new and important theory that contributes to the explanation of 
alliance success and superior firm performance that should also be useful and beneficial for 
logistics services. This study seeks to provide a first step towards creating this link. As an 
understanding of logistics alliances based on the dynamic capabilities approach has not yet 
been advanced in the logistics literature, this paper develops a specific logistics alliance 
management capability framework that leverages the explanatory potential of the dynamic 
capabilities approach for logistics alliance research and management. In this way, we 
contribute to theory development in the field of logistics alliance research, but also support 
managers in their relevant strategic and organizational considerations and the priorities they 
must adopt in order to enhance logistics alliance success and, thereby, firm performance. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The alliance management capability construct based on the 
dynamic capabilities approach is briefly explained next. In the following section, specific 
characteristics of logistics alliances are derived and the general alliance management 
capability construct for logistics alliances is specified and integrated into our framework of 
logistics alliance management capabilities. The final section concludes and points out avenues 
for further research. 
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3.3 THE DYNAMIC ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES CONSTRUCT 
With regard to evolutionary economics (Zollo and Winter, 2002), and resource-based view 
reasoning (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007), the strategic management literature 
has devoted a lot of attention to the construct of dynamic capabilities (and alliance 
management capabilities). Extant studies provide strong conceptual and empirical support for 
the positive impact that a firm’s dynamic alliance management capability can have on various 
outcome measures, such as alliance success, firm performance, and stock market returns 
(Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Schreiner 
et al., 2009).  
Dynamic alliance management capabilities (DAMC) are perceived as a multidimensional 
construct of specific organizational routines (Døving and Gooderham, 2008; Sarkar et al., 
2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Schreiner et al., 2009), reflected in behavioral patterns and 
processes that address key alliance management issues (Jones et al., 1998; Sarkar et al., 2009) 
such as absorptive capacity (Mowery et al., 1996) and relational capability (Capaldo, 2007; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Wang, 2007). Because DAMCs enable firms to “purposefully create, 
extend, or modify the firm’s resource base, augmented to include the resources of its alliance 
partners” (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, p. 1195), these firms are able to face, or even create 
successful market changes and realize sustainable competitive advantages (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). 
Schreiner et al. (2009), Schilke and Goerzen (2010), and Sarkar et al. (2009), among others, 
have conceptualized DAMC according to five constitutive elements: coordination, learning, 
proactiveness, transformation, and relational governance. Because “capabilities are complex, 
structured, and multidimensional” (Winter, 2003, p. 992), the design and coherent interplay of 
these five dimensions determines a firm’s dynamic alliance management capability. These 
dimensions constitute the firm’s systematic method for modifying alliance-related routines, 
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which means that they represent a high-order capability (Zollo and Winter, 2002) that arises 
from learning about how to manage alliances (Cyert, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Learning occurs when organizations modify their actions according to the difference between 
expected and obtained outcomes (“error detection and correction in theories-in-use”) (Argyris, 
1978). The existing literature has acknowledged and empirically supported learning 
mechanisms as the main drivers for a firm’s dynamic alliance management capability (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002) and has shown them to be positively affected by a 
firm’s alliance experience (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010) and a dedicated alliance function 
(Kale et al., 2002).  
3.4 A LOGISTICS ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES MODEL 
In the general strategy field, the general dynamic capability construct is specified to 
functional domains in order for them to be more concretely analyzed and more specific 
implications to be formulated. For example, dynamic capabilities in purchasing (Schlömer, 
2011) and new product development (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) are identified and specific 
routines and adaptation mechanisms are forwarded. In order to leverage this potential and to 
yield more meaningful results for logistics alliance management, there is a need for a specific 
logistics alliance management capabilities (LAMC) model that builds on and further specifies 
the general DAMC framework to the peculiarities of the logistics alliance context.  
Based on the main drivers of logistics alliance success discussed in the logistics alliance 
literature (see Table 4) and the basic dimensions of DAMC (Zollo and Winter, 2002), the 
present paper proposes a specific three-dimensional LAMC model that illustrates how the 
general DAMC logic is specified to the logistics alliance context and how LAMC can explain 
improved logistics alliance success.   
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Table 4 Overview of identified logistics alliance success factors, alliance management 
capabilities dimensions and derived logistics alliance management capabilities 
Logistics alliance success factors DAMC dimensions  LAMC dimension 
Alliance governance  
 Partner(s) selection 
 Alliance type choice 
Proactiveness  
Identification of valuable 
alliance opportunities 
 
Alliance governance  
 Identification of valuable 
Partner and alliance type 
choice  
Operational process design 
 Information exchange  
 Supply chain planning  
Coordination 
 Synchronization of activities 
 Synergy realization 
 Information exchange 
Coordination 
Coordination and 
communication based on e-
technologies  
Control and monitoring 
 Alliance performance  
 Alliance reorganization  
Transformation 
Change management  
Monitoring and adaptation  
Monitoring and initiation of 
alliance modification  
Trust and commitment  
 Managerial behavior 
 Involvement 
 Conflict management 
Relational governance  
 Openness  
 Trust 
 Commitment 
 Conflict management 
Relational governance  
Creation and maintenance of 
effective working atmosphere   
 
 
Learning  
Absorption, seizing and 
integration of new knowledge 
Learning mechanisms 
Continuous improvement of 
alliance management 
capabilities through learning 
 
 
The three layers of the LAMC model are: (1) operational logistics activities (micro-level) that 
deal with the execution of joint (alliance) logistics processes; (2) logistics alliance 
management routines (macro-level), which ensure effective alliance management and, 
therefore, alliance performance; and (3) learning mechanisms (meta-level) that aim to 
improve the firm’s logistics alliance management routines continuously over time. The 
peculiarities of the logistics market result in differential requirements for the design of all 
LAMC dimensions. These peculiarities include the variety of supply chain actors and 
different logistics alliances constellations (LSPs, OEMs, combinations), the scope and 
diversity of logistics activities that call for a significant integration/coordination of joint 
logistics processes, analytical, dense and detailed information exchange and monitoring 
mechanisms, and the moderate velocity of this market characterized by detailed and analytical 
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routines based primarily on existing knowledge that is dependent on data and information 
systems (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Figure 66 summarizes our model of LAMC as 
specified dynamic alliance management capability.  
 
 
Figure 6 Logistics alliance management capabilities model. 
Based on general framework of Zollo and Winter (2002). 
 
The operational logistics processes encompass order processes, inventory management, 
transportation, warehousing and handling, facility network management, and value-added 
services. The way in which these services are performed is mostly based on learned, stable, 
collective, and approved behavior patterns that result from tacit knowledge, prior experience, 
and organizational learning (Winter, 2003). Depending on the aim of a given alliance, a subset 
of these activities is performed within (or on behalf of) the logistics alliance (see micro-level 
in Figure 6). These activities require specific adaptations depending on the alliance partner(s) 
– either in the technologies used, the location or sequence of physical processes performed, or 
underlying informational processes. From an LAMC perspective, the execution of logistics 
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activities and their adequate adaptation relative to the specific alliance context is ensured and 
improved due to learning mechanisms over time (as illustrated by arrow 1 in Figure 6), which 
results in the micro-level foundation of LAMC. For instance, within a manufacturer-logistics 
service provider (LSP) alliance that either focuses on simple shipments, or on highly 
integrated operational activities (such as the assembly of doors within a customer’s car 
manufacturing process), the effectiveness and efficiency of the logistics activities depends on 
the LSP’s expertise in the respective activity and its adaptation to the specific customer. Prior 
alliance experience with the respective activity and partner(s) enables the LSP to improve its 
service offerings and joint work due to the knowledge it has gained about (a) specific 
customer’s peculiarities, such as IT systems, processes, and procedures; and (b) potential 
opportunities, obstacles, and problem solutions within the operation of specific logistics 
activities, such as time-sensitive assembly of goods within a customer’s process.  
The performance of the operational logistics activities is impacted by a firm’s logistics 
alliance management capability. In particular, the LAMC of a firm is reflected in the approved 
and effective execution of these operational activities and, more importantly, allows this 
execution to be adapted to the requirements of various alliance contexts, such as a 
manufacturer–LSP alliance or LSP–LSP alliance constellation, based on gained alliance 
knowledge (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) (see macro-level and arrow 2 in Figure 6). This 
logistics alliance management capability incorporates alliance and relational governance, 
coordination, and monitoring and adaptation routines. While alliance and relational 
governance routines are somewhat generic alliance management routines, the coordination 
and the monitoring and adaptation routines address peculiarities of logistics alliances, 
incorporating the high reliance on quality and the degree of data and information exchange, as 
well as control and monitoring mechanisms to steer the effective execution of the operational 
processes (named above), thereby improving the logistics alliance’s performance.  
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Firstly, a firm needs alliance governance routines that ensure (a) a proactive search, 
identification, and evaluation of potentially valuable alliance opportunities (for example, 
vertical, horizontal or lateral alliances; bilateral or multi-lateral alliances); (b) the choice of an 
adequate relationship type (for example, joint venture versus contractual outsourcing 
relationship; exploitation versus exploration alliance); and (c) the clarification of goals, rules, 
responsibilities, and specific investments among the partner(s) (such as joint operational, 
service, or strategic improvements). These decisions define the fundamental organizational 
frame of the alliance, such as the alliance governance structure, and therefore strongly 
determine the execution and evolution of the alliance activities. Apart from these fundamental 
conditions, effective logistics alliance management requires relational governance routines 
that are individually adjusted to a firm’s alliances and partners to create and maintain an 
effective working atmosphere among the partners in all of a firm’s alliances involving trust, 
commitment, openness, and specific partner-oriented conflict management and managerial 
behavior. The attitude between partners will have a major impact on the degree and quality of 
information flow, the decision making method, and therefore the effectiveness of all 
operational alliance activities.  
Because the performance of logistics alliance activities is highly dependent on the degree and 
quality of data and information flow and on the synchronization of supply chain activities, 
coordination routines are required in order to ensure effective information exchange and 
supply chain planning among partners. These routines involve a firm’s ability and willingness 
to exchange information and to plan logistics activities with the alliance partner(s) that are 
effectively based on the utilization of e-technologies. This implies the implementation, use, 
maintenance, and alignment of data and information systems within the organization, as well 
as with the partners’ technical requirements and standards. These systems, which include 
Efficient Customer Response (ECR), Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), Continuous 
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Replenishment (CR), Collaborative Transportation Management (CTM), and Collaborative 
Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) process related systems, allow for 
operational improvements, competency development, and learning between firms, and 
therefore increased operational performance and alliance success (Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003; 
Smaåros, 2003; Thomas, 2010).  
In order to leverage the coordination of joint activities and the use of e-technologies 
purposefully within their alliance operations, firms need specific monitoring and adaptation 
routines. These routines ensure that reasonable performance measures are defined, in areas 
such as financial, productivity, quality, and customer satisfaction (Kampstra et al., 2006), that 
are technically applicable and make it possible to interpret meaningful results out of the data 
pool provided. Therefore, adaptation routines are crucial for firms that require general 
openness and flexibility towards internal and external change requests, to develop and initiate 
alliance modifications, such as alliance governance or route planning changes based on 
measured alliance performance outcomes. In a manufacturer–LSP alliance, for example, the 
choice of an adequate alliance governance structure that includes a clear assignment of 
responsibilities, reward, and risk sharing instruments, significantly impacts the partners’ 
motivation and commitment to the alliance, due to predefined consequences (beneficial or 
unfavorable). Such alliance governance structures necessarily differ across an LSP’s various 
manufacturer–LSP alliances: depending on such factors as partner characteristics and 
preferences, the adequate adaptation and implementation of alliance governance structures to 
different alliance situations reflects a firm’s LAMC.  
Furthermore, the implementation of adequate monitoring measurements to identify 
optimization potential and error sources is necessary in order to develop and initiate practical 
implications, such as adjustments of existing IT systems for an improved information flow. In 
particular, the identified challenges within the alliance requires adequate behavior in terms of 
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communicating and interacting with the customer, allowing for changes in cases such as a 
customer’s misuse of existing IT systems, through information meetings, trainings, or even 
penalties if no improvements occur over time.  
In order to realize ongoing improvements of operational logistics activities performance, and 
therefore logistics alliances success over time, learning mechanisms as a high-order dynamic 
capability arising from prior alliance experience are needed (see meta-level and arrow 3 in 
Figure 6) to ensure continuous development, reflection, and adaptation of logistics alliance 
management routines and activities providing a dynamic perspective (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Because these learning mechanisms improve a firm’s alliance management capability, 
and therefore alliance success, they yield practical implications for purposeful LAMC 
development and, consequently, constant logistics alliance success improvements. The 
strategic management literature has identified the implementation of an effective alliance 
learning process and the realization of a dedicated alliance function as practical, 
organizational measures that ensure the articulation, codification, sharing, and internalization 
of alliance management knowledge within the organization (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale 
et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007) to enhance alliance success over time (Hofer et al., 2009; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). In the logistics field, this can imply such developments as the 
extension of existing customer relationship management functions to incorporate a systematic 
alliance knowledge management as one of various logistics-oriented implications from the 
DAMC framework. For instance, a LSP that has cooperated or continues to cooperate with a 
shipper, with a focus on transshipment activities, has gained knowledge about areas such as 
technical requirements, potential obstacles, and improvement methods in this specific alliance 
setting; this enables the LSP to leverage this know-how in a new alliance or in the 
management of other alliances. In particular, if a LSP knows that the usage of a specific IT 
system or tool is one of the main alliance obstacles, it might institutionalize IT training with 
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its alliance partners from the outset in order to reduce potential error sources.  
Furthermore, the logistics market is characterized by a variety of supply chain actors that 
primarily focus on logistics activities. Therefore, logistics alliances comprise different 
constellations (LSPs, OEMs, combinations) that might also be reflected in relevant facets of 
DAMC. The ability to identify and adjust opportunities for an alliance with a supplier from 
the perspective of an OEM will require different sets of monitoring measures and routines 
than the same aspects would in a LSP–LSP cooperation. Also, the logistics industry structure 
and market environments represent a rather moderate velocity market, which results in 
different requirements for the design of routines and, therefore, firm’s capabilities. Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000) suggested that this kind of market is characterized by detailed and 
analytical routines that are based primarily on existing knowledge. These tendencies towards 
analytical, dense, and detailed information exchange are already apparent in the high 
dependency of logistics alliance success on data and information systems and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
3.5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
Alliances are a relatively well-studied phenomenon in the logistics field. However, few 
studies have attempted to link logistics alliance performance to the existence of specific 
organizational capabilities of the involved firms. This finding is surprising given the insights 
that capability-oriented studies have been able to achieve in the strategy field, and it suggests 
valuable potential for an application in the logistics domain. This paper has proposed an initial 
model of logistics alliance management capabilities that provides a new perspective to the 
explanation of logistics alliance performance and success.  
Substantial additional research efforts are required. As the number of theoretical and 
empirical contributions to the topic of DAMC is quite small, studies that follow a quantitative 
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research design will tend to base their construct operationalizations and measures on existing 
DAMC scales from the strategy literature. While this approach has some advantages, in terms 
of circumventing the arduous process of generating and validating logistics-specific measures 
of alliance capabilities, their explanatory contributions are likely to be of only a rather general 
nature, with few touch-points to logistics activities and processes. Due to the above-
mentioned disadvantages of large-scale, quantitative studies, we suggest that explorative 
research designs are particularly useful at the current theoretical development stage of the 
DAMC concept in logistics (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008; Gammelgaard, 2004; Naslund, 2002; 
Yin, 2003). An exploratory research design provides an open approach towards the 
identification of specific LAMC. The exploration of their design, organizational determinants, 
and interplay makes it possible to develop a logistics business-related construct and 
implications for managers to strengthen alliance success. Future research should build upon 
an explorative design in order to provide more in-depth answers to the following questions: 
 What are the constitutive elements of a specific LAMC and how do these elements 
interact? 
 What are the effects of differences in the design of these constitutive elements?  
 How can LAMC be purposefully developed?  
 What are impediments to the development and leverage of a firm’s LAMC? 
As DAMC are embodied in firm-specific alliance management behavioral patterns, routines, 
processes, and structures, case studies in the logistics industry provide promising research 
opportunities. In order to uncover the complex and evolving nature of the dynamic alliance 
routines, future data collection should benefit from discovery-oriented in-depth interviews 
with key informants in order to gain a deep and comprehensive understanding of their 
experience with regard to the specific logistics alliance context under investigation. 
Longitudinal case studies are suggested because of their ability to investigate contemporary 
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phenomena within their real-life, highly complex contexts over time (Wilhelm, 2011). Such 
longitudinal case analyses could focus on investigating firms’ alliance management activities 
within the organization, such as the interplay with different internal stakeholders, or 
organizational mechanisms; externally with regard to the partner(s); as well as identifying 
continuous alliance modifications as a firm’s LAMC impact to meet or create changes, either 
within the alliance constellation (such as new partner entrance) or externally in the 
environment (such as new technologies or market offerings). 
Contrasting multiple-case designs (Yin, 2003) involving successful and less successful 
logistics alliances of firms competing in alliance intensive industries also seem to be fertile as 
they yield differences in a firm’s LAMC by comparing these alliance-experienced firms. This 
makes it possible to identify and analyze relevant determinants of the suitability of alliance 
management capabilities. In addition, an investigation of the role of LAMC in different 
alliance types, such as exploration or exploitation relationships, is recommended in order to 
explore further differences in alliance management capabilities designs and modes of 
functioning. Overall, these avenues for further research will potentially enable scholars to 
gain additional results about logistics alliances and the role that dynamic capabilities play for 
their successful functioning. This conceptual paper has offered the first links between the 
capability research focus and the specific logistics functions and tasks.  
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4. THE DYNAMICS OF LSP ALLIANCE FAILURES: A GROUNDED THEORY 
APPROACH   
 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
The paper explores the dynamics and mechanisms of alliance failure. Based on a case analysis 
employing the qualitative method of grounded theory, this research indicates that alliances 
between Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) fail due to an iterative self-enforcing process. 
This evolutionary process is marked by: (1) limiting alliance setup, (2) an inferior alliance 
structure, (3) non-satisfactory performance, and (4) stagnation and failure. The underlying 
mechanisms that drive LSP alliances through these stages towards failure consist of: (a) low 
partner dependence, (b) a lack of benefit allocation, (c) non-agreement on adaptations, and (d) 
a lack of alliance value. The self-enforcement of failure emerges as non-satisfactory 
performance, which reduces the likelihood of alliance adaptations. This limited alliance 
adaptability, however, fails to improve future alliance execution and performance, leading 
finally to alliance failure. The research provides an initial process-based conceptualization of 
LSP alliance failure. Accordingly, the research provides initial and valuable insights into the 
black box process of alliance failure which add to our existing understanding of LSP alliances 
and provide a promising starting point for further research. By explaining the drivers and their 
underlying mechanisms, this study helps alliance managers to develop meaningful 
implications to prevent alliance failure and improve alliance performance. 
 
Keywords: Logistics business; Strategic alliances; Collaboration; Logistics service provider; 
Alliance evolution 
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Over recent decades, horizontal alliances between LSPs have increasingly gained attention 
both in academia and in practice (Carbone, 2005; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Long, 2015). LSP 
alliances as “voluntary initiated, long-term relationships among autonomous LSPs… that 
strive for benefits that could not be achieved by the individual companies alone” (Schmoltzi 
and Wallenburg, 2012: 54) allow partnering LSPs to cope with both the fierceness of 
competition in global markets and the pressure of increasing customer demands. Through 
horizontal alliances, LSPs increase their productivity, service portfolio and quality while 
reducing costs, yielding competitive advantages and thus improved market position (Carbone, 
2005; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). These alliance benefits 
emerge due to the realization of economies of scale (i.e., resource and knowledge sharing), 
economies of scope (optimized asset and capacity utilization, minimized empty mileage) and 
specialization in core activities (reduced costs of non-core/supporting activities). Prominent 
examples of LSP alliances can be found in the aviation industry (e.g., Star Alliance, 
Oneworld, SkyTeam), the maritime shipping industry (Midoro et al., 2005; Midoro and Pitto, 
2000), and also increasingly in the freight market (Klaas-Wissing and Albers, 2010). 
According to empirical surveys, almost 60 percent of German LSPs engage in at least one 
horizontal partnership (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012) and over 30 formal LSP alliances 
are created solely in Belgium and the Netherlands (Cruijssen et al., 2007b). Despite the 
growing relevance of horizontal LSP alliances in practice, a large percentage do not meet the 
partners’ expectations, and may even be considered failures (Kampstra, 2006; Stank, 2001; 
Wilding and Humphries, 2006). Alliances are considered to be failures if performance 
expectations are not met, no value is created, and/or alliances “persist beyond their useful 
life” (Inkpen and Ross, 2001; Wittmann, 2007).  
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While scholars argue that LSP alliance failure may emerge due to the strong independence of 
and rivalry among partnering LSPs, yielding a high risk of opportunism and expressive 
management complexity (Rindfleisch, 2000; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012), the empirical 
evidence is very limited on LSP alliance management in general, and LSP alliance failure in 
particular. The only exception is Cruijssen et al.’s (2007b) initial attempts towards an 
explanation of LSP alliance failure by recognizing inter-organizational impediments (partner 
selection, a fair allocation mechanism, the unequal negotiation positions of partners, and 
information and communication technology (ICT)). The sparse literature on this phenomenon 
is surprising given the growing importance of horizontal alliances for LSPs and their impact 
on LSPs’ value (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012). Among the 
reasons for this shortcoming are that logistics scholars have traditionally spent considerable 
effort in explaining mainly vertical logistics alliances, thus explaining major gaps in our 
understanding of horizontal LSP alliances. The initial scholarly work on LSP alliances 
emphasizes either: (a) the identification of success factors and their correlation with alliance 
outcomes (Krajewska et al., 2008; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2012; Wallenburg and Raue, 2011), or (b) the operationalization and 
quantification of costs savings based on simulation models and success stories (Chen and 
Chen, 2003; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Wright et al., 2010), i.e., in the context of maritime 
shipping (Midoro et al., 2005; Midoro and Pitto, 2000) and the airline industry (Chen and 
Chen, 2003; Fan et al., 2001; Yan and Chen, 2007). Thus, the prior research recognizes the 
importance of horizontal alliances for LSPs’ value, but very little is known about the dynamic 
process of alliance evolution, incorporating both alliance success and failure. The scarcity of 
the (empirical) research on LSP alliance failure causes a “process black box”, resulting in an 
incomplete understanding and explanation of LSP alliances and how they evolve over time. 
However, given the widely acknowledged difficulty of alliance management yielding failure 
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rates of strategic alliances up to 70 percent (Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003), it is crucial that 
both scholars and managers gain insight into the reasons for alliance failure (Wittmann, 
2007). This holds true in particular for LSP alliances due to: (a) their high degree of 
independence and rivalry, and (b) the significant operational integration required to capitalize 
an alliance’s potential, increasing managerial complexity and thus the likelihood of alliance 
failure. To avoid and cope successfully with the problems and risks accompanying LSP 
alliances, further research is needed on the dynamics of alliance failure, extending our 
understanding of LSP alliances and adding to our practical knowledge of how to management 
them (Lambert et al., 1999) and what is required for improving alliances (Wittmann, 2007). 
To address this research gap in the dynamics of LSP alliance failure (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; 
Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003), I conduct a grounded theory-based case analysis. Based on 
the case study of THE ALLIANCE, a multilateral LSP alliance, I gain new insights into the 
process of LSP alliance failure by emphasizing its drivers and underlying mechanisms. As 
such, this paper advances horizontal LSP alliance theory and practice by taking an explorative 
view of the alliance failure process by considering its underlying mechanisms and their 
functioning over the whole alliance lifecycle. This process-based conceptualization of LSP 
alliance failure provides new insights into the mechanisms that drive an alliance towards 
failure and thus adds to our understanding of LSP alliance evolution. These findings help 
managers to develop meaningful implications to prevent failure and improve alliances’ 
performance. Thus, the research results serve as a starting point for further research and for 
managers to take actions to prevent alliance failure and thus improve the likelihood of alliance 
success.  
The study is structured as follows. The following paragraph synthesizes the current 
knowledge of horizontal LSP alliance management and failure. The next chapter describes the 
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research design based on an explorative case study of THE ALLIANCE, a multilateral LSP 
alliance. Following the qualitative method of grounded theory, the results that emerged from 
the data are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion and considerations of 
further research.  
4.3 FAILURE OF LSP ALLIANCES 
During the 1980s and going into the 1990s, vertical logistics alliances increasingly gained 
importance as firms began to outsource logistics functions to third parties to meet increasing 
customer demands for speed, reach, quality and affordability of logistics services (Bowersox, 
1989; Daugherty, 2011; Ellram and Cooper, 1990). Horizontal LSP alliances as “voluntarily 
initiated, long-term relationships among autonomous LSPs that operate on the same stage of 
the supply chain… [and] strive for benefits that could not be achieved by the individual 
companies alone” (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012: 54 ) emerged more recently. LSPs as 
“companies which perform logistics activities on behalf of others” (Delfmann; et al., 2002: 
204) build horizontal alliances primarily for two reasons: first, to realize efficiency gains 
though the optimization of capacity and inventory management (Cruijssen et al., 2007b), and 
second, to improve customer service by pooling complementary assets, resources and 
competencies, such as, LSPs’ geographic networks (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011). Due to these potential benefits, alliances allow the LSPs involved to 
generate competitive advantage. Meanwhile vertical LSP relationships are traditionally 
differentiated among the chosen governance structure (transactional versus partnership-based 
agreement) (Daugherty, 2011) or their degree of partner integration (operational versus 
strategic partnerships) (Lambert et al., 1999; Mortensen and Lemoine, 2008; Stefanson, 
2006). More recently, Schmoltzi and Wallenburg (2011) conceptualized LSP alliances as 
multidimensional systems varying in terms of their contractual, organizational, functional, 
geographical, service and resource scope.  
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The management of LSP alliances as cooperative endeavors among autonomous LSPs is not 
based on legal entities. This informal and non-hierarchical nature of alliances differs 
significantly from the governance of organizations, M&A or equity-based cooperation. 
Alliances (as social networks) build on “pro-social feelings and acts of reciprocity, rather than 
relations of dominance” (Bunge, 1996: 271).  
In general, the challenge of multilateral alliance management lies in the coordination of 
interactions among independent partners without the benefit of a hierarchical authority in 
order to create and extract alliance value (Dhanarag and Parkhe, 2006; Grandori and Soda, 
1995). Given the strong rivalry among partnering LSPs acting as (either close or distant) 
competitors in the market, the complexity of LSP alliance management even increases as the 
tension between cooperation and competition is balanced (so called “co-opetition”) to secure 
the collective pursuit of alliance goals and expected behavior.  
Despite these idiosyncrasies of LSP alliances, the research on horizontal LSP alliances has 
emerged only recently (Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). While 
horizontal alliances have definitely gained increasing attention in logistics research, the prior 
research primarily emphasized the identification of either specific outcomes (based on 
analytical and simulation studies) or performance impact factors within the context of LSP 
alliances (see Table 5 for an overview). However, their isolated identification and definition 
of static antecedents (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Midoro and Pitto, 2000; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011, 2012) fails to explain how and why LSP alliances evolve (either 
successfully or not) over time. For example, Cruijssen et al. (2007b) identify four major 
impediments of horizontal LSP alliances (partner selection, determining and dividing the 
gains, unequal negotiating positions of partners and ICT). Assuming the negative impact of 
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these factors on alliance performance, their study lacks further clarification of the underlying 
processes of how and why these (supposed) negative alliance outcomes emerge. 
Table 5 Overview of impact factors on LSP alliance performance 
Categories and dimensions of impact factors 
Partner selection  Resource scope (Cruijssen et al., 2007c; Midoro and Pitto, 2000) 
 
Alliance structure  Legal form (contractual agreements; joint ventures; minority stakes) 
(Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999) 
 Organizational complexity (number of partners, nature of their role 
and contribution, level of mutual trust, task complexity) (Midoro 
and Pitto, 2000) 
 Degree of (contractual) formalization (Evangelista and Morvillo, 
1999; Makukha and Gray, 2004; Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011; 
Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012; Tate, 1996)  
 
Alliance 
management 
 Degree of partner integration (Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999; 
Hernández et al., 2011), 
 Cost/synergy allocation (Krajewska et al., 2008)  
 Joint route planning (Cruijssen et al., 2007b; Park, 1997).  
 
Alliance control  Performance measurement (Van Hoek and Mitchell, 2006; Zineldin 
and Bredenlow, 2003) 
 
 
Moreover, the extant strategic management literature on alliance evolution, and in particular 
on alliance failure, remains sparse (Wittmann, 2007). Only a few evolutionary models of 
alliance evolution exist. Among them, the most prominent conceptualizations are those of 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Doz (1996). These conceptualizations identify and define 
alliance drivers, such as governance structure, trust and risk (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), or 
initial conditions, learning, re-evaluation and revised conditions (Doz, 1996). Furthermore, 
Wittmann (2007) identifies various drivers of alliance failure (different kinds of managers’ 
decisions) and conceives of them (rather obviously observable) as developmental stages of 
alliances (strategic planning, partner selection, termination). However, I argue that these 
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evolutionary conceptualizations are not sufficient to understand and explain the process of 
LSP alliance evolution (whether success or failure).  
A promising approach to the explanation of a process provides in general for the concept of 
social mechanisms (Pajunen, 2008), which holds true for LSP alliance failure processes. 
Mechanisms are processes that activate or prevent some change in a concrete system (Bunge, 
1997), such as an alliance. Thus, mechanisms help to understand observed relationships as 
they explain “how and/or why one thing leads to another” (Anderson et al., 2006: 103). Thus, 
the mechanisms-based approach turns out to be a solid vehicle for shedding light on the black 
box process of LSP alliance failure. It allows us to explain and articulate the causal linkages 
within the processes that drive alliance failure (i.e., understanding the processes by which X 
causes Y (Anderson et al., 2006)). As such, I overcome the shortcomings of the prior research 
on the identification of individual alliance variables (stating that X causes Y). The proposed 
mechanisms-based conceptualization provides a more comprehensive picture of the overall 
LSP alliance failure process.   
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I conducted an explorative study employing the qualitative method of grounded theory 
formulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1998) to elaborate upon, 
expand existing findings and generate new insights (substantive data-based theory). 
Accordingly, I provide relevant predictions, explanations, interpretations and implications for 
the under-investigated phenomenon of LSP alliance failure. Since case studies allow the 
gaining of new insights into underexplored research areas (based on rich the detail which is 
only provided by founders and participants) (Weick et al., 2005; Yin, 2003), I conducted an 
intensive case study of THE ALLIANCE – a multilateral alliance between LSPs – from the 
perspective of a focal firm (in the following, called THE FIRM). The data analysis followed 
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grounded theory methods, allowing for the purposeful investigation of processes and their 
evolving nature (Langley, 1999; Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Maurer and Ebers, 2006). Thus, 
grounded theory turned out to be a particularly useful method for uncovering and examining 
the dynamics of the LSP alliance failure process and its underlying mechanisms, effects and 
interplay over time. In addition, this research design corresponds to the emerging call from 
operations management research for more qualitative research methods to: (1) systematically 
observe and incorporate real-life situations and/or problems, and (2) develop (new) theories 
and models rather than only testing them (Kumar and Nathwani, 2012; Lavie and Miller, 
2008). 
4.4.1 Sample: The case of THE ALLIANCE 
The ALLIANCE was a voluntary agreement between THE FIRM and two ─ after two years 
between three ─ other international freight carriers (in the following, called THE 
PARTNERS). The partnering LSPs aimed to increase customer value and each other's 
profitability through a jointly operated seamless global network, and they harmonized 
products and processes, promising competitive advantage for all alliance members. THE 
ALLIANCE was completely and collectively governed by the alliance members themselves. 
This so-called “participant governance” (Provan and Kenis, 2008: 234) was formally 
accomplished through a dedicated alliance project team consisting of an alliance board (THE 
ALLIANCE BOARD) and five sub-teams (THE ALLIANCE TEAMS) staffed equally with 
designated experts of the partnering LSP organizations. These ALLIANCE TEAMS reported 
directly and exclusively to the ALLIANCE BOARD (illustrated in Figure 7). THE 
ALLIANCE BOARD was collectively responsible for the alliance’s management and 
decisions-making based on symmetric power relations among the partnering LSPs 
(irrespective of differences in the partners’ organizational sizes, resource capabilities or 
performance). It met regularly every two-to-three months and functioned as a final decision-
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making and escalation committee in charge of the alliance and for reporting to the individual 
corporate managements. THE ALLIANCE BOARD dedicated a central program manager 
who made decisions that were representative of all the partners and steered the four 
ALLIANCE TEAMS. These equally staffed teams focused on partner harmonization (in 
terms of products, handling, IT systems, sales and, after two years, also networking), striving 
for the conceptualization and implementation of the alliance’s opportunities. THE 
ALLIANCE TEAMS met physically every six weeks in Europe or Asia, held audio 
conferences weekly, and constantly exchanged information via email and telephone. The lead 
positions (the central program manager and team leaders) were equally shared and rotated 
every two years among the partnering LSPs. However, THE ALLIANCE did not, in the end, 
succeed in yielding the slow downscaling of alliance interactions after four years. In its ninth 
year, THE FIRM officially resigned from THE ALLIANCE (after three years of hold-up). 
 
 
Figure 7 The organization of THE ALLIANCE 
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4.4.2 Case relevance of THE ALLIANCE 
The ALLIANCE is a particularly relevant case for exploring the dynamics of LSP alliance 
failure. First, the ALLIANCE represents one of the alliance types which is acknowledged as 
exhibiting the highest complexity, volatility and failure rate, as it comprises international 
competitors, on the one hand, and requires a significant degree of partner integration, on the 
other hand, to perform a joint logistics system globally based on highly integrative operational 
interactions. Second, THE ALLIANCE provides a complete picture of an LSP alliance’s 
evolution over an entire alliance lifecycle, allowing for the capture of the evolutionary process 
of alliance failure required for gaining new insights into its underlying dynamics, their 
mechanisms and interplay. Third, access to former participants from different organizational 
functions, managerial levels and partner firms allowed for obtaining diversified, detailed and 
valuable insights, thereby providing a solid database for theory development (see Table 7). In 
addition, THE ALLIANCE exhibited interesting and well-known success factors (in both the 
logistics and strategic alliance management literature) in the beginning, such as strong top-
management commitment and the implementation of a dedicated alliance function (Kale et 
al., 2002), raising the question as to why THE ALLIANCE did not succeed in leveraging 
these favorable initial conditions and failed in the end. Overall, THE ALLIANCE represents a 
particularly relevant case for investigating the current study's object of interest in depth and to 
elaborate as to how and why THE ALLIANCE evolved over time. In doing so, this case study 
contributes to the “process gap” and to the existing understanding of LSP alliance failure in 
the literature. 
4.4.3 Data collection  
Grounded theory, as with the generation of data-based theory, builds on the simultaneous and 
iterative collection, codification and analysis of empirical data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). To 
secure the relevance of the collected data, I applied the method of theoretical sampling 
  
 
103 
whereby the process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory (in the form of: 
What data needs to be collected next, for what theoretical reason, and by which comparative 
group?) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). I considered THE ALLIANCE TEAMS as the first 
comparative group for the analysis of logistics alliance failure due to their theoretical 
relevance for the alliance’s management and evolution. Based on the initial key categories 
emerging from the comparison among THE ALLIANCE TEAMS (e.g., between different 
focus teams, such as IT and Product), I selected further comparative groups THE ALLIANCE 
BOARD and THE FIRM, to elaborate on and interrelate emerging categories and their 
properties, striving for theoretical saturation (no generation of additional data that would 
allow for the development of further category properties). The data collection took place from 
June 2011 and November 2012. The primary data sources for theory generation were 20 semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews (except for two telephone interviews), lasting between one 
and four-and-a-half hours. These (audio-recorded and transcribed) interviews were guided 
around open questions aiming to gather data about the research question: Why did the LSP 
alliance fail? (see Table 8 for the interview structure). Due to these loosely framed interviews, 
I remained open throughout the data collection to aspects of alliance failure that my 
informants defined as important and valuable, providing insights into the evolutionary failure 
process. While the 20 interviews were the primary data source for this study, I referred to 
further sources of evidence (Yin, 2003) by also including archival data (newspapers, market 
reports) and internal presentations, memos and documents, including written corporate long-
term plans concerning the objectives and milestones of THE ALLIANCE. These sources 
proved useful for providing and verifying context in relation to the interviewees' statements. 
To meet Lincoln and Gupa’s (1985) criteria for credibility, I discussed the preliminary 
research results with selected interview partners (member-checking as a trustworthiness 
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technique) (see also Amit et al., 1993) as well as with scientists and market experts at various 
stages in the study.  
Table 6 Overview of conducted interviews 
Informant level  
Management level 
THE ALLIANCE 
BOARD/TEAMS 
THE FIRM Sum 
Top management  
(Executive Board Member/ (Senior) Vice 
President/ Senior Program Manager) 
5* 4 9 
Operational management 
(IT, Sales, Product, Handling, Network)  
10** 1 11 
Sum of interviews 15 5 20 
* Includes one interviewee from one of the allied LSPs. 
** Includes two interviewees from one of the allied LSPs. 
 
 
Table 7 Interview Guideline 
Interview structure  Questions 
A. General information about the 
individual participation in THE 
ALLIANCE 
Please describe your participation in THE ALLIANCE.  
B. Alliance goals  What were the alliance goals?  
C. Problems in THE ALLIANCE 
Which problems did you face in pursuing the alliance 
goals, and why?  
How did you address these problems? 
Did you succeed or not, why? 
 
D. Alliance performance Why was THE ALLIANCE terminated ultimately?  
 
 
4.4.4 Data analysis  
The data analysis process occurred in parallel to the data collection and followed the method 
of grounded theory formulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and as applied by several others 
(Isabella, 1990; Suddaby, 2006). Following constant comparative analysis, the data and the 
theory were permanently compared and contrasted throughout the process of data collection 
and analysis to yield diversified, data-based theoretical conceptualizations (Glaser and 
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Strauss, 1967). By comparing emerging incidents with previous codified incidents or 
properties of a category (within and across different groups), I gained insights and findings 
from the data (such as underlying similarities, differences and patterns), allowing me to 
develop increasingly more abstract conceptual categories and properties. The emerging 
theoretical conceptualization was constantly reflected for its suitability as an analytical 
framework for more recently collected data, resulting in permanent reconceptualization ─ 
often based on the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity (Isabella, 1990; Suddaby, 2006). 
Through the constant comparison of the emerging data and the theory, the research results 
should yield a relevant data-based theory.  
In this study, the process of theory generation began during the data collection phase at THE 
ALLIANCE. In an initial step, I assigned the data to an emergent code scheme based on the 
research question: What were the dynamics of alliance failure and how did they work? As 
such, the initial codes used to structure the data were problems faced within the alliance 
management process, their rationales and consequences for the alliance’s evolution. I 
constantly modified these initial codes by comparing them with new incidents, eliminating old 
ones and integrating new ones, to identify and develop relevant categories and their 
properties. For example, the category “non-satisfactory performance” emerged as the 
interviewees stated that the lack of significant alliance benefits added to alliance failure. By 
constantly comparing how the involved parties (within and across different comparative 
groups) evaluated the alliance’s performance, I identified that alliance performance evaluation 
underlies different attributes and that it may change over time. The comparative analysis 
across different groups indicates in which circumstances (e.g., the design of incentive 
systems, corporate cultures, alliance tasks) I find different kinds of alliance performance 
evaluation. Table 9 outlines the increasing integration and reduction of the initial codes into 
more relevant aggregated dimensions. The final results of this analysis process reveal that 
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alliance failure emerges due to an iterative self-enforcing process marked by four different 
development stages and mechanisms. These findings are presented in the following section.  
 
Table 8 Structure of the grounded theory analysis – emergence of dimensions 
First-order codes  Second-order 
codes 
Aggregate 
dimension 
Complementarity of: 
 Geographical networks (number of additional destinations, countries, 
customer markets) 
 Assets (warehouses, means of transportation) 
 Product portfolio and customer services (frequencies, capacities, value-
added services) 
Limited partner 
complementarit
y 
Limiting 
alliance 
setup • Different business philosophies (market perception, strategies, goals)  
• Different corporate cultures (i.e., decision making styles, 
communication modes and control systems) 
Organizational 
incompatibility 
• Lack of antitrust immunity 
• Different antitrust immunities with the partnering LSPs 
Competition 
law 
• No agreement on mutual assessment criteria and equity share through 
the negotiation process 
• Collective authority and shared responsibilities (joint steering 
committee) 
• No-binding commitment (lack of specification and codification of 
partner contributions) but mutual stated alliance commitment (reflected 
in the allocation of human capital; top management statements) 
Shared alliance 
governance 
Inferior 
alliance 
structure 
• Strong partner integration in a dedicated alliance team 
• Limited/occasional integration of internal experts/decision-makers 
• Structure of the dedicated alliance team (complexity, organizational 
embeddedness, authority structure within the line organizations) 
Weak 
involvement 
• Output formalization focusing on milestones of partner integration (e.g., 
harmonization of products and processes) 
• Lack of a priori defined product and process standards but ongoing 
harmonization pursued by the alliance teams through benchmarks, 
negotiations and conceptualization 
• Lack of formalized control systems (a priori commonly agreed-on 
performance measures; lack of standardized monitoring processes; lack 
of reliable and effective control of each other’s alliance behavior and 
outcomes) 
• Lack of common/insufficiently aligned IT systems (limited data 
exchange), such that the processes of interactions fail with logistics 
business requirements (time, costs, efficiency, reliability, transparency)  
Lack of 
common work 
standards 
• Lack of tangible results (increases in sales, asset utilization)  
• Occasional success stories Efficiency 
Non-
satisfactory 
per-
formance 
• Perceived reciprocity among allied LSPs (comparison of one’s own 
contributions with a partner’s investments (time, efforts, human capital 
investments) 
• Complains about a lack of formalized revenue sharing (joint cash box) 
Equity 
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• Strategic changes to overcome impediments (significant investments, 
decisions taken, risks taken)  
• Perceived adjustments to and treatment of escalated problems and 
shortcomings (IT, joint cash box, antitrust) over time 
Adaptability 
• Actions taken without significant effects (new partner, alliance goals 
shift on cost aspects, implementation of a new network team) 
• No or insufficient change of the initial alliance set-up fails to address 
shortcomings in the partner constellation and alliance structure 
• Repeat dissatisfaction with alliance performances  
Lack of 
strategic 
changes 
Stagnation 
and failure 
• Strategic fit between alliance and corporate needs (analysis, personal 
perception)  
• Personal/corporate experiences with prior alliances and bilateral 
cooperation (own corporate history, emerging success stories of 
alliances in related industries)  
• Personal friendship among founders  
Lack of 
commercial/str
ategist 
dependence 
Low partner 
dependence 
• Misaligned corporate incentive structure (alliance only secondary 
priority, alliance targets are not measured/do not count for personal 
targets)  
• Self-confidence/ego: strong identity with the parent firm emphasizes the 
priority of one’s own product; process and service solutions neglecting 
alliance agreements 
Interest 
conflicts 
Lack of 
benefit 
allocation • Uncertainty about reciprocity 
• Fear of negative personal and/or economic consequences 
• Perception of alliance goals as being unrealistic; demotivation  
• Threat of “doing something wrong” (lack of antitrust, protection of 
strategic resources and knowledge) causes resistance and change 
aversion 
Uncertainty 
• Limited willingness to compromise among the involved parties 
(prioritization of individual benefits) 
• Ongoing discussions and negotiations (individual targets, expectations 
performance evaluations) are timely and costly 
Lack of 
consensus Non-
agreement on 
alliance 
adaptations 
• Alliance leader’s decisions/activities depend upon the parent firm 
• Delayed or ineffective decision-making processes in the alliance board  
• Instability of alliance commitment/decisions taken due to changes in the 
external environment and/or shifts in the parent firms’ strategies 
Parent firm 
dependence 
 Lack of significant investments or decisions regarding alliance 
modifications  
 Continuous escalation of already-known impediments in alliance 
execution (i.e., IT, joint cash box, capacity management) 
Lack of 
improvements 
Lack of 
alliance value 
 Downscaling or refusal of strategic decisions (based on concepts and 
problem-solutions developed by the dedicated alliance teams) causes 
frustration  
 Arising doubts about the alliance’s advantages and top management’s 
commitment given the lack of required decisions/investments  
 Diminishing efforts and priority of alliance initiatives in daily business  
Frustration 
with 
performance 
 Lack of structural power creates an instable alliance mandate 
(dependent upon top management’s commitment, prior alliance 
performance, parent firms’ priorities)  
 Use of a personal network for convincing people to support the alliances  
 Shift of responsibilities in regional centers and their leading managers 
 Loss of credibility due to past performances  
Diminishing 
mandate 
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4.5 RESULTS 
As with other inter-organizational relationships, the evolution of LSP alliances (both success 
and failure) depends upon a set of initial conditions (Doz, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) 
and their subsequent structural governance and management towards specific alliance goals. 
The findings of THE ALLIANCE reveal that, in the case of failed LSP alliances, these three 
drivers are somehow limited in their functioning, explaining the dynamic process of alliance 
management failure. This process of LSP alliance failure is marked by four stages: (1) 
limiting alliance setup, (2) inferior alliance structure, (3) non-satisfactory performance, and 
(4) stagnation and failure (see Figure 8). These stages are driven by specific underlying 
mechanisms, leading from one stage to another, and resulting in a self-enforcing failure 
process of LSP alliances. In the following, I explain these four development stages in detail 
before I elaborate upon the underlying mechanisms (in the next section) which cause the 
evolution of an alliance from one stage to another, thereby driving the alliance failure process. 
This combined perspective/analysis provides new insights into both the reasons for and the 
dynamics of LSP alliance failure by shedding light on the “process black box” of LSP alliance 
failure.  
4.5.1 The four stages of the alliance failure process  
(1) Limiting alliance setup  
The limiting alliance setup among partnering LSPs emerged due to the: (i) The limited 
complementarity of the partners’ resources and competencies, (ii) Organizational 
incompatibilities, and (iii) Competition law constraining the cooperative interactions among 
them.  
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Figure 8 The dynamic process of LSP alliance failure 
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(i) The limited complementarity of the partners’ resources and competencies 
LSP alliances are motivated by increases in LSPs’ service offerings and/or efficiency through 
pooling and leveraging each other’s resources and competencies among partnering LSPs. In 
the case of THE ALLIANCE, the partnering LSPs aimed to search for and develop joint 
alliance opportunities. A FIRM representative explains: “The spirit was more like - we want 
to see what we can do together - how we can position ourselves in the market, what additional 
value can we offer to the customer? That did function pretty well overall” (THE FIRM). 
However, it turned out that the creation of alliance value depends strongly on the 
complementarity of the LSPs’ contributions. This complementarity is significantly limited in 
the case of the high similarity of LSPs’ geographical networks. A high degree of similarity of 
LSPs’ geographical coverage minimizes the LSPs’ potential for geographical extension and 
the commercialization of additional destinations; however, it allows for greater frequency and 
capacities. In THE ALLIANCE, three of the four partnering LSPs provided a similar global 
network, varying only in their home market coverage. Therefore, THE ALLIANCE provided 
them only with a very limited number of new destinations, minimizing the alliances value for 
them: “If I have a network that is so far self-sufficient and requires connections only in a few 
destinations, and the partner has the same network, then there won't be any interfaces and no 
demand” (Manager of the ALLIANCE TEAMS). Moreover, the benefits of additional 
frequency and capacity were less than expected, as the joint management of the capacities and 
inventories among the allied LSPs remained limited. The reasons behind this were primarily 
legal and technical constraints, but also the partners’ hesitance to share strategic resources and 
competencies, such as IT know-how, networks and revenue management, with competitors. 
Thus, the partnering LSPs failed to build commercial dependence on each other, despite the 
potential alliance’s value. 
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(ii) Organizational incompatibilities  
Organizational compatibility refers to the “psychological distance” (Grandori and Soda, 1995: 
187) between partnering firms based on the distance of their organizational profiles measured 
by their operating strategy, corporate culture, management style, nationality (Parkhe, 1993) or 
even firm-size (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). The research revealed that differences in 
business strategies and activities among partnering LSPs hampered the effective execution of 
the alliance. In particular, the firm’s legal set-up (an autonomous organization with its own 
profit center and its business strategy (freight management as a core competence; asset or 
asset-free carrier) had a strong impact on the partners’ business priorities, e.g., in terms of 
customer services, handling and training standards. As one manager stated it, differences in 
business philosophies imply “completely different starting points and accordingly completely 
different expectations about the whole topic (of THE ALLIANCE). That made a lot very 
difficult-to-impossible, causing a lot of discussions” (THE FIRM). In addition, differences in 
the partners’ corporate cultures (also driven by national cultures) caused misunderstandings, 
inefficiencies (both effort- and time-wise) and bounded the alliance’s execution until the 
involved parties became familiar with each other’s internal processes, i.e., of decision-
making, communication and negotiation. These drawbacks increased the time and effort spent 
on dealing and cooperating effectively with each other (e.g., through frequent personal 
meetings/social events of THE ALLIANCE TEAMS). Overall, organizational compatibility 
increases the risks of misunderstandings and mistrust, hampering the effective coordination of 
interactions and thus driving alliance failure.  
(iii) Competition law  
Competition law (also known as antitrust law) strives to maintain market competition by 
regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies and may drive LSP alliance failure. Legal 
ramifications gain in importance with increased levels of partner integration in LSPs 
  
 
112 
businesses, reflected in, e.g., joint strategic planning, pricing or capacity sharing and/or 
revenue management. My research results revealed that LSP alliances that require antitrust 
immunity but which cooperate (enforced or voluntarily) without legal permission are limited 
in their cooperative activities, and thus in their alliance’s value creation. As LSP alliances 
without antitrust immunity run the risk of being alerted by regulatory agencies, they need to 
exercise significant care in performing inter-firm activities, causing uncertainty among the 
alliance’s executers (in terms of what it is allowed to do). Overall, the findings reveal that, 
depending upon the specific alliance’s situation and partner composition, legal regulations 
may limit the activities and processes of LSP alliances. The regulatory agency will be alert to 
impede the likelihood of illegal agreements among the partnering competitors. The risk of 
falling under competition law increases in the case of horizontal alliances between 
competitors, such as multilateral LSP alliances, due to the potential creation of monopoly 
market situations or illegal price agreements.  
(2) Inferior alliance structure  
Organizational structures divide labor into distinct tasks which need to be performed and 
coordinate these tasks within systems (Mintzberg, 1979), such as alliances. In the present case 
of LSP alliance failure, the alliance structure remained inferior based on: (i) shared alliance 
governance, (ii) the weak involvement (of both internal and external parties), (iii) a lack of 
common work standards, and a lack of (iv) formal control systems and (v) common IT 
systems. As such, THE ALLIANCE failed to steer the behavior and outcomes of the involved 
parties effectively towards the accomplishment of common alliance goals. 
(i) Shared alliance governance 
Shared alliance governance refers to the equal involvement of all allied partners in the 
alliance governance process (Provan and Kenis, 2008). THE ALLIANCE was marked by a 
collective decision-making authority allocated in the executive ALLIANCE BOARD (vertical 
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centralization (Albers et al., 2013)). All the members were collectively responsible for the 
decisions and activities of the alliance exclusively based on their commitment and 
involvement. However, my findings reveal that the effectiveness of this shared alliance 
governance was challenged by the low degree of independence among the partnering LSPs, 
allowing for conflicts of interest, opportunistic behavior and change aversion. While the 
shared alliance governance structure facilitated effective partner interactions on the strategic 
alliance level (in THE ALLIANCE TEAMS), it failed in steering the partners’ interactions on 
the operational level (in THE FIRM) in response to the threat of opportunistic behavior.  
(ii) Weak involvement 
Involvement refers to the strength of ties among the involved individuals, both from within 
the firm and among partnering organizations, varying in their scope, density and activity. In 
the case of THE ALLIANCE, the dedicated ALLIANCE TEAMS, as means to improve and 
to coordinate alliance activities (Albers et al., 2013; Kale et al., 2002), built the central 
attachment and connection among all the involved individuals (internal and external parties). 
A TEAM member summarized thus: “Each team had physical meetings. We had video 
conferences and communicated a lot via email or phone. We had conference calls regularly 
and exchanged documents. There have been very regular steering committee meetings” (THE 
ALLIANCE). While these TEAMS covered all the relevant areas of logistics activities (sales, 
marketing, handling, IT and (later on) networks), this involvement concentrated on 
individuals from the strategic management level of the partnering LSPs. Through intensive, 
personal interactions between the involved individuals from the partnering LSPs fostered via 
regular personal meetings (every six weeks) and exclusive social events (e.g., excursions and 
leisure activities), the ALLIANCE TEAMS built up mutual understanding and trust, and 
created a shared identity with THE ALLIANCE over time. This psychological linkage to each 
other (process of social integration (Weick, 2013)) helped to reduce mistrust and 
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misunderstandings and the (perceived) threat of opportunistic behavior. As such, the dense 
integration of the involved individuals from the partnering LSPs increased the effectiveness of 
the alliance’s activities and promoted stability and equity in the ALLIANCE TEAMS. 
Overall, the central integration of the involved parties with the ALLIANCE TEAMS 
facilitated intensive cooperation activities at the strategic level of the alliance. However, it 
proved to be weak in steering more operational alliance activities at lower hierarchical levels 
among both internally and externally involved parties.  
(iii) A lack of common work standards 
The standardization of work processes understood as standards for guiding doing the work 
itself (work orders, rules and regulations, etc.) plays a crucial role in the effective 
coordination among the independent partnering firms and the creation of overall alliance 
value (Mintzberg, 1979). THE ALLIANCE built upon output formalization (specifications of 
interaction outcomes) to coordinate the interactions among the allied LSPs. However, this 
output formalization was revealed to have a significant drawback. While the final outcomes 
were specified, concrete work processes, standards, rules and manuals which steered the 
operational interactions, customer services and capacity management among the allied LSPs 
were missing. My research results revealed that the lack of standardized products and 
handling processes among the allied LSPs reduced the reliability and efficiency, and thus the 
customer value, of the joint LSP alliance. These differences among allied the LSPs in their 
customer services (e.g., time definitions, quality and tracking services) and handling 
procedures (e.g., loading priorities, training and security), defined by their various product 
features, significantly constrained the alliance’s value capitalization. The findings indicate 
that the lack of work standards hampered the alliance’s executers at the operational level, as 
clear work and technical standards to jointly perform and/or coordinate the alliance’s 
activities were missing. By being aware of the importance of operational standards, the allied 
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LSPs in THE ALLIANCE intended to collectively specify and codify joint products (e.g., 
features, quality and security standards) and handling processes (e.g., automatized data and 
information exchange processes and handling procedures). However, as these standards were 
not defined a priori, their joint development during the alliance turned out to be highly time 
consuming and costly, as consensus among the collectivity of the allied LSPs was required. In 
addition, these agreed on standards (if ever achieved) still varied in their specificities and 
executions among allied LSPs . In the meantime, standardized products and working 
processes common to all the partnering LSPs were lacking, which hampered the smooth and 
effective handling of goods within the LSP alliance until mutual consensus on joint 
specifications and codifications were finally derived (if ever). Due to this ex post 
formalization process of standardization, the alliance yield increased coordination costs due to 
the tediousness of collective consensus-finding as constrained by the individual interests of 
the allied partners. Overall missing or unaligned work standards caused inefficiencies and set 
aside network effects and customer acceptance in the LSP alliance. 
(iv) A lack of formal control systems 
The lack of formal control systems based on a priori defined alliance expectations and 
performance measures (Spekman and Kamauff Jr, 1998) impedes the reliable and effective 
control of each member’s behavior and outcomes. My research indicated that formalized 
control systems based on a priori defined behavior- or outcome-based criteria and 
standardized monitoring processes across all allied LSPs are needed to limit opportunistic 
behavior both within and across a firm’s boundaries. THE ALLIANCE lacked formalized 
performance measures and monitoring processes, or other safeguards to control (and if 
necessary to sanction) undesirable behavior and outcomes of the involved parties (both 
within, but especially across, THE FIRM’s boundaries). In addition, formalized control 
systems help to identify room for improvements, facilitating value creation for the alliance. 
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Despite the acknowledged need for alliance control, difficulties remain in defining and 
monitoring relevant measures. Allied LSPs either do not know or else fail to agree on relevant 
alliance performance measures or required reporting processes across all the involved LSPs. 
The latter are crucial to collecting and analyzing reliable and meaningful data, as the 
following statement indicates: “We defined the targets and then I pulled a report and 
manipulated it, and made a monthly follow-up so you could see whether things went in the 
right direction or not... As far as I know, THE PARTNERS didn't have the systems to do the 
same” (THE ALLIANCE). Overall, the lack of formal control adds to the threat of 
opportunistic behavior, both among the partnering firms driven by the pursuit of their 
individual corporate goals and interests, as well as among the internal executers, despite 
hierarchical structures.  
(v) A lack of common information and technology systems  
IT systems represent one of the central integration mechanisms for managing information 
flows between organizations (Ebers, 1997) as well as along supply chain entities 
(Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004). They make inter-organizational data-sharing among 
partnering firms feasible, while reducing communication costs (Grandori and Soda, 1995). In 
the logistics business, IT systems can be seen as the backbone of process optimization, as they 
align the processes around sales, pricing, route planning, capacity management and customer 
service. This alignment of processes even gains in importance in LSP alliances in 
coordinating these logistics activities among multiple independent partners in a way that 
leverages the alliance’s potential. The lack of common IT systems (or the misalignment of 
them) impedes the reliable, fast, automatic and standardized data exchange among allied LSPs 
required to perform joint logistics systems. As one manager of the ALLIANCE TEAMS 
stated: “Logistics is a dynamic business that needs to be fast. One cannot rely only on 
telecommunication - these times are gone. Such cooperation has to work quickly. IT systems 
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have to fully support it. But we did not have this” (THE ALLIANCE). The resulting 
drawbacks hampered the effective performance of the joint logistics system provided by the 
allied LSPs, and thus impeded the maximization and capitalization of the alliance’s value for 
both customers and LSPs. My findings reveal that allied LSPs were conscious about the need 
for more-integrated IT Systems: “One factor that is probably more pivotal or important is IT 
- because that turned out to be very much a practical obstacle... We still came up against a 
situation where the - let’s call it the functional capacity of the four IT systems - were very 
different. And if we would have had concentrated a bit more, if we would have put more 
money and effort into solving that... I think we would have stood a much, much, much better 
chance of making it (THE ALLIANCE) happen” (ALLIANCE BOARD). However THE 
BOARD did not decide on such stronger technical integration of or investment in a common 
IT System, but instead strived for piecewise technical harmonization. The reasons for 
accepting these technically driven inefficiencies were based on the threat of opportunistic 
behavior, the unintended loss of strategic knowledge, and the significant investment costs of 
an integrative IT system in the face of uncertain alliance outputs in the future.  
(3) Non-satisfactory performance  
As in general, the execution of alliance activities and the efforts of all alliance members 
determine an alliance’s performance. In the case of THE ALLIANCE, its performance was 
not satisfactory. This dissatisfaction resulted from the contemplation that the alliance’s 
performance fell short of the partners’ expectations. My findings indicate that this evaluation 
was based on three criteria: (i) the alliance’s efficiency in terms of logistics activities, (ii) the 
equity of the partners’ contributions to the alliance, and (iii) the adaptability of the alliance 
over time.  
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(i) Efficiency  
Efficiency refers to the economic reasoning of the alliance (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 93). 
The partnering LSPs assessed the alliance based on its costs and outcomes and then compared 
it to going alone: “As long as there is not a tangible, monetary target behind it, nothing is 
going to work out. And as long as it is not imaginable and tangible… the whole idea will 
become obsolete pretty fast. And that's what happened” (THE ALLIANCE).  
(ii) Equity  
Equity as "fair dealing" (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: 93) refers to the reciprocity among 
partnering firms. My findings indicate that allied LSPs assess their received benefits in 
relation to their own investments to the alliance and in comparison to the perceived benefit-
contribution relation of their partners. Perceived imbalances in these two relations cause 
frustration and demotivation among the involved parties. As such, the lack of equity adds 
ultimately to the alliance’s failure if not addressed properly, as the following statement 
illustrates: “We usually provided the project leader or at least the program manager. We 
invested quite a lot, more than all of the others in total. But that is the attitude of THE FIRM. 
And then we are regularly disappointed when we are not getting the same in return. We 
invested a lot but we were not able to force anyone” (THE ALLIANCE). 
(iii) Adaptability  
Adaptability refers to the alliance’s ability to adapt initial alliance set-ups (Doz, 1996: 79) in 
order to face environmental changes and to secure the alliance’s improvement over time. 
Thus, in THE ALLIANCE, people assessed the alliance according to its ability to overcome 
identified shortcomings hampering the capitalization of the alliance’s opportunities. Thus, the 
involved parties assessed THE ALLIANCE and its strategic priority based on its progress in 
overcoming major impediments, namely the collective agreement on a common product and 
process standards, fair revenue sharing, IT systems solutions and antitrust regulations.  
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The combined perception of these three performance criteria (efficiency, equity and 
adaptability) results in a total assessment of the alliance. In addition, these criteria are 
assessed in relation to the individual alliance members’ expectations and goals: “Each LSP 
had its own sort of agenda and way of using THE ALLIANCE in whatever way they found 
right for them, or at least they sort of they read the books with their own eyes, if you know 
what I mean” (THE ALLIANCE). Therefore, the alliance’s performance evaluation may vary 
significantly among the involved parties (both within and across each firm’s boundaries). For 
example, the managers involved from the ALLIANCE TEAMS tended to assess the alliance’s 
development positively, primarily based on the accomplishment of their defined targets. On 
the other hand, the managers involved at the operational level evaluated THE ALLIANCE 
critically, as they did not see any tangible results (e.g., increased volume, sales or load 
factors). These differences in the evaluation of the alliance’s performance complicated the 
process of consensus building among the allied LSPs. Given the shared governance structure, 
THE ALLIANCE needed to find mutual agreement for any alliance decisions and adaptations. 
A statement of one of the ALLIANCE BOARD member explains the challenge involved in 
the process of mutual decision-making: “The business case which has been discussed ran 
through the organization’s own assessment process and everybody got the results: that is not 
beneficial or that is beneficial for me, but not for the others. But it never came out that the 
case was beneficial for all four partners, because the applied KPIs aimed to optimize the 
stand-alone status. To gear the alliance’s benefit and to integrate it in the individual cases as 
a correcting quantity - that never happened” (THE FIRM). 
(4) Stagnation and failure 
Alliances are always associated with changes in working routines (Das and Teng, 2001). 
While changes are obligatory, they are always accompanied with resistance and fear. While 
the allied LSPs identified major impediments to the effective execution of the alliance and 
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conceptualized solutions, they ultimately could not find collective agreement on strategic 
change initiatives. Therefore, THE ALLIANCE failed to adapt to these challenges, resulting 
in a situation of stagnation that finally led to the alliance’s failure. For example, driven by the 
non-satisfactory outcomes of THE ALLIANCE, the partnering LSPs agreed upon searching 
for new partners to complete the joint global network (the new alliance set-up), as well as 
upon shifting the alliance’s emphasis from service improvements towards costs reductions 
(the adaptation of the alliance’s goals). However, the acceptance of a fourth LSP into THE 
ALLIANCE did not prove helpful in addressing the shortcomings of the initial alliance set-up 
(low interdependence among allied LSPs). The new partner’s network showed significant 
overlaps with the existing alliance’s network, increasing the degree of complexity in terms of 
interest alignment and operational coordination among the now four parties rather than 
providing significant alliance benefits. Furthermore, the emphasis on costs savings within 
THE ALLIANCE reached its limits as common product and process standards, joint IT 
systems and fair revenue sharing among the allied LSP remained missing; even the focus on 
joint asset utilization (e.g., joint warehouses) was rarely realized due to either capacity or 
technology restrictions or else contractual agreements with third parties. One manager of THE 
TEAMS summarized thus: “The idea [of joint warehouses] often failed because people said 
"we have too much traffic, it is impossible", or due to being bound to premises in the long-
term where it was not possible to renegotiate the contract. There have been very many 
operational issues that could not be solved. But there has been an agreement to monitor this” 
(THE ALLIANCE). Overall, THE ALLIANCE failed to increase the (commercial) 
dependence among the allied LSPs. Given the lack of commercial dependence and/or strategic 
changes in the alliance’s structure, its evolution remained exclusively dependent upon the 
partners’ commitment. This commitment, however, turned out to be unstable and impacted by 
multiple factors, such as the alliance’s performance and the parent firms’ strategies and 
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priorities, as well as individual mindsets and expectations. My findings reveal that this 
personal commitment diminished over time because it was not absorbed by structural 
adaptations (e.g., through a joint cash box or enforceable agreements), and because it instead 
encountered emerging doubts as to the alliance’s advantages and credibility. Even highly 
committed managers became frustrated and resigned over time due to the lack or downscaling 
of requested alliance adaptations, missing tangible results and an absence of sanctions for 
undesirable behavior. These repeated bad experiences and disappointments with the alliance’s 
performance (in terms of economic, equity and adaptability outcomes) caused a period of 
stagnation for the alliance. This situation led finally to the alliance’s failure.  
4.5.2 Mechanisms of the Alliance failure process 
My findings reveal that the process of alliance failure among LSPs is marked by four 
developmental stages. To understand and explain how and why these stages emerge, I 
emphasize the underlying mechanisms which lead an alliance from one stage to another. I 
identified four main mechanisms that produce an alliance’s phases and which drive an LSP 
alliance towards failure (see Figure 9 for an overview). In the following, I elaborate upon each 
of these four mechanisms and their component parts in order to explain their orchestrating 
functionality.  
 
  
 
122 
 
Figure 9 Mechanisms in the logistics alliance failure process  
 
(a) Low partner dependence 
Partner dependence reflects “the way in which different firms perceive [that] they need each 
other to perform their work and reach certain outcomes” (Zacharia et al., 2009: 103). Through 
pooling and leveraging resources and competencies of a partnering LSP, joint alliance 
outcomes are achieved. The importance of the outcomes for the individual LSP, in terms of its 
performance and competitive market position, determines the degree of partner 
interdependence as well as a firm’s commitment, investments and efforts spend in the 
alliance. My research revealed that THE FIRM perceived a rather low – if any – degree of 
dependence on THE ALLIANCE and/or its partners: “There were not a lot of new 
destinations. …and these three or four transports a week, we could always do by ourselves” 
(Manager of the ALLIANCE TEAMS). Only the smallest partner of THE ALLIANCE 
benefited significantly from THE ALLIANCE network by serving and promoting new 
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geographical markets, destinations and additional capacities. Thus, the partnering LSPs failed 
to build commercial dependence on each other, despite the potential alliance’s value. As a 
consequence, the low partner dependence added to the threat of opportunistic behavior. In 
addition, the research results reveal that partner interdependence may vary significantly 
among partners in multilateral LSP alliances. This imbalance shifts attention towards the 
assessment and treatment of partners’ contributions, i.e., in terms of the (fair) distribution of 
jointly generated alliance benefits. This treatment is essential to creating and maintaining 
sufficient incentives for cooperation among all the involved parties. Thus, THE ALLIANCE 
built upon the commitment of the involved parties to pursue common alliance goals lacking a 
binding commercial or strategic interdependence among them.  
Commitment refers to the personal responsibility in satisfying the alliance’s interests and 
expectations, varying in its degree of responsibility for the alliance’s success (e.g., by 
vouching for a top manager’s good names, relation-specific investments or a firm’s own 
reputation and performance (Fawcett et al., 2006). My results indicate that commitment 
determines the willingness of both external and internal alliance decision-makers and 
executers to compromise in favor of mutual alliance benefits. In this case, the commitment of 
the allied LSPs manifests in the contribution of primarily human resources to dedicated 
ALLIANCE TEAMS. While the degree of responsibility for the alliance’s success remained 
rather low, THE FIRM invested extensive human resources in THE ALLIANCE. These 
resources comprised the effort spent by its senior alliance representative on THE ALLIANCE 
and the assignment of selected experts to the dedicated ALLIANCE TEAMS (a full-time job). 
THE FIRM allocated, on average, nine full-time positions at any given time to THE 
ALLIANCE TEAMS, taking up three of the five leading positions. The corporate 
embeddedness of the ALLIANCE TEAMS (hierarchically, directly below THE FIRM’s 
corporate executive board) symbolized THE ALLIANCE’s strategic priority within THE 
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FIRM. My findings revealed that this commitment among the partnering LSPs was based on: 
(i) Strategic fit between the alliance’s goals and corporate needs (perceived by the founders), 
(ii) Prior alliance experience of the alliance (i.e., with these partners), and (iii) Personal 
friendship among the partners’ representatives. However, this commitment turned out to be 
rather uncertain and instable, as it was strongly impacted by the (changing) parent firms’ 
strategies and targets in terms of personal mindsets and structural authorities.  
(i) Strategic fit 
Since commitment emerges if partners perceive the value of the benefits derived from the 
relationship (Fawcett et al., 2006), the fit between the (expected) alliance outcomes and the 
firm’s strategic needs is fundamental. Based on a systematic analysis and prior experiences, 
THE PARTNERS’ top management selected THE ALLIANCE as the most suitable strategic 
option (next to M&A and organic growth) to face increasing competition within the logistics 
industry. One of the ALLIANCE BOARD members summarized thus: “At least from a 
theoretical point of view all the possibilities were there, and that was our starting point. 
Everyone was very open-minded. I think we all wanted to make this happen” (THE 
ALLIANCE). The founders decided, initially, on a strategy program striving for successive 
partner integration primarily based on product and process harmonization to appear on the 
market as one company. Cross-owner shipments were kept as further integration steps 
depending upon the alliance’s development. The integration was carried out along mutually 
defined goals and milestones based on a clear schedule. Based on an initial business plan, the 
allied LSPs expected improved customer services and profitability gains through THE 
ALLIANCE (i.e., due to new destinations and improved capacity utilization) while keeping 
their strong and flexible market position. These expected alliance benefits would have helped 
to sustain competitiveness in the face of the trend of consolidation within the industry.  
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(ii) Prior alliance experiences 
The commitment to the alliance was also based on positive experiences of prior bilateral 
cooperation among the LSPs involved in THE ALLIANCE. THE FIRM had already 
experienced long-lasting bilateral cooperation with two of the three partners. These 
experiences provide them with insights into the partner’s business activities, operational 
systems and cooperative behavior. These insights reduce the perceived uncertainty 
accompanying THE ALLIANCE. In addition, the commitment to the alliance emerged due to 
positive experiences with multilateral alliances in related business fields made by THE FIRM. 
Therefore, THE FIRM’s corporate management was inclined to transfer this rather innovative 
idea of a multilateral alliance in their industry to increase the perception of them as market 
pioneers.  
(iii) Personal friendship 
Beyond the experience of the alliance among the allied LSPs, personal friendships among the 
initial founders of THE ALLIANCE added to their commitment to it. The individual 
representatives of the allied LSPs got along very well. This personal trust and understanding 
facilitated their mutual agreement on strategic alliance decisions, such as alliance goals, 
strategies, targets and partner contributions. Thus, the friendly representatives of the alliance 
partners, organized as the ALLIANCE BOARD, agreed on THE ALLIANCE as a voluntary 
arrangement aiming to realize a win-win situation for all the partners based on a shared 
governance structure. The so-called “shared alliance governance” was based on collective 
involvement and commitment (see (i) shared alliance governance in the section above), and 
allowed the allied LSPs to keep their own identity, power and flexibility, giving consideration 
to their mutual independence.  
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(b) A lack of benefit allocation 
The lack of benefit allocation understood as formalized revenue sharing mechanisms (a so 
called joint cashbox) within an alliance hampers significantly the share of responsibilities and 
rewards among partnering LSPs. Given the strong rivalry among allied LSPs, a clear and fair 
perceived cost/reward sharing mechanisms are required across all the involved parties to 
secure alliance reciprocity, thereby balancing the tension between cooperation and 
competition. My findings indicate that, due to the lack of formalized revenue sharing and thus 
concrete incentive mechanisms, the first priority of each LSP was to maintain their own 
bottom line. Without clear and fair perceived allocation mechanisms for jointly generated 
alliance revenues, the LSPs decided in the last instance in favor of their own organization. 
The alliance’s executers, (e.g., sales managers) favored their own (proven) products and 
processes, striving primarily to optimize their own capacities, because the parent firm’s 
income was that which counted. Therefore, they purposefully neglected alliance agreements 
and accepted potential disadvantages for individual customers. However, my findings 
indicated that LSPs might not succeed in defining formalized cost and/or benefit-sharing 
mechanisms given the difficulties involved in measuring and assessing the comparable worth 
of each partner’s resources and skills allocated to the alliance and their equitable rewards (in 
line with Wittmann (2007)).  
The lack of a formalized benefit allocation facilitated opportunistic behavior among 
the involved parties and hampered the alliance’s execution, both impacting negatively on the 
alliance’s performance. Opportunism as the conscious behavior of partners to take (selfish) 
advantage of situations plays a crucial role in cooperative partnerships (Das, 2006). As the 
selected alliance structure builds primarily upon the commitment and involvement of 
partnering LSPs, the threat of opportunistic behavior can even increase. Such non-cooperative 
behavior of involved LSPs hampers effective alliance execution significantly, and thus 
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impedes the capitalization of mutual alliance benefits. My findings revealed that the lack of 
formalized benefit allocation fosters opportunistic behavior in multilateral LSP alliances as it 
causes (i) Conflicts of interest , and (ii) uncertainty about the alliance’s goals and execution. 
These drivers hamper the alignment of LSPs’ behavior and outcomes in relation to the 
accomplishment of common alliance goals and thus add to the likelihood of alliance failure.   
(i) Conflicts of interest  
Conflicts of interest emerge due to different preferences and goals among partnering firms 
and managers, interfering with the commitment and involvement of the involved parties. 
Given the rivalry and independence of partnering firms in horizontal arrangements, as in the 
case of THE ALLIANCE, these conflicts of interest are especially relevant, increasing the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior. Confronting the tension between being responsive - 
simultaneously - for the goals of their parent firms and of the alliance, partnering LSPs tended 
to act opportunistically for two reasons. First, my research reveals that conflicts of interest 
among involved alliance parties emerge due to a lack of or misaligned incentive systems, such 
as a joint cash box. This mismatch between corporate and alliance targets facilitates 
opportunistic behavior among an alliance’s executers (internal and external), hampering its 
execution and performance. My findings revealed that alliance executers (like humans in 
general) act in favor of the honored, legalized and rather short-term-orientated goals and 
targets of their parent firm. As such, they more or less continuously neglect the long-term-
oriented strategic alliance’s goals and benefits in their daily business. Second, my findings 
indicate that LSPs strongly identify themselves with their own parent firms in terms of their 
brand, products, processes and services. Identity and involvement are recognized as 
fundamental drivers of human thought and action (Turner, 1987). Based on the strong self-
confidence emerging due to a firm’s past successes, reputation and market position, alliance 
executers may question the necessity and advantages of sharing their own (proven) solutions 
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with their competitors. The following statement illustrates the tensions: “I'm tempted to say, 
we were at a point where even our own people thought about us as debris in the organization. 
People said to us: “You want to present the accomplishments of THE FIRM on a silver plate 
and step away from the own identity for the alliance? Is that how it is supposed to be?” We 
were down to this point” (THE ALLIANCE). Overall, conflicts of interest emerge especially 
in LSP alliances due to the existing independence and rivalry among allied LSPs. If these 
tensions are not sufficiently absorbed by the alliance’s structure (e.g., through formalized 
revenue sharing mechanisms), these conflicts increase the likelihood of opportunistic behavior 
which in turn significantly hampers the alliance’s execution and performance. 
(ii) Uncertainty 
While firms have increasingly engaged in alliances in recent decades, the concrete alliance 
goals are not always obvious to all the involved parties or else are perceived differently 
among them. My findings indicated that this lack of clarity regarding goals adds to alliance 
failure. In the case of THE ALLIANCE, this emerges because a clear purpose for the alliance 
was not defined a priori – instead, it was intended to be defined during the alliance’s 
evolution. THE ALLIANCE’s founders followed the maxim “Let’s see how far we get”. One 
ALLIANCE TEAM member viewed this approach skeptically: “The very big guys, they 
should have, in my view, closed themselves in the room and they shouldn't have left it until 
they had a crystal clear picture of what they wanted to gain with this... but it just wasn't clear 
enough in my book to be successful” (THE ALLIANCE). However, the continuous definition 
of goals leaves this correlation between the alliance and a firm’s strategic needs vague and 
uncertain. As such, it gives rise to doubts about the alliance’s economic reasoning and 
strategic relevance for the parent firm, and thus hampers the commitment of the involved 
parties towards the alliance’s execution (e.g., in terms of resource allocation). In addition, the 
continuous goal-definition hampered the communication of a clear goal for the alliance down 
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the firm’s hierarchy. This poor communication of the alliance’s goals created a knowledge 
gap between the top management, who defined the alliance’s goals, and the lower 
management who were supposed to execute them. In the case of THE ALLIANCE, 
significant differences in the perception and assessment of the alliance’s goals existed - while 
the top management agreed on the continuous harmonization of products and processes, 
striving for full integration, the middle management on the operational level lacked a clear 
vision of the alliance, thereby doubting the alliance’s advantages. As such, the latter were left 
uncertain about concrete operational implications and consequences (What to do? How to do 
it? What does the alliance mean to me/my division and firm?). The research revealed that 
knowledge gaps based on informational asymmetry between the alliance’s decision-makers 
and executers hampered the alliance’s execution. This lack of knowledge manifested itself as 
uncertainty among the alliance’s executers about the alliance’s goals (Why do we do this?) 
and the alliance’s economic and personal consequences (What does that mean for the firm/for 
me?), adding to the employees’ resistance to change (i.e., in terms of their own proven 
routines for the execution of the new and uncertain processes and activities of the alliance).  
In addition, the alliance’s executers acted especially cautiously due to antitrust 
regulations and the knowledge gap. For example, the sales managers criticize the limited 
operational opportunities to cooperate with the allied LSPs, given the legal restrictions: “If I 
want to increase the business and [its] possibilities significantly, I have to give the sales team 
the power to do so. If I want to appear consistent and integrated, I have to allow them to do 
so. This, first and foremost, belongs to the topic of consistent prices, consistent capacity 
access and common distribution” (THE ALLIANCE). In their interactions with the allied 
LSPs, involved parties accepted the alliance’s inefficiencies and customer disadvantages in 
order to protect the firm’s strategic resources (e.g., IT know-how and capacity management 
policies). The emerging nature of the alliance’s goals and/or their poor communication may 
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result in the alliance’s executers’ perception of alliance targets and strategies as being 
unrealistic. This perception reduces the willingness and commitment of the alliance’s 
executers, as they know that they will fail to achieve the (overvalued) alliance expectations. 
Interestingly, the feasibility of alliance goals may vary significantly between the involved 
parties, since even alliance goals and purposes that are defined and conceptualized by internal 
and external experts may be perceived as being unrealistic by the operational executers. Here, 
the question arises as to how far the evaluation of the alliance’s feasibility depends upon the 
managers’ self-interest (the problem of conflicts of interest is discussed above). Thus, the lack 
of clear and realistic alliance goals yields uncertainty among the alliance’s executers, which 
facilitates opportunistic and resistant behavior. This non-cooperative behavior hampers the 
effective execution of an alliance, and thus drives alliance failure.  
(c) No agreement on alliance adaptations  
Given the shared alliance governance, alliance adaptations require a form of collective 
decision-making among all the involved partners. However, my findings revealed that 
disagreements among alliance decision-makers (i.e., alliance board members and alliance 
managers) on alliance adaptations emerge due to: (i) Lack of consensus among them, and (ii) 
Dependence upon the parent firm. This disagreement causes lengthy negotiation processes, 
striving for the required consensus among the decision-makers, holding-off significant 
alliance changes for long periods. However, even if consensus on collective alliance decisions 
and adaptation is (finally) achieved, the agreed upon alliance changes might be reduced to a 
common denominator. These limitations in an alliance’s adaptability impede significant 
improvements in an alliance’s functioning and performance. The resulting alliance stagnation 
causes inefficiencies in the alliance and leads, finally, to alliance failure.   
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(i) Lack of consensus 
The collective decisions and the execution of alliance change efforts made by decision-
makers emerge through a negotiation process based on their individual alliance performance 
evaluation. My findings reveal that, despite the knowledge of unsatisfying alliance results, 
escalated problems for the line organizations, and obstacles and requirements identified by the 
ALLIANCE TEAMS, THE FIRM was not able to agree upon the requested decisions and/or 
investments to improve the alliance’s situation. In particular, the lack of a joint cash box, IT 
system and antitrust immunity impeded the execution of the alliance’s activities, e.g., joint 
capacity management for the benefit of the alliance. However, no consensus among the 
decision-makers on such strategic choices in favor of alliance adaptations could be achieved. 
The reasons behind this are the nature of the non-binding commitment lacking enforceable 
agreements, and the differences in the interests and performance evaluations among the 
involved parties (both internal and external). One ALLIANCE BOARD member justified the 
lack of consensus in the alliance governance structure: “As long as it is a voluntary situation, 
the only situations where you can make it (the implementation of joint IT systems) happen is 
when you make an acquisition or a merger, if you buy another company and force them to use 
your system” (THE ALLIANCE).  
Given the independence and rivalry of allied LSPs, different performance evaluations 
emerge due to individual assessments and interpretations of alliance outcomes (i.e., 
efficiency, equity, adaptability). These individual alliance evaluations ─ biased by the 
interests, mindsets and experiences of the allied LSPs and/or decision-makers ─ lead to the 
withdrawal of a common and reliable knowledge base among the involved decision-makers 
from all the allied LSPs. The emergence of individual alliance evaluations causes a lengthy 
negotiation process in striving for consensus. THE ALLIANCE required this consensus for 
collective decisions on alliance adaptations due to the lack of formalized performance control 
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(alliance structure). THE FIRM (or any other allied LSP) was unable to force a decision as to 
and/or execution of alliance adaptations without the agreement of the other LSPs. There was 
nothing else for THE FIRM to do but to follow their strategy of incremental integration, 
striving to continuously convince (or find consensus among) the partners. Thus, THE 
ALLIANCE could not overcome situations of non-consensus among the involved LSPs. The 
collective decision-making policy led to continuous negotiation processes searching for 
consensus, causing additional coordination costs and stagnation until an agreement could be 
found (if ever).  
(ii) Dependence upon the parent firm  
The agreement on strategic alliance adaptations depends upon the parent firm’s strategy. An 
alliance’s decision-makers generally require the authority of their parent firms to decide upon 
and execute strategic alliance changes. My findings indicate that limitations to the alliance 
decision-makers’ authority causes increased alliance coordination costs in terms of time and 
effort (in line with Wittmann (2007)), and reduces the likelihood of strategic alliance 
adaptations, as the alliance’s decision-makers need to obtain approval from their parent firms. 
The following statement of one of the ALLIANCE TEAM’S members supports this 
impression: “Over four years we were in the mood to try various initiatives which did not 
work out. The parent firms looked already. You won't stand that for long as the managing 
board. At some point in time, it will be said that we had better leave. I still want to make a 
career - I do not want to louse it up” (THE ALLIANCE).  
In THE ALLIANCE, the ALLIANCE TEAMS’ power relied solely on the top 
management’s commitment and authority residing in the respective allied LSPs. Thus, the 
ALLIANCE TEAMS depended upon the top management’s assistance to give specific orders 
to others (e.g., to the sales or marketing department) in order to coordinate the alliance’s 
activities. Lacking this assistance, the ALLIANCE TEAMS relied solely on their individual 
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persuasiveness and personal networks (within and across each firm’s boundaries) to convince 
others in favor of the alliance’s goals and their implementation. This dependence upon 
informal power highlights the importance of these alliance managers’ personal embeddedness 
(i.e., for the recruitment of dedicated alliance team members) for the alliance’s evolution. 
However, both chains of authority are limited in their functioning, as they are highly 
dependent upon each individual member’s commitment to the alliance. In addition, such an 
alliance power structure, which is exclusively based upon commitment and involvement, is 
threatened by any other more formalized chain of line authority. For example, shifts in the 
parent firm’s strategy may impede the required approval for requested alliance adaptations. 
Such shifts in corporate priorities may emerge due to external changes in the environment, 
such as the market crisis after 9/11, or simply due to changes in the firm’s management which 
lead to it attaching less or even no importance to the alliance. The dependence upon the parent 
firm and external changes also appears in the statement of one ALLIANCE BOARD member: 
“The market was weak and when you already have a slim organization to motivate why you 
should set extensive management resources aside to work on something, that couldn't really 
make any solid calculation” (THE ALLIANCE). The limited authority of the alliance’s 
decision-makers within the power structure of the respective parent firms threatens the 
alliance’s stability (being highly unrestricted in their decision-making) and hampers mutual 
agreements on alliance adaptions among allied LSPs.  
(d) Lack of alliance value  
As THE ALLIANCE did not succeed in creating significant alliance value for the involved 
LSPs, the alliance commitment diminished among the involved parties. Commitment as the 
personal responsibility to satisfy the alliance’s interests and expectations constituted the main 
driving force behind THE ALLIANCE due to the low partner interdependence (both 
commercial and strategic). Commitment facilitates mutual consensus, helping to realize the 
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effective execution of an alliance as well as adaptations. However, commitment is only 
sustained over time if the partners perceive the benefits derived from the alliance. Thus, 
dissatisfaction with prior alliance performances causes a shrinking commitment among both 
alliance decision-makers and executers. My results indicate that shrinking commitment 
emerges over time due to: (i) A lack of improvements, (ii) Frustration with the alliance’s 
performance, and (iii) A diminishing alliance mandate to drive an alliance’s implementation. 
Given the need for commitment and involvement in THE ALLIANCE’s governance (shared 
alliance governance) this shrinking commitment causes significant impediments in alliance 
execution, reducing the likelihood of alliance adaptations (by increased negotiation costs in 
terms of effort and time). Accordingly, the lack of significant alliance value resulted in 
shrinking commitment which leads finally to alliance failure.  
(i) A lack of improvements 
Given the need for collective decision-making on alliance adaptations, strategic changes in 
THE ALLIANCE (alliance set-up, structure, performance) failed to significantly improve the 
alliance’s execution and performance. My results indicate that THE ALLIANCE lost its drive 
as central alliance obstacles could not be overcome (even though they were identified), such 
as a lack of antitrust immunity, fair revenue-sharing and IT alignment. Despite continuous 
work on problem solutions and interventions through the ALLIANCE TEAMS (partly with 
strong support by alliance executers from their respective parent firms), the requested and 
expected top management decisions on alliance adaptations were held off (i.e., there was no 
agreement on alliance adaptations). The reasons behind this are that their solutions (even 
those agreed upon in the ALLIANCE TEAMS) could not be enforced among the ALLIANCE 
BOARD due to a lack of mutual agreement between the alliance decision-makers, and due to 
their limited mandate in their respective parent firms. Thus, these impediments to alliance 
adaptability result from the inherent flexibility and adaptability of the alliance structure itself. 
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The established steering and control mechanisms (a lack of enforceable agreements and a 
limited alliance mandate in the parent firm) were too weak to enforce the alliance’s execution 
against the independence and emerging opportunistic behavior among the partnering LSPs. 
Given the need for alliance improvements - despite the difficulties regarding agreement on 
strategic adaptations - the alliance’s decision-makers decided to place more emphasis in the 
following on joint network management (pursuit by a new ‘network’ ALLIANCE TEAM), on 
shifting the alliance goals from a service perspective towards cost reductions (joint asset 
utilization and procurement), and on shifting the responsibility for the alliance’s 
implementation increasingly from the ALLIANCE TEAMS to senior managers in the line 
organization. However, and despite these adaptations, the operational obstacles remained 
important. The lack of significant alliance improvements which would help to address the 
identified alliance limitations (i.e., in the alliance partner set-up and structure) resulted in 
alliance stagnation. The allied LSPs were conscious about the required alliance adaptations 
and possible solutions, but the responsible decision-makers did not succeed in finding mutual 
agreements among the involved parties on respective change initiatives.  
(ii) Frustration with the alliance’s performance 
Over time, the commitment of the involved parties turned into frustration as the alliance’s 
implementation did not succeeded as expected. An ALLIANCE TEAM manager perceived 
this evolution as follows: “In the beginning we had a quite clear picture. This picture, 
however, was destroyed during the process, because you felt that you were moving with a 
different pace and you were using different ways of solving problems. It needed quite a long 
time, until you agreed on some things” (THE ALLIANCE). The lack of significant 
improvements through collective decisions on strategic alliance adaptations results in endless 
discussions going around in circles and the ongoing downscaling of initial alliance goals. One 
ALLIANCE TEAM member summarized that, after four years: “Many have seen that it 
  
 
136 
makes sense, but they said also that joint IT and a cash box are required. And then we worked 
and discussed and tried. But we never got the permission to take the last step with antitrust 
and so on” (THE ALLIANCE). My results reveal that the personal commitment and belief of 
the involved parties in THE ALLIANCE (also as a strategic priority of their parent firms) 
faded away. In particular, the initially highly committed ALLIANCE TEAM members felt 
disappointed that their intensive work failed to realize the expected alliance effects over the 
years. They resigned as their alliance solutions and change requests were repeatedly denied, 
down-scaled and turned back to them for further analysis and consensus building by the 
alliance decision-makers.  
(iii) A diminishing alliance mandate  
LSP alliance failure is also driven by the lack or decline of a clear alliance mandate within 
and across a firm’s boundary. Driven by non-satisfactory performances over time, the alliance 
mandate to execute alliance interactions and decisions within and across the firm’s boundaries 
diminished. My findings indicate that the missing recognition of top management and an 
absence of commitment (reflected in, e.g., adaptations, investments and top-down devices) 
weakened THE ALLIANCE’s mandate and reputation in THE FIRM significantly over time. 
The diminishing mandate became noticeable especially in the alliance’s operational 
execution. The following statement of one ALLIANCE TEAM member illustrates this 
process: “What happens if the commitment is missing? You'll get an incredible amount of 
frontiers in your own organization, because the employees are permitted to build frontiers. It 
is possible to say: “No, we do not participate. We do not change our processes” (TEAM 
member). Thus, the ALLIANCE TEAMS, as the responsible organizational unit for the 
alliance’s implementation, faced increased challenges in convincing executers to engage in 
alliance activities. The informal authority (and rather small size) of the ALLIANCE TEAMS 
in relation to THE ALLIANCE’s global scope turned out to be insufficient (determined by the 
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alliance structure) to cope with the threat of opportunistic behavior among the involved 
parties. Due to the lack of achieving collective decisions on alliance adaptations, the alliance’s 
implementation progressed slowly despite comprehensive efforts (i.e., of the ALLIANCE 
TEAMS), providing no tangible alliance benefits for THE FIRM. Acknowledging that the 
alliance’s goals were not feasible without additional investments, and believing that they had 
pushed the alliance for long enough, THE FIRM passed the responsibility for the alliance on 
to a partner as its second two-year term as chairman ended after four years. In the following, 
THE FIRM’s commitment to THE ALLIANCE weakened and finally faded away as market 
changes led the partners to refocus on their own bottom line and as new priorities emerged. 
After four years, THE FIRM dissolved the dedicated ALLIANCE TEAMS via an internal 
restructuring program of process and service improvement. The alliance’s activities and 
resources were continuously downscaled to a minimum in THE ALLIANCE’s sixth year. One 
ALLIANCE BOARD member summarized this process as follows: “We have pushed it for 
four years, invested capacities and our best people – now it’s your turn to see how you get 
along (meaning THE PARTNERS)… That was done knowingly, that no significant progress 
will be made in the next few years” (ALLIANCE BOARD member). However, it would take 
another three years until THE FIRM officially completed THE ALLIANCE, after nine years. 
Interestingly, my results revealed that dissatisfaction yields the need for the modification of 
the alliance’s initial conditions, allowing for improvements in its future execution and 
outcomes (Provan and Kenis, 2008: 247). However, it simultaneously increases the threat of 
opportunistic behavior and reduces the likelihood of mutual agreements on strategic alliance 
adaptations among involved parties (both internal and external). This vicious circle between 
an increased need for modification and shrinking commitment triggered by the alliance’s non-
satisfactory performances can cause alliance failure if the partners do not succeed in taking 
strategic changes to break through it 
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4.6 DISCUSSION 
The research questions of this study focused on the alliance failure process, aiming to explain 
the drivers and underlying mechanisms of LSP alliance failure. Taking an evolutionary 
perspective, this study provides new and valuable insights into the “process black box” of 
LSP alliance failure. Based on my findings, I developed a process-based conceptualization of 
LSP alliance failure marked by four alliance stages: (1) limiting alliance setup, (2) an inferior 
alliance structure, (3) non-satisfactory alliance performance, and (4) stagnation and failure 
(see Figure 8). The dynamic of this failure process emerges due to an iterative and self-
enforcing process based on four mechanisms which drive the LSP alliance towards failure: (a) 
low partner dependence, (b) lack of benefit allocation (assumed reciprocity), (c) no agreement 
on alliance adaptations, and (d) a lack of alliance value (see Figure 9). The effects and 
outcomes of these mechanisms are produced by the specific design and interplay of their sub-
elements, driving the LSP alliance through the four alliance stages towards failure. Thus, my 
findings provide new explanations for the drivers (how these mechanisms are activated) and 
reasons for alliance failure (how each mechanism’s outcome was produced). As such, my 
research reveals the path-dependent relations between these mechanisms (as in Pajunen, 
2008). In particular, if the strong top management commitment of the three founding LSPs 
would not have resulted in an inferior alliance structure, then there would not have been any 
foundation for activating the mechanisms of opportunistic behavior causing non-satisfactory 
alliance performances. Similarly, if these non-satisfactory performances would not have been 
performed, the urge for the mechanisms of non-agreement on alliance adaptations would have 
been lacking, thereby driving the alliance towards stagnation and finally failure. The alliance 
failure process emerges due to the combination of these mechanisms. Nonetheless, these 
mechanisms are based on the interplay of their respective sub-elements.   
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The study provides an initial process-based conceptualization of LSP alliance failure which 
contributes both to research and practice. By providing new insights into the dynamics and 
underlying mechanisms of alliance failure, my findings explain the self-enforcing process of 
alliance failure. This valuable knowledge-base may act as a starting point for further research, 
and allows for managerial implications to improve LSP alliance performance. In the 
following, I elaborate upon the main contributions of my study to the existing research (both 
logistics alliances and general alliance management) and to practices allowing for alliance 
performance improvements. 
4.6.1 Research Contributions 
The research results show that the explanation via mechanisms makes it possible to provide a 
meaningful account of alliance failure (as with Pajunen’s (2008) findings on organizational 
decline). Accordingly, this study adds to Anderson et al.’s (2006) argumentation that 
“organization theories will be enriched if scholars expend more effort to understand and 
clarify the social mechanisms at play in their work and move beyond thinking about 
individual variables and the links between them to considering the bigger picture of action in 
its entirety” (Anderson et al., 2006: 102). To understand an alliance’s evolution and clarify the 
reasons for alliance failure, I identify the relevant mechanisms and their underlying 
component parts which are, in their interplay, responsible for the activation of these 
mechanisms driving alliance failure. My dynamic rationale of alliance failure based on 
organizational mechanisms contributes to the existing research of logistics as well as general 
alliance management in several respects.  
First, my mechanisms perspective of alliance failure incorporates the aspect of causal 
ambiguity which has not so far been tackled by the existing research. While prior research 
results reveal alliance impact factors such as partner dependence, benefit allocation, and 
alliance adaptability, they do not consider these mechanisms in the whole system of an 
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alliance. My results provide comprehensive insights into the component parts of these alliance 
mechanisms and their interplay, shedding light on the way in which the mechanisms are 
activated and drive alliance evolution. As such, I provide explanations as to why the identified 
activities and events may be associated with alliance failure (e.g., partner dependence, 
management commitment and dedicated alliance teams) as well as with alliance success.  
Second, my results capture the evolving nature of alliances in the real world. This process-
based conceptualization of alliance failure adds to the existing stage models of alliance 
failure. By explaining the underlying mechanisms, this study explains how the stages of 
alliance failure actually emerge over time. The findings indicate that the process of alliance 
failure is caused by the activation and interplay of different mechanisms rather than the 
implementation of certain activities or events at a given alliance stage. As such, my results 
also reveal new activities and events that drive an alliance’s evolution, such as agreement on 
alliance adaptations, which need to find a place in alliance research. These valuable findings 
of my study may shift the focus from the alliance formation phase towards the opportunities 
and duties involved in the alliance management phase. Overall, a major contribution of my 
research consists in the explanation of how the stages of alliance failure emerge over time.  
Third, the mechanisms-based conceptualization of alliance failure provides insights into the 
relation between alliance activities and the entities which perform them. The prior research 
has focused so far on the identification of specific activities (alliance composition, alliance 
structure and relational behavior), neglecting the parties involved or else emphasizing top 
mangers’ perceptions. However, my research allows for the consideration of the different 
entities which actually perform the activities. These findings reveal that, besides the top 
managers, dedicated alliance managers, alliance executers on the operational level as well as 
decision-makers of the respective parent firms play a crucial role in alliance failure. 
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Interestingly, I identified different outcomes for the same mechanisms among the involved 
entities’ alliance setting (output formalization facilitates alliance outcomes on the strategic 
level but hampers the alliance’s operational execution). Thus, my findings provide a more 
comprehensive picture of alliance failure by incorporating a broader alliance environment.  
Overall, the research findings indicate that the mechanisms of alliance failure are 
activated through a specific combination and the interplay of activities and events initiated by 
different entities. Thus, my results support the view of Bunge (1997) that organizational 
mechanisms are generally substance-specific. However, in line with the argumentation of 
Pajunen (2008), I suggest that this specificity does not impede further research or the 
systematic comparison of my findings (i.e., of my higher-level mechanisms producing LSP 
alliance failure). I assume that the identified mechanisms and their functioning producing 
alliance outcomes over time are likely to be recognized in other alliance failures. Thus, my 
specific mechanisms identified in the case of LSP alliance failure may act as a starting point 
for further research providing for the specific characteristics of mechanisms that may be 
worth elaborating in future research to improve (LSP) alliance performances.  
4.6.2 Managerial implications 
The dynamic process of LSP alliance failure is based on non-satisfactory outcomes of partner 
interactions caused by limitations in the initial alliance set-up and the misalignment of the 
alliance structure. The self-enforcing failure process emerges as these shortcomings hamper 
the adaptability of the LSP alliance in order to realize significant alliance improvements in 
both execution and performances. Thus, LSPs need to avoid and cope with non-satisfactory 
performances, as well as to enact alliance adaptations to improve alliance performances in 
order to break through the self-enforcing process of alliance failure. This is because non-
satisfactory alliance performances emerge due to the limitations in the initial alliance set-up 
(emerging from limited partner complementarity and an inferior alliance structure), allowing 
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for undesirable behavior among partners (i.e., opportunism and change aversion). LSPs need 
to minimize and cope with these challenges. Based on my findings, I identify three central 
implications: (1) Creating partner dependence among allied LSPs under the compliance of 
legal constraints, (2) align the alliance structure to the alliance strategy, and (3) enacting 
alliance adaptations.  
(1) Creating partner dependence 
To secure partner dependence, LSPs need to consider and accomplish the following tasks in 
their alliance planning phase. An LSP which wants to engage in an alliance needs to precisely 
define the strategic gap that it wants to close by the alliance. The fit between the LSP’s 
corporate strategy and the alliance ensures the economic reasoning of the alliance. The clear 
definition of a specific and relevant alliance value derived, e.g., through a systematic and 
comprehensive business case, is required to create meaningful alliance outcomes, and thus 
secures the sustained alliance commitment of the involved parties over time. LSPs should 
select alliance partner(s) who allow it to close the identified strategic gap. Thereby, they need 
to consider both partners’ resource complementarity as well as the organizational 
harmonization necessary to capitalize the partner complementarity. LSP complementarity 
refers both to the market penetration (geographical coverage and customer portfolio - 
Schmotzi and Wallenburg, 2011: 562) and the market competence (business activities and 
core competencies) while the organizational compatibility incorporates the LSP’s operating 
strategy, corporate culture, management style and nationality (Lavie et al., 2012). The 
evaluation of LSPs’ complementarity should be based on the specific strategic gap that a 
given LSP wants to close under consideration of potential legal constraints. Overall, the 
higher that the degree of dependence of an LSP’s performance on the alliance is (i.e., on the 
partners’ resources and competencies), the higher its alliance commitment. Since alliance 
commitment reduces the threat of opportunistic behavior while facilitating mutual agreements 
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among allied LSPs, it increases the likelihood of stable and legitimated alliance interactions. 
However, to avoid too strong and/or asymmetric dependence among partnering LSPs (causing 
lock-in situations), LSPs should strive for mutual partner dependence (reciprocity) to ensure 
that the identified mechanisms hold true for each partnering LSP as well.  
(2) Align the alliance structure to the alliance strategy 
LSPs need to align the alliance structure to the alliance strategy’s pursuit in order to close the 
identified strategic gap. Being dependent upon the alliance strategy, the alliance activities are 
either strategic or operational in nature, requiring different structural mechanisms for the 
effective coordination between the allied LSPs, such as a specific type and degree of alliance 
formalization.  
First, rather strategic-oriented activities among LSPs, such as the search for further 
alliance opportunities and problem solutions (such as the harmonization of products and 
services pursued by the ALLIANCE TEAMS in my case), are facilitated by standardized 
outputs of these joint works. While this finding goes in line with the traditional organizational 
literature (Mintzberg, 1967), it has not yet been applied to logistics alliances. In addition, 
socialization based on the emergence of mutual norms and values among involved parties 
plays a crucial role in coordinating strategic interactions, e.g., realized through the 
implementation of dedicated alliance teams. Through the implementation of dedicated 
alliance teams staffed by competent representatives of all alliance partners, LSPs facilitate the 
alliance outcomes as: (a) the involved experts work autonomously in the pursuit of predefined 
goals animating their creativity and motivation, (b) these teams channel potential conflicts 
among partnering LSPs, reducing concerns in the parent firms, and (c) they allow for 
socialization processes based on frequent and personal interactions, creating a joint identity 
among the involved parties which strengthens their commitment for the alliance.  
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In comparison, more operational interactions among partnering LSPs require a higher 
degree of formalization in terms of standardized work processes. Given the importance of 
efficiency in logistics systems for LSPs’ value, the operational activities among the partnering 
LSPs need to be formalized to: (a) secure the efficiency - and thus the competitiveness - of the 
jointly performed logistics systems, and (b) enable the effective coordination of joint 
activities. The standardization of logistics processes and accompanied services is crucial to 
realize “one face for the customer”, yielding (externally perceived) customer value, and to 
running a logistics system together. In addition, this standardization plays a crucial role in the 
effective coordination among the partnering LSPs, and requires the implementation of aligned 
IT systems allowing for reliable and quick information exchange among them. The lack of 
standardized operational processes defining how to do the work itself, through work orders, 
rules and regulations, impedes the stable and legitimated implementation of alliance 
interactions in daily business, and thus the likelihood of expected alliance performances.  
Second, to align the various interests among independent LSPs, even competing on the 
market, an LSP alliance requires a fair and stable revenue-sharing mechanism. This 
mechanism needs to ensure that each partner gains alliance benefits in relation to their 
individual contributions. This formalized reciprocity is needed to maintain commitment and 
prevent mistrust among allied LSPs. In addition, the revenue-sharing mechanisms needs to be 
flexible and based on real-time considerations to incorporate the ad hoc capacity and revenue-
management decisions among partners required to act effectively in the logistics business.   
(3) Enacting alliance adaptations  
LSP alliance failure emerges due to a lack of required alliance adaptations preventing tangible 
improvements in the alliance’s performances over time. Thus, LSPs need to ensure that the 
alliance is able to enact required changes in order to prevent failure. To secure the necessary 
alliance adaptability, LSPs needs to agree in the negotiation phase of the alliance on 
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formalized alliance control mechanisms based on a priori defined measures, as well as on the 
formalized responsibilities of the LSPs involved. As such, they secure the enforceability of 
the decisions and contributions required for the execution of alliance adaptations. The 
formalization of alliance control should be based on a priori defined alliance performance 
measures relevant in the specific alliance context. LSPs need to overcome the difficulties in 
defining relevant measures and ensuring adequate data collection to realize a common and 
accepted performance evaluation among the involved parties. In the case of shared governed 
LSP alliances, this common evaluation builds the foundation for collective decision-making 
and facilitates the search for consensus among allied LSPs. In addition, the binding 
commitment based on formalized responsibilities ensures that decisions are made for the 
benefit of the alliance’s evolution, facilitating the negotiation process and allow for decisions 
made in the favor of the alliance (despite non-satisfactory results in the first place).  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The study provides the first empirical evidence of the failure of multilateral LSP alliances. 
Based on the presented results, I developed an initial process-based conceptualization of LSP 
alliance failure explaining the underlying dynamics and mechanisms in the as yet under-
investigated context of LSP alliance failure. Taking an evolutionary perspective, the findings 
indicate that LSP alliance failure emerges due to an iterative self-enforcing process marked by 
the development stages of: (1) limiting alliance setup, (2) an inferior alliance structure, (3) 
non-satisfactory alliance performance, and (4) stagnation and failure. This self-enforcing 
failure process relies on four mechanisms: (a) low partner dependence, (b) a lack of benefit 
allocation (assumed reciprocity), (c) non-agreement on adaptations, and (d) lack of alliance 
value. By explaining the underlying dynamics and mechanisms of LSP alliance failure, my 
empirical results provide new and valuable insights into the “process black box” of LSP 
alliance evolution. Accordingly, the research adds to our existing understanding and 
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explanation of LSP alliances and their outcomes (Cruijssen et al., 2007c; Schmoltzi and 
Wallenburg, 2011). In addition, these theoretical contributions to the research help managers 
to develop concrete managerial implications. My findings reveal three main levers with 
respective implications to prevent failure and to improve LSP alliance performance: (1) 
creating partner dependence, (2) aligning the alliance strategy to the structure, and (3) 
enacting alliance adaptations.  
Acknowledging the limited external validity of my findings due to their focus on a 
single case study within a specific context, the study nonetheless adds to the existing 
knowledge by providing new insights that are useful to theory-building in the still young 
research field of LSP alliances. The findings reveal empirical support for some of the 
performance-impact factors discussed in the existing research, but they also indicate that the 
existing conceptualizations of LSP alliances are not yet comprehensive. By providing the first 
process-based conceptualization of LSP alliance failure, unpacking its underlying dynamics 
and mechanisms, the study sheds light on the so-called "process black box" of LSP alliance 
failure. Furthermore, the results contribute to future research on LSP alliances. The provided 
conceptualization may serve as an initial starting point for further investigation into the 
identified dynamics and mechanisms, e.g., by investigating and comparing different contexts 
(such as strategic- and operational-oriented LSP alliances). The study also contributes to the 
development of managerial implications, as the conceptualization provides useful insights into 
the underlying dynamics and mechanisms of alliance failure, and thus into potential levers for 
improving alliance performance.   
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5. UNPACKING DYNAMIC ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY: A 
GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
 
 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
This paper explores alliance management capability understood as specific dynamic 
capability reflected in the continuous development, reflection and reconfiguration of alliance 
management processes in response to changes and/or to shape situations. The findings of a 
case analysis10 employing the qualitative method of grounded theory suggest that dynamic 
alliance management capability consists of four constitutive routines: Coordination, 
proactiveness, mobilization and transformation providing an initial conceptualization in the 
context of single alliance management. The research provides a dynamic view of the 
processes and conditions underlying DAMC routines, allow firms to develop and deploy 
alliance capability to competitive advantages. The core contribution of this study is to identify 
and explore the constitutive routines of a firm’s dynamic alliance management capability and 
their effect on continuous development and modification of alliance management processes 
allowing firms to alter their resource base. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of strategic alliances has gained tremendous attention in literature over the 
past decades (Gulati, 1998). Alliances allow firm’s to alter their resource base through the 
integration of partner’s resources, and thus to realize competitive advantages. Despite the 
enormous scholarly work on alliances, the failure rate of alliances remains surprisingly high 
with up to 50 per cent (Koza and Lewin, 2000). Interestingly, Anand and Khanna’s (2000) 
                                                          
10 This analysis refers to the same case study as the paper „The Dynamics of LSP Alliance Failure“ in chapter 
four of this thesis.  
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empirical research indicates that alliance performance differs across firms due to the 
“existence of differences in ‘alliance capabilities’ across firms” (Anand and Khanna, 2000, 
p.313). Further research provides empirical evidence for the impact on alliance performance 
and elaborates on surrogates of this capability, such as alliance experience and dedicated 
alliance functions (Powell et al., 1996; Kale et al., 2002; Schreiner et al., 2009).  
Schreiner et al. (2009) conceptualize alliance management capability as a set of specific 
“knowledge/skills to address key issues that arise in managing any individual interfirm 
collaboration (…) embodied in the practices and behaviors of individuals” (Schreiner et al., 
2009, p.1399) consistent of three main dimensions: coordination, communication and 
bonding. Given the need for dynamization to ensure alliance success under changing 
conditions over time, scholars interpret alliance capability recently as specific dynamic 
capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Sarkar et al., 2009; Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010). Dynamic capabilities are “the organizational and strategic routines by which 
firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, p. 1107). Consistent with prior scholars (Helfat et al., 2007; 
Sarkar et al., 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), I define dynamic alliance management 
capability (DAMC) as a specific ”type of dynamic capability with the capacity to purposefully 
create, extent, or modify the firm’s resource base, augmented to include the resources of its 
alliance partners” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 66.). As higher-order organizational capabilities 
(Winter, 2003), DAMC ensures a continuous reflection, development and modification of 
approved alliance management routines in response to changes in contexts or conditions and 
to shape situations allowing for sustainable competitive advantages. Sarkar, Aulakh and 
Madhok (2009) and Schilke and Goerzen (2010) provide first attempts to conceptualize 
DAMC in the context of alliance portfolio management. They identify partnering 
proactiveness, relational governance, portfolio and interorganizational coordination, 
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interorganizational learning, and alliance transformation as constitutive routines of DAMC 
and offer first insights into the process of DAMC. However, research (both conceptual and 
empirical) is very limited in this young research field of DAMC and remains insufficient to 
understand and explain the process of DAMC. Given the importance of alliance capability for 
a firm’s alliance success and thus the need for opening the “black box” of DAMC process 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., (2002); Sarkar et al. (2009), this study aims to address 
this gap by exploring and providing new insights into the constitutive routines of DAMC 
reflected in the process of continuous reflection, development and modification of alliance 
management practices, processes, and behavior.  
Therefore, I conducted a longitudinal case study of ABC, a multilateral alliance between 
logistics service providers, and analyzed the obtained interview and archival data by applying 
the qualitative method of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) to elaborate how alliance management processes develop and modify over time. Based 
on the results of this firm level analysis, the study provides an initial attempt towards the 
conceptualization of DAMC including its constitutive routines and processes. Thereby, this 
empirical study contributes to the young research field of dynamic capabilities, and in 
particular of dynamic alliance management capabilities by exploring and explaining on 
constitutive routines of DAMC and thus, and gaining new insights that shed light on the 
“black box” of DAMC process and elaborates on our understanding of dynamic capabilities. 
Additional, these findings contribute to strategic alliance management literature as 
constitutive routines of DAMC can be seen as levers of alliance management to sustain 
alliance performance. Furthermore, with respect to managerial implications, the 
conceptualization od DAMC allow firms to purposefully develop and deploy DAMC in 
organizations. 
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5.3 THE DYNAMIC ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES CONSTRUCT  
Referring to evolutionary economics (Zollo et al., 2002), and resource-based view reasoning 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007), the construct of dynamic capabilities gained a lot 
of attention in the strategic management literature (Barreto, 2010). Extant conceptual and 
empirical research indicates the positive impact that a firm’s dynamic capabilities have on 
firm’s competitive advantages and performance (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002; Teece, 2007). Dynamic capabilities allow firms to 
continuously alter their resource base by integrating, reconfiguring, gaining and releasing 
resources, and thus to face, or even create successful market changes and realize sustainable 
competitive advantages over time (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), inter alia through alliances, 
mergers and acquisitions. In line and consistent with other scholars (Helfat et al., 2007; Sarkar 
et al., 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), I interpret DAMC as a specific ”type of dynamic 
capability with the capacity to purposefully create, extent, or modify the firm’s resource base, 
augmented to include the resources of its alliance partners” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 66.). 
Arguing that DAMC is a complex, structured, and multidimensional construct of specific 
organizational routines (Winter, 2003; Døving and Gooderham, 2008; Sarkar, 2009; Schilke, 
2010), the design of these routines and their coherent interplay determine the firm’s process of 
continuous development, reflection and reconfiguration of alliance management processes. 
These routines are reflected in organizational practices, processes and behavioral patterns 
dealing with key alliance management issues (Sarkar, 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; 
Brekalo et al., 2013). A first attempt towards a conceptualization of DAMC is provided by 
Sarkar, Aulakh and Madhok (2009) focusing on the context of alliance portfolio management. 
They suggest that alliance portfolio management capability consists of three organizational 
processes: partnering proactiveness, relational governance, and portfolio coordination. Schilke 
and Goerzen (2010) offer a second conceptualization of dynamic alliance (portfolio) 
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management capability involving five dimensions: alliance proactiveness, interorganizational 
and alliance portfolio coordination, alliance transformation, and interorganizational learning. 
Despite these initial research on DAMC focusing on the context of alliance portfolio 
management, very little is known about the constitutive routines and processes of dynamic 
alliance management capabilities in the context of single alliance management. Due to the 
limited knowledge on DAMC in terms of its constitutive routines and processes, this study 
aims to add to the existing research by providing new insights on how alliance management 
processes develop and modify in response to changes resulting in a conceptualization of 
DAMC.  
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I conducted an explorative study employing the qualitative method of grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to elaborate on and expand existing 
findings and to generate new insights into the yet under investigated research field of DAMC. 
Grounded theory allows purposefully investigation of processes capturing their dynamic and 
evolving nature (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Langley, 1999; Maurer and Ebers, 2006). 
Therefore, this approach is particular useful to uncover and examine DAMC as it appears in a 
lengthy process of continuous reflection, development, and reconfiguration of alliance 
management practices, processes and behavioral patterns.  
5.4.1 Sample 
As case studies allow gaining new insights in yet underexplored research areas based on rich 
detail only provided by founders and participants (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003), I conducted a 
longitudinal, intensive case study of ABC, a multilateral alliance between logistics service 
providers (LSPs), from the perspective of the focal firm ALPHA. ABC was founded in April 
2000 by ALPHA, BETA and GAMMA, three LSPs from Europe (ALPHA and GAMMA) 
and Asia (BETA) to increase each other’s profitability, market position, and customer 
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services through a seamless network, harmonized products and handling processes (ALPHA’s 
annual report, 2000). With nearly 500 destinations in 103 countries, seven central hubs around 
the world and 14,68 billion freight tonne-kilometres, ABC wanted to become “the world’s 
leading logistics system” (ALPHA’s annual report, 2000). To realize the alliance goals, the 
partners build up a dedicated alliance project team as illustrated in Figure 1010. It reported 
directly to the President of the Corporate Management Product and Sales and in this function 
responsible for the international network. The Integration Board led by the CEOs of BETA 
and GAMMA and ALPHA’s Sales Presidents functioned as last decision and escalation 
committee being in charge for the alliance and reporting to the individual corporate 
managements. This board met regularly ever two to three months and was supported by 
personal assistants organized in the Partner Implementation Team. The integration board 
dedicated a central Program Manager who steered all alliance activities and took decisions 
representative for all partners being responsible for the alliance. By playing a double role, he 
had to keep both ALPHA’s and ABC’s interests together. Four dedicated Business-
Integration-Teams (BITs) comprised of and led by partner employees were established taking 
over the tasks of integration: Harmonization of products (Product BIT) and handling 
processes (Handling BIT), synchronization of IT-Systems (IT BIT), and seamless sales 
cooperation (Sales BIT). The BITs searched, identified and analyzed joint alliance 
opportunities and developed theoretical concepts for their implementation in the everyday 
business. Therefore, they met physically every six weeks in Europe or Asia, hold audio 
conferences weekly and exchanged constantly information via email and phone. Their results 
were discussed with the Program Manager and presented to the Integration Board. In 2002, a 
fourth partner from Asia (DELTA) joined ABC to complement the alliance network in this 
region. They took over the lead for the Handling BIT, while ALPHA was then responsible for 
the new build Net Access BIT. Despite, various initiatives to implement alliance activities and 
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to overcome accompanied obstacles, the expected alliance effects could not be realized over 
years, leading to a slow down scaling of alliance activities by 2004 and its official 
disintegration in 2009.  
 
Figure 10 The organization of ABC 
 
ABC is a particular relevant case to explore the constitutive routines of DAMC reflected in 
the process of continuous development and modification of alliance management processes. 
First, the formation of ABC as multilateral alliance constituted an innovation for ALPHA 
(and all partners). Thereby, ALPHA was forced to align their existing approved alliance 
management routines to this new context forcing the execution of DAMC. Second, ABC 
provides a complete picture of an alliance evolution capturing the lengthy process of DAMC 
from the formation until its final dissolution. I selected this case setting of a slowly 
discontinuing logistics alliance purposefully as it is a useful case to gain new insights (a) into 
the processes and routines which underlay the DAMC (reflected in the continuous 
development, reflection and modification of alliance processes over several years), and 
particularly (b) into the underlying learning mechanisms of dynamic capabilities which help 
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firms to improve logistics alliance performances in future (systematical learning from alliance 
failure; codify and leverage of this learning for future logistics alliances). Third, the access to 
former participants from different organizational functions, managerial levels, and partner 
firms allowed obtaining diversified, detailed and valuable insights and providing a solid 
database for theory development (see Table 9). Overall, ABC represents a particular relevant 
case to investigate the object of interest in depth and to elaborate how alliance management 
processes change (or do not change) over time contributing to the “process gap” and to the 
existing understanding of DAMC in literature. 
5.4.2 Data collection  
Data collection took place from June 2011 until November 2012 and refers to multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin, 1984) by including data collected through interviews, internal 
presentations, documents, and newspapers. The primary sources were the 20 semistructured, 
face-to-face interviews (except of two telephone interviews) lasting between 1 and 4.5 hours. 
The interviews were tape recorded and transcript for data analysis. Following theoretical 
sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), I first interviewed members of the ABC alliance 
(Alliance Integration Board and Business Integration Teams). As the cooperation with the 
parent organization emerged as important issue of the alliance management process during 
research, I included participants from the operating divisions and from the corporate level in 
the sample.  
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Table 9 Overview of conducted interviews 
Informant level  
 
Management level 
THE ALLIANCE 
BOARD/TEAMS 
THE FIRM Sum 
Top management  
(Executive Board Member/ 
(Senior) Vice President/ Senior 
Program Manager) 
5* 4 9 
Operational management 
(IT, Sales, Product, Handling, 
Network)  
10** 1 11 
Sum of interviews 15 5 20 
 
* Includes one interviewee from one of the allied LSPs. 
** Includes two interviewees from one of the allied LSPs. 
 
 
The data collection covers the alliance evolution from 2000 until its official closure in 2009. 
The semi structured interviews are guided around open questions aiming to gather 
information about (a) the individual respondent and its participation in the alliance (e.g. space 
of time, and function), (b) the actions/interactions taken to implement alliance opportunities 
and/or to solve problems (e.g. which actions they took to realize alliance goals and/or to 
address problems and why they succeeded or not, e.g. which opportunities and/or challenges 
emerged during the alliance, how did you identify them, which measures did you adopt to 
meet them), and (c) finally concluded by the individual assessment of the alliance 
performance along predefined evaluation criteria (e.g. The alliance was characterized by a 
strong and harmonious relationship between the alliance partners.) and (d) their learnings (e.g. 
what did you/your firm learn? what would you do differently next time?). Due to these 
loosely framed interviews, I remained open throughout the data collection to aspects of the 
alliance management that my informants defined as important and valuable. Thereby, data 
were obtained on the alliance management processes between the involved entities and their 
development over time in order to (a) realize alliance goals and/or to (b) respond to 
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problematic situations they find themselves in. While the 20 interviews were the primary data 
source for this study, I studied archival data provided by newspapers, market reports as well 
as internal presentations and documents including written, corporate long-term plans 
concerning objectives and milestones of the ABC alliance. These sources proved useful to 
verify and provide context to the interviewee`s statements.  
5.4.3 Data analysis and coding  
Following the overlapping, iterative processes of data collection, data analysis and 
conceptualization (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), I gained insights and findings from the data by 
identifying increasingly more abstract, conceptual categories through the comparative 
analysis of empirical data (Suddaby, 2006). As I focus on DAMC understood as process of 
continuous developing, reflecting and reconfiguring alliance management practices, processes 
and behavioral patterns in response to changes and/or to shape situations, I applied Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1998) procedure of process coding. I analyzed the data purposefully for alliance 
management processes between the involved entities - understood as “a series of evolving 
sequences of action/interaction that occur over time” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 165.) - 
and assigned them to an emergent open code scheme. This analysis was guided by constant 
comparative analysis (Browning et al., 1995; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and asking questions, 
such as e.g. which alliance management processes are set in place, how and why are they 
changing or staying the same, and how do the consequences impact the alliance management 
processes in the following. In the end, I produced 228 open codes which were reduced 
subsequently into increasingly abstract categories through applying axial coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) resulting in 16 1
st
 order concepts (see middle column in Table 10). Applying 
selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), I further consolidate the categories to yield the 
four core categories (see right column in Table 10).  
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Table 10 Grounded theory analysis - Emergence of categories 
   
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions
 - Motivation of partners
 - Decision policies - Integrate decisions takers in BITs
 - Commitment of partners, e.g. decision for ABC between friendly related CEOs
 - Agreement on mutual goals - e.g. joint global network 
 - Define goals and targets based on business case
 - Agreement on fundamental conditions, alliance type, name, approach, decision and 
reporting proesses 
Agreeing on alliance 
type, goals and strategy 
 - Integration of decision takers and managers/experts of line functions in BITs
 - Recognition of top managements and partners commitment, e.g. resource allocation
 - Communicate to create awareness (intern and extern)
 - Top Management support, e.g. resource assignment, decision taking
 - Give responsibility to area managers 
 - Incorporation of alliance goals in corporate governance mechanisms, like operative targets, 
reporting tools  
Winning the support of 
involved parties  
 - Assignment of experts of all partners
 - Kick-off Meeting as social event to create commitment and team spirit
 - Working atmosphere, intense, divers but focused discussions 
 - Motivation through e.g. exclusivity and ABC as personal promotion 
Integration of accredited 
experts of alliance 
partners 
 - Intense search and development for alliance opportunities, inputs of individual experience/ 
Know how 
 - Working atmosphere in BITs
 - Benchmark of partner's products and processes
 - Intense search and development for alliance opportunities, including full integration 
 - Search and finding of consensus in BITS 
 - Coordination of BITs and results
Independent, but 
focused search and 
development of alliance 
opportunities
 - Control of BIT's progress and alliance results (problem of measurement/KPIs)
 - Low alliance effects leads to shift of focus from revenues and sales to commercial issues
 - Personnel change and fluctuation 
 - No significant customer vale creation lead to doubts or restistance of customers
Identifying problems 
and rooms for 
improvements
 - Escalate issues/topics BITs can not agree on to Integration Board 
 - Escalation not successful as no decisions/top down orders  
 - Escalate conflicts to Board, e.g. harmonization of network 
 - Escalation, but lack of top down orders and implementation efforts 
Initiating change efforts  
 - Discussion in Integration Board 
 - Discussion with line managers, e.g. round meetings 
 - Call to continue search for consensus in BITs
 - Communication campaign to convince participants
 - Integration Board discussions on escalated problems/conflicts
 - Integration board fails due to missing regulations/governance mechanisms 
 - Integration board fails due to emotionality and persistence on individual 
products/processes/systems
 - Top down orders to realize changes, e.g. harmonized product features, special rate 
agreement
Searching for consensus 
to find mutual 
agreement for change 
efforts 
 - Give resonsibility to line managers, e.g. development of joint sales organization in US 
 - Analysis  and discussion of problem solutions in Integration Board  Einführung eines Bonus-
Systems a la "Miles&More" - Aber nicht weiterverfolgt
 - Call for further search and development of problem solutions / consensus based concepts 
in BITs 
 - Focused communication campaing to demonstrate commitment, create unity and provide 
guidance 
 - Alignment and establishment  of incentive mechanisms  
 - Alignment of corporate targets including alliance activities, e.g. ABC budget
 - Problem intervention through BITs, e..g moderating between counterparts, using pesonal 
contacts, providing information, workshops 
Driving change efforts 
to impede frustration 
ANIMATING FOR 
JOINT WORK
PULLING TOGETHER 
 FOR ALLIANCE 
OPPORTUNITIES
CALLING FOR 
CHANGE
HESITATING TO 
"PUSH THE 
BUTTON"
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Using the conditional/consequential matrix (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.181-200), I related 
the identified processes to the situational context in order to trace the connectivity between 
processes and conditions over time (see Figure 11). This contextual analysis allowed me to 
conceptualize the process of DAMC in terms of shifts in the nature of the evolving sequences 
of alliance management processes explained in the following result section. 
 
Figure 11 DAMC process reflected in shifts of the nature of evolving sequences of 
alliance management processes 
 
Applying constant comparative method, I analyzed and summarized these sub processes, their 
evolution and consequences in form of evolving sequences of actions/interactions along a 
timeline. This method permitted me to compare data obtained from those participants 
involved in ABC early in its history with information available from later participants 
(Browning et al., 1995). To explore the DAMC routines reflected in the continuous 
development and modification of alliance management processes, I identified all alliance 
management processes implemented between the involved parties to track their development 
(changing or staying the same) over the course of the alliance. By elaborating how and why 
they changed or stayed the same, I drew conclusions on the constitutive routines of DAMC 
(see Table 11).  
5.5 RESULTS 
My analysis suggests that the commitment to change determined the process of continuous 
development, reflection and reconfiguration of alliance management practices, processes and 
time
Animating 
joint work
Pulling 
together 
Call for 
change
Hesitating to 
“push the button”
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behavioral patterns in the case of ABC. Four sub processes (Animating joint work, Pulling 
together, Calling for change and Hesitating to “Push the button”) emerged from the data 
each explaining the evolution of ABC reflected in evolving sequences of actions/interactions 
and contributing to the process of DAMC. The shift in the nature of these sub processes, their 
interrelations and impact on the next sub process by becoming part of the conditions are 
illustrated in Figure 11.   
5.5.1 Animating joint work  
Gulati (1998) and Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) among others explain the realization of 
competitive advantages in alliances with the “exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of 
products, technologies, or services” (Gulati, 1998, p.293). In the case of ABC, the partners 
wanted to realize competitive advantages through the realization of a joint global seamless 
network providing more destinations and frequencies and synergy potentials (e.g. joint asset 
utilization, procurement). The first category Animating joint work consistent of two sub 
processes (Agreeing on alliance type, goals and strategy; Winning the support of involved 
parties) describes the way ALPHA allow for the implementation of alliance activities in the 
organization.  
Agreeing on alliance type, goals and strategy  
Driven by positive experiences with multilateral alliances in related business fields, ALPHA’s 
corporate management and particularly its ABC responsible Sales President were ambitioned 
to transfer this innovative idea of a multilateral alliance in their industry to become a market 
pioneer. The friendly related representatives of alliance partners, organized as Integration 
Board, agreed on ABC as a voluntary arrangement aiming to realize a win-win-win-situation 
for all partners and characterized by democratic, mutual decision processes. Furthermore, they 
decided on a strategy program striving for successive integration primary based on product 
harmonization to appear on the market as one company. Starting with process and standard 
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harmonization, they kept cross-owner shipments as further integration steps depending on the 
alliance’s development. The integration was carried out along mutual defined goals, 
milestones and targets based on a time schedule (graphically presented as s-curve) and broken 
down into operative targets for affected business fields providing concrete guidelines for all 
involved parties. Based on its business plan, ALPHA’s expected alliance effects of sales 
increases of 0,5 up to 0,75 per cent particularly through additional destinations in Asia and 
Australia and joint capacity management. 
Winning the support of involved parties  
To create the awareness in the organization for necessary changes accompanied with alliance 
implementation, ALPHA’s top management pushed the alliance activities, integrated 
purposefully line managers into the alliance work and defined operative targets incorporating 
alliance goals. ALPHA’s Top Management exemplified their commitment to the alliance idea 
through an extensive contribution of resources emphasizing ABC’s strategic priority within 
the organization. The resource allocation consisted primarily of human resources assigned to 
the dedicated project team and further investments in its effectiveness (employee’s payment, 
office facilities, travel budget). ALPHA’s Sales President spent the majority of his time on 
ABC and a dedicated ABC project team of own experts (around nine people) working full 
time to realize a focused, professional and systematical search and development of alliance 
opportunities. Finally, the top management legitimated ABC in the line organization through 
sign posted decisions and their acceptance and accomplishment of ABC’s suggestions 
resulting in process adaptations or product feature alignments.  
Assuming that the personal integration in alliance activities increases ABC’s acceptance in 
the line organization and thus supports its implementation, experts and decision takers were 
purposefully integrated in alliance activities, e.g. through assignment to focused working 
subgroups, target discussion with BITs, or bearing responsibility. Especially the area 
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managers were involved as they had the responsibility to realize ABC goals onsite 
independently with their counterparts. Encouraged through regional kick-off meetings hold by 
Integration Board and BIT members and guided by an defined alliance framework as 
requirements for working together, e.g. network standards, harmonized product features, 
special rate agreements, the area managers identified and discussed independently with 
representatives from the partners possible fields to implement the alliance in their area.  
The incentive to realize ABC goals was supported by incorporating alliance goals in operative 
targets, e.g. in personal objectives agreements and dedicated ABC revenue budget, and by the 
duty to perform regular reports to monitor the implementation process. However, as the ABC 
targets were only recognized indirectly in a second budget, the interests of the individual 
organization kept always priority. Additional, BIT members used their personal contacts and 
networks to involve their colleagues and to open them for the idea of allying. Existing doubts 
and resistances in the line organization were proactively addressed, e.g. in round table 
meetings with BIT members. 
Summary 
The mutual agreement of ALPHA’s, BETA’s and GAMMA’s top management (supported by 
their friendly relationships) on joint alliance goals, strategies, targets and resources defined 
the conditional framework for all alliance management processes and coordinate their 
systematic analysis, assessment and development. ALPHA’s top management’s commitment 
exemplified particularly in their comprehensive resource allocation (human resources and 
investments for the effectiveness of the dedicated alliance project team), and in the 
incorporation of alliance goals in the top down devices created awareness for the topic and for 
required changes of existing processes in the line organization for the pursuit of ABC.  
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Additional, ALPHA purposefully integrated leading managers and decision takers in the 
alliance activities (BITs) (a) to incorporate their valuable, practical knowledge and 
experiences in the analysis, and (b) to increase the willingness for changes through their 
personal participation. Besides, the top management incorporated alliance goals in internal 
steering mechanisms and addressed proactively employee’s doubts, fears, and obstacles in a 
channeled way through round tables with BIT members and focused communication to 
mobilize the line organization and push the alliance activities in the line organization.  
5.5.2 Pulling together for alliance opportunities 
Due to the interdependencies between partners, firms need to create commitment and 
mutuality between the involved parties to ensure that they pull together for the pursuit of the 
alliance goals. The second category including the processes of Integration of accredited 
experts of alliance partners and Independent, intensive team work steered by predefined 
targets presents how ALPHA proceeded to create commitment and feelings of mutuality 
among their employees and their respective counterparts to ensure that they all pull in the 
same direction.   
Integration of accredited experts of alliance partners  
In order to allow a focused and systematic analysis of potential alliance cooperation fields, the 
ABC Integration Board agreed on the establishment of a dedicated alliance project team. 
Following Program Manager’s suggestions, ALPHA’s corporate management assigned 
experts characterized by specialized knowledge, cooperative competence, and good internal 
contacts and networks. The assigned BIT members were personally engaged to the alliance 
either through the professional challenge by contributing to a market innovation that would 
demonstrate their leader position in the industry, by personal chances for promotion or by the 
possibility to work autonomously providing space for individual creativity and learning.  
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Independent, but focused search and development of alliance opportunities 
Steered by the Integration Board’s devices, including goals, strategies, targets and time 
schedule, the experts (about 30 in total) were assigned to four Business Integration Teams 
(BITs) looking into the most important areas of logistics business: (1) product harmonization, 
(2) common handling processes and quality standards, (3) synchronization and development 
of IT solutions, and (4) seamless sales cooperation. Besides, the experts worked 
independently in themselves, only coordinated by the alliance program manager and the 
respective partner assignees. As most of the experts knew each other and were accustomed to 
different cultures from prior working experiences, the team functioned very well and 
harmonized. As the experts argued intensively about their individual opinions, but only in the 
matter of the alliance, a professional, open and target-orientated working atmosphere 
emerged. Additional, a clear communication structure was set in place, ensuring constant 
personal contact between project members through regular physical meetings, and 
communication technologies documented by reports and protocols. 
Thus, the BITs provided a space for continuous, joint search and development of alliance 
opportunities, e.g. based on product and process benchmarks and/or individual expertise, and 
thus for purposeful and professional discussions of the partner’s opinions. This very intense 
analytical phase in the first five to six months led quite fast to a big picture of what 
theoretically was possible ranging from “creating a joint IT-Platform”, “sharing business 
fields” to even “merging into one company”.  
Special team building events were organized to commit all participants to the alliance, such as 
e.g. a central kick off meeting with all BIT members, additional social program at the regular 
BIT meetings, like safari tours, fishing boat trips and accommodation in all inclusive, first 
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class hotels. Through the intensive joint work, the members got to know each other and learnt 
to understand the partner’s organizational processes, e.g. in terms of decision taking, 
improving the joint work, personal relations and thus, the overall team spirit.   
Summary 
The assignment of accredited experts from all partners to the dedicated alliance project teams 
(BITs) aiming to identify and conceptualize alliance opportunities with their counterparts, 
ensured a continuous, focused and highly qualified identification, analysis and development 
of alliance management processes benefitting from individual expertizes, experiences, and 
internal insights.  
Despite, the BITs worked intensively for months, the developed concepts rose on one hand 
side concerns about partner integration due to personal consequences, e.g. such as job 
security, personal career, and showed on the other hand difficulties in their practical 
implementation as existing processes and systems, such as e.g. IT systems and handling 
processes, weren’t able to incorporate the required alliance management processes. For 
example, due to missing revenue shared system the partners remained competitors in the 
market impeding the required neutrality of joint sales operations. In conclusion, the 
theoretical identification and development of alliance opportunities were realized, while 
ALPHA faced obstacles in their practical implementation and in the alignment of existing 
processes.  
5.5.3 Calling for change 
As joint work is always associated with changes in working routines, risks of opportunistic 
behavior and uncertainties about organizational performance impacts and personal 
consequences, the willingness to change attitudes is obligatory, but accompanied with 
resistances and fears. Das and Teng (2001) conceptualize this ambiguity as interplay between 
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trust, risks and control (Das and Teng, 2001). The second core category consists of two sub 
processes (Identifying problems and rooms for improvements; Initiating change efforts) 
presenting how ABC dealt with the challenge to realize alliance activities in everyday 
business.  
Identifying problems and rooms for improvements 
ALPHA’s top management established additional reporting processes between the involved 
parties (corporate management, integration board, BITs, and line functions) to monitor the 
implementation of alliance activities. Based on monthly sales reports, providing information 
on e.g. how much ABC volume was handled, the ABC development and its effects. The data 
collection served as base to identify areas for further investigation. But, as the sales targets 
were monitored manually, besides the general system, the ABC targets were always second 
priority. Additional, the assessment of alliance effects relied on general organizational key 
performance indicators questioning their adequacy. Besides these formal reporting processes, 
the BITs collected and documented continuously feedback of line managers allowing problem 
identification and communication of best practices. A comprehensive analysis of ABC’s 
evolution and results was announced and conducted by the top management after two years to 
decide on the alliance further development (exit/further integration).  
Based on the identification, problems and conflicts were escalated to and primarily addressed 
by the BITs. Problem interventions involved focused communication campaigns, discussions 
and workshops at all important hubs in the world aiming to moderate purposefully between 
counterparts, demonstrate commitment and to provide guidance, like e.g. related to antitrust 
or information management.  
Due to their comprehensive alliance know how and their personal contacts, they usually 
succeeded in their problem interventions and convinced involved parties of the alliance. 
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However, the created alliance spirit evaporated by the first incident between the partners, and 
the BITs were not able to intervene in all these conflicts or problematic situations worldwide 
due to their limited resources. Therefore, the ABC integration board decided to give more 
responsibility of alliance implementation in the hand of the regional managers while the BITs 
role continuously changed from action driver to moderator. The transfer of alliance idea into 
the country organizations was carried out with mixed success. It depended heavily on the 
individual’s openness and willingness and on the competitive situation between the partners 
onsite as steering mechanisms were limited.  
Driven by internal feedback, problem escalation, and monitoring results the BITs worked 
continuously on the development of problem solutions and/or improvements. This work based 
on (a) pooled expertise, e.g. for the development of technical systems to replace the missing 
joint IT System and cashbox between the partners (e.g. extended reservation systems, 
Dynamic-Rate-System to exchange capacities dynamically), (b) systematic information and 
data collection, like e.g. in the case of IT-solutions for failed messages identified through 
specific reports and (c) on individual experiences and creativity, as e.g. in the case of the 
identified need for an additional Net Access BIT addressing purposefully problems in 
network and capacity management between partners. 
Initiating change efforts  
The BIT reported situations, conflicts or problems they could not solve and topics they did not 
agree on to the Integration Board functioning as last escalation committee and asked for their 
decisions. The board members discussed intensively these concerns in their regular meetings 
trying to solve the situation. But, usually no agreement was found and could not be forced due 
to the lack of formal obligation, impeding the expected decision and top-down guidelines. 
Instead the board called the BITs for further analysis and discussions to find consensus. As 
the BIT members had to follow the same organizational restrictions or guidance as their 
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bosses, some topics were discussed over months without any progress, like e.g. the question 
of network harmonization.  
The lack of top down devices and thus, the missing recognition of top management 
commitment’s in the organization weakened the mandate of the alliance. Thereby, awareness 
creation pursuit by the BIT members got even more difficult as line manager’s resistance to 
align themselves with the alliance requirements increased. This resistance based on the lack of 
understanding the need to change approved processes, coupled with uncertainties about 
performance effects and personal consequences. In consequence, the BIT members asked for 
a stronger corporate management commitment including the level of seniority exemplified 
through clear top down decisions and orders allowing the BITs to realize alliance activities. 
Like, e.g. ALPHA accepted the suggestions of favorable rate agreements to increase partner’s 
trust in ABC and ordered their implementation against resistance of senior managers. 
However, the ABC realization remained predominantly limited to the employee’s individual 
commitment and personal contacts between BIT members and line managers allowing 
discussion and implementation of alliance activities. 
SUMMARY 
The alliance implementation lost drive as operational obstacles arise, including the lack of 
antitrust immunity, joint cashbox and IT solutions, and expected top management decisions 
hold off. Furthermore, the established steering and control mechanisms were too weak to 
enforce alliance activities against these obstacles and allowed resistances to emerge in the 
organization. Driven by these problems and conflicts, the BITs continued to develop 
intensively solutions to improve the alliance implementation. However, their findings could 
not be enforced due to lack of mutual agreement between the partners, and the low alliance 
mandate in the line organization leaving the alliance implementation to individual 
commitment. Therefore, expected alliance benefits in terms of revenue increases failed to 
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appear by 2002. As no mutual agreement could be found or forced for the required changes, 
the alliance goals were aligned and shifted more towards (a) cost reduction and synergies 
realization, e.g. through joint asset utilization, and procurement, and (b) commercial 
opportunities addressed by an additional Net Access BIT.  
5.5.4 Hesitating to “Push the button” 
As alliances are “[v]oluntary interfirm cooperative agreements, often characterized by 
inherent instability arising from uncertainty regarding a partner’s future behavior and the 
absence of a higher authority to ensure compliance” (Parkhe, 1993) they are always 
accompanied by risks. Das and Teng (1998) identify relational (grounded on partner’s 
opportunistic behavior) and performance risk threating the partner’s financial, technological, 
physical and managerial resources. Therefore, firms have to balance the risk with the 
development of confidence in partners based on trust and control (Das and Teng, 1998). The 
third category comprising two sub processes (Finding mutual agreement for change efforts; 
Continuous consensus searching lead to frustration) demonstrate the challenge for ABC to 
implement alliance activities due to accompanied risks and consequences.   
Finding mutual agreement for change efforts  
Despite the knowledge on unsatisfying alliance results, escalated problems of the line 
organization, and identified obstacles and requirements by the BITs, the top management was 
not able to agree on asked decisions and/or investments to improve the situation. Particularly, 
the lack of a joint cashbox and antitrust immunity impeded the execution of alliance activities, 
like e.g. a joint capacity management for the benefit of the alliance. 
But, as the alliance was not binding at all, ALPHA could no force the required mutual 
agreements on decision and investments neither it was able to sanction misbehavior. 
Therefore, there was nothing else for the integration board but to follow their strategy of 
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incremental integration striving for continuous convincing and consensus finding with the 
partners.  
Continuous consensus searching lead to frustration  
Over time, the involved parties got frustrated as the alliance implementation progress did not 
succeed as expected. Especially BITs members were disappointed that their intensive, full 
time work of more than three years on alliance opportunities and problem solutions failed to 
realize the expected alliance effects. Their personal commitment and belief in the alliance 
faded away, as their conceptualizations, recommendations and calls for decisions were 
repeatedly denied, down-scaled and turned back to them for further analysis and consensus 
finding by the integration board. 
The lack of required top down decisions and changes and the increasing resistance of line 
managers both hampered the implementation of alliance activities allowing only realizing the 
low hanging fruits of the alliance not justifying the comprehensive investments made by 
ALPHA in the meantime.  
In order not to let the disappointment turned into frustration, rather radical innovation, were 
conceptualized and presented to the integration board aiming to pull the lever of the alliance. 
For example, the possibility of joining partner’s sales organizations into one entity in the US 
market was analyzed based on the initiation of the local ABC Steering Board consisting of all 
partner’s senior sales managers (excluded DELTA). Anticipating that this would function as a 
role model for further roll-out upon successful completion, a dedicated project team worked 
this opportunity out for its presentation in Integration Board. Despite the commitment of the 
local managers to set up a joint sales organization, the Integration Board dismissed the 
concept in summer 2004. Unofficially, this refusal was recognized as sign post decision for 
ALPHA’s engagement in ABC alliance.  
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SUMMARY  
Over the time, the commitment of the involved parties turned into frustration as the 
implementation of alliance activities did not succeeded as expected impeding tangible 
benefits. Escalated problems, identified obstacles and requirements were discussed in the 
Integration Board. But, usually no mutual agreement on change initiatives could be reached or 
forced by the decision takers due to missing regulations. Therefore, the BITs were asked to 
continue in their analytical work to find consensus, resulting in endless discussions in the 
BITs and ongoing downscaling of initial alliance goals.  
Despite comprehensive efforts, the alliance implementation progressed only slowly (due to 
the lack of mutual agreement on signposting decisions) providing no tangible benefits for 
ALPHA. Acknowledging that the alliance goals are not feasible without additional 
investments and believing that they have pushed the alliance long enough, ALPHA passed the 
responsibility for the alliance to BETA as its second two-year term of chairman ended in late 
summer 2004. “We have pushed it four years long, invested capacities and our bests people – 
now its your turn to see how you get along. … That was done knowingly that no significant 
progress will be made in the next years.” (Integration Board Member) In the following, 
ALPHA’s commitment for ABC weakened and finally faded away as market changes led the 
partners to refocus on their own bottom line and new priorities emerged. In September 2004, 
ALPHA disintegrated the dedicated ABC project team within an internal restructuring 
program of process and service improvement. Alliance activities and investments were 
continuously downscaled up to the last ABC meeting in December 2004. ALPHA officially 
completed the alliance in 2009.   
The case shows that despite continuous and high professional analysis and development of 
alliance opportunities, alliance implementation depends on top management commitment. It 
determines the way how involved parties are mobilized, integrated and maintained to support 
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alliance activities. Top management commitment for an alliance needs to be reflected in 
concrete top down decisions and sanctions of misbehavior allowing the required changes to be 
made in a moderate time horizon. In the case of ABC, the alliance project team got lost in 
details, raising doubts about the top management’s willingness to truly realize partner’s 
integration with all consequences, including particularly giving up the own identity and taking 
high (financial, reputational, personal) risks. A member of the integration board made the 
point: “... as long as you have your own bottom line your fairly safe; if you start giving up on 
that, you take a huge step - if you can't balance that risk by having a very solid business case, 
than you will never be allowed by your own owners, your shareholders.” 
5.6 DISCUSSION  
The results of the conducted grounded theorizing analysis represent the DAMC process in the 
case of ALPHA by exploring how alliance management practices, processes and behavioral 
patterns were developed and modified over time in response to changes and problems and/or 
to realize alliance opportunities. Four constitutive routines of DAMC reflected in this 
processes emerged from this data: Coordination, Mobilization, Proactiveness, and 
Transformation (see Table 11 for an overview). To elaborate and add to the existing 
knowledge on the constitutive routines of DAMC, I explain these routines in the following 
and compare my findings with existing literature in the field of strategic alliance management, 
dynamic capability and change management emerged as relevant theory background.  
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Table 11 Alliance evolution and constitutive DAMC routines 
 Proactiveness 
Routine to ensure continuous 
identify and development of 
alliance opportunities and 
problem solutions 
Coordination 
Routine to steer and 
synchronize alliance activities 
between independent partners 
Mobilization 
Routine to win the support of 
participants and create mutuality 
among them 
Transformation 
Routine to identify, initiate and drive 
change efforts 
Animating joint work 
- Agreeing on alliance type, 
goals and strategy 
- Winning the support of 
involved parties 
Identification and assessment of 
alliance opportunities with respect 
to the specific context 
- Definition of alliance 
governance mechanisms, e.g. 
decision policies  
- Alignment of internal 
steering mechanisms, e.g. 
operative targets 
- Integration of involved parties  
Assignment of resources and 
responsibilities 
 
Pulling together 
- Integration of accredited 
experts of alliance partners 
- Independent, intensive team 
work steered by predefined 
targets 
- Intense, full time search and 
development of alliance 
opportunities based on pooled 
expertise, systematic data 
collection and analysis 
- Independent work focused on 
predefined areas 
Communication process to 
ensure intense work and 
personal contact 
- Intense work with partners, 
coupled with social events 
Intrinsic motivation through 
accreditation, attractive job 
description and working 
atmosphere, exclusivity   
 
Calling for change 
- Identifying problems and 
rooms of improvements 
- Initiating change efforts 
Search for and development of 
improvements and problem 
solutions 
- Alignment of reporting and 
monitoring processes, 
including feedback loops 
- Alignment of  steering 
mechanisms to support 
change efforts 
Escalation of problems, conflicts 
and/or room for improvements  
- Systematic collection, analysis 
and interpretation of data gained 
through monitoring and reporting 
processes and informal feedback 
- Define adequate evaluation 
criteria 
- Escalate problems to decision 
takers 
Hesitating to “Push the 
Button” 
- Finding mutual agreements 
for change efforts 
- Continuous consensus 
searching lead to 
frustration  
- Innovate to change the status 
quo 
Consensus-oriented development 
of alliance opportunities 
 - Consensus finding  
- Mutual agreement on change 
efforts 
- Trust in each other’s 
commitment 
- Pulling together for the alliance  
- Acceptance of change efforts  
Drive change efforts 
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5.6.1 Coordination 
Given the importance to coordinate the interdependencies between alliance partners, DAMC 
involves coordination routines to steer and synchronize alliance activities between partners for 
the pursuit of joint alliance goals. In line with scholars of dynamic alliance management 
capability, coordination consists of the mutual agreement on alliance type, goals, strategies, 
and targets, the assignment of responsibilities, tasks, rules, and the definition of governance 
mechanisms, resource, including decision policies and steering mechanisms allowing to force 
decisions and penalize misbehavior among partners (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Sarkar et al., 
2009; Brekalo et al., 2013). Additional, coordination routine comprises the realization and 
maintenance of efficient communication processes. Efficient communication is the timely, 
accurate, and complete knowledge and information sharing processes (including formal and 
informal information) between independent partners required to synchronize each other’s 
activities (Schreiner et al., 2009). Therefore, firms need to have knowledge and skills on 
selection and establishment of adequate communication systems and modes, such as e.g. IT 
systems and software, and common rules and standards, such as e.g. minutes and protocols of 
meetings and regular status reports, and interpretation of messages. Scholars among Kale et 
al. (2002) argue that the formation of a dedicated alliance team, as in the case of ABC, allow 
organizations to “capture, integrate, and disseminate alliance-management know-how” 
allowing for learning effects (Kale et al., 2002, p.750) in the alliance management. This 
learning curve could be identified, but was limited to the BITs in ABC. Due to the importance 
of coordination in the context of alliance and in line with existing alliance management 
capability literature (Dyer, 1998; Sarkar et al., 2009; Schreiner et al., 2009; Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010), I suggest coordination routine as one of the constitutive routines of DAMC.  
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5.6.2 Proactiveness 
The purpose of alliances is the implementation of alliance opportunities aiming to realize 
competitive advantages. Therefore, DAMC consists of a proactive routine ensuring 
continuous identification and development of alliance opportunities, obstacles and rooms for 
improvements for the pursuit of alliance implementation. Scholars refer to this ability as 
alliance or partnering proactiveness (Gulati, 1999; Sarkar et al., 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 
2010) as “a firm’s engagement in discovering and acting on new partnering opportunities 
ahead of competitors” (Sakar et al., 2009, p.587). The ongoing development of alliance 
opportunities and problem solutions requires comprehensive expertise and resources, such as 
personnel and time resources. In the case of ABC, this proactiveness was ensured through the 
formation of a dedicated alliance team of experts striving for ongoing, mutual and target-
oriented development of alliance opportunities and problem solutions based on pooled 
expertise and systematic data collection and analysis.   
 
5.6.3 Mobilization 
As alliance implementation is accompanied by the alignment of existing and approved 
organizational processes and business logic, DAMC comprises a mobilization routine to win 
the commitment of involved parties and to create feelings of mutuality among them allowing 
for sustainable alliance implementation. To mobilize employees in the organization for the 
pursuit of alliance goals, they need to be aware and convinced of the alliance through (a) an 
effective communication process (Why? What it is in it for us and you? How? When? What 
are the consequences?) and (b) the recognition of top management’s commitment reflected in 
formal coordination and steering mechanisms, rules and resources assignments. Additional, 
firms have to create mutuality allowing for the alignment of partner’s individual interests to 
ensure that they act in concert for the joint alliance goals.  
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As individuals get psychologically linked to each other through processes of social integration 
(Harrison et al., 1998), firms need to integrate individuals, particularly decision takers, in 
alliance activities. Through intensive and frequent personal contacts based e.g. on scheduled 
physical meetings, coupled with social events, interpersonal linkages between counterparts 
emerge allowing to create strong personal contacts. Commitment and strong personal bonds 
relieve the search for consensus and mutual agreements between partners and thereby the 
alliance implementation.  
 
5.6.4 Transformation 
Given changes in economy and alliance conditions, arising problems or identified rooms for 
improvements, DAMC comprises a transformation routine to identify the need for 
modification and to drive the identified change efforts striving for a perfect fit between 
partners over time. Alliance transformation includes contract amendments, fluctuations in 
alliance-related personnel, or changes in alliance-related governance mechanisms (Reuer and 
Zollo, 2000; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Firms need to continuously monitor alliance 
activities and effects through systematically data collection and interpretation based on formal 
and informal reporting processes in order to identify problems in the alliance implementation 
as well as rooms for improvements. Thereby, firms are able to escalate the identified 
problems and inefficiencies to decision takers in order to initiate change efforts.  
 
5.6.5 Summary 
Based on the presented results, I provide an initial conceptualization of DAMC in the context 
of single alliance management including four constitutive routines: coordination, 
mobilization, proactiveness, and transformation. By exploring and explaining the constitutive 
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routines of DAMC reflected in the continuous development and modification of alliance 
management practices, processes and behavioral patterns in response to changes and/or to 
shape situations the firms find themselves in, I add knowledge to the existing literature on 
DAMC. The empirical results add to the knowledge on the existing findings on DAMC 
routines of coordination (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Sarkar et al., 2009), proactiveness and 
transformation (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010), and provide new insights on the yet not 
considered DAMC dimension of mobilization. Interestingly, learning did not emerge from the 
data as constitutive DAMC routine even it is acknowledge as determinant of alliance 
capability in the literature. This leads to the assumption that learning in the case of ABC may 
be limited to the dedicated alliance team and thereby incorporated in their continuous search 
and development for alliance opportunities. Additional, the importance of personal 
commitment for alliance implementation emerged from the empirical data, highlighting the 
specific role of partner’s corporate management as driver of the alliance. The provided initial 
conceptualization of DAMC understood as multidimensional construct of four constitutive 
routines provides insight on the constitutive routines, their design and coherent interplay 
shedding light into a firm’s process of continuous development and modification of alliance 
management processes and thus, the alliance success of an organization over time.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
As some firms are more successful than others in their ability to create value from alliances 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000), the study aims to unpack this alliance capability and thus, to add 
to existing knowledge on alliance capability. I define alliance capability as a specific ”type of 
dynamic capability with the capacity to purposefully create, extent, or modify the firm’s 
resource base, augmented to include the resources of its alliance partners” (Helfat et al., 
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2007, p.66) reflected in the continous reflection, development, and reconfiguration of firm’s 
alliance management practices, processes and behavioral patterns in response to changes in 
context and conditions and/or to shape situations in which the firm finds itself in. Based on 
the results of grounded theorizing analysis of interview and archival data collected by a 
longitudinal case study of ABC, a multilateral alliance between Logistics Service Providers, I 
explore the DAMC process to identify and explain the constitutive routines of DAMC. Based 
on my results, I provide an initial conceptualization of DAMC understood as complex, 
structured, multidimensional (Winter, 2003) construct of four constitutive routines: 
Coordination, proactiveness, mobilization and transformation.  
In consideration of the limited external validity of my findings by focusing on a single case 
study within a specific context, the study aims to add on existing knowledge and to gain new 
insights useful for theory building in the young research field of dynamic capabilities, and in 
particular of dynamic alliance management capabilities. Thereby, the findings provide 
empirical support for some of the DAMC routines discussed in existing research. However, 
they also indicate that the existing conceptualizations of DAMC are not yet comprehensive. 
Elaborating on how firms develop and modify continuously their alliance management 
practices, processes and behavioral patterns, the study contributes to the existing research on 
DAMC by providing an initial conceptualization of DAMC, unpacking its constitutive 
routines and shedding light on the “Black box” of DAMC processes. Furthermore, this study 
contributes to future research on DAMC as the provided conceptualization may serve as 
initial point for further elaboration on the identified routines, their design and interplay, e.g. 
by investigating and compare different contexts (such as mergers and acquisition; research 
and development).  
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The study contributes also for the development of managerial implications, as the 
conceptualization provides useful insights on the underlying processes of DAMC routines and 
thus on potential levers for developing and deploying a firm’s alliance management 
capability. In particular, the creation of personal commitment was identified as crucial 
determinant of the DAMC process ensuring the proactive identification and development of 
alliance opportunities and support for their implementation. In conclusion, the study unpacks 
DAMC by providing new insights into the “Black box” of the DAMC process and an initial 
conceptualization of DAMC useful for further research and development of managerial 
implications. 
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